FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1995

Making Peace with the Guilty

A candid report from Bosnia by the recently retired U.S. Deputy Commander in Europe, Charles G. Boyd

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The Sorrows of Egypt
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1995
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Clinton and his team have reversed the legacy of American diplomacy. Unlike their cannier predecessors, they allow rhetoric to drive policy—not vice versa.

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The difference between the factions in Bosnia is not morality, as the Bosnian Muslims and Western press insist, but power and opportunity. All have the same goal: to avoid living as a minority. All have committed crimes against other ethnic groups. Despite its claims of neutrality and preaching against military solutions, the United States has favored the Bosnian Muslims, keeping silent as they launched offensives from U.N.-guarded safe areas. Since air strikes cannot resolve the conflict, the United States must discourage violence by all sides and let Russia—the one country Serbs trust—take the lead in negotiations.

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When the founders forged the United Nations 50 years ago, they envisioned nothing less than a messianic transformation of politics and diplomacy. But they neglected to take human nature and history into account. The concept of collec-

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tive security that they bet on to keep order was dead a few years later—though it has taken the humiliations of Bosnia to demonstrate this definitively. What's a world organization to do in the confused twilight of the nation-state? Traditional diplomats have proved they are better at settling conflicts, but the dream of global community is still alive in the human imagination.

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People need an international system for security of many kinds. But the United Nations today is precariously funded, stretched thin by an unprecedented number of peacekeeping missions, and generally underequipped to deal with the rising demand for its services. Reform is necessary for the middle-aged organization. States touchy about sovereignty and interest groups pushing their agendas must sink their differences and work out a plan to revitalize the world body. They might consider giving it an independent source of income and some standing troops for enforcement power.

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Egyptians are nostalgic for their bourgeois past, still wanting to believe that their country is not just a state but an idea and a historical movement. But in their odyssey through liberalism, pan-Arabism, nationalism, and Islamicism, their dreams of greatness have been continually disappointed. Today President Mubarak leads a country with an exploding population, a fraying infrastructure, and a violent fundamentalist fringe. The sorrows of Egypt lie not in any one adversity but in the decline under the military regime of a once vibrant civic life. The state is all that remains.

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Competitiveness debates have contrasted countries that have industrial policies, like Japan, with more laissez-faire countries like the United States. But the pivotal difference is the level of a people's trust. High-trust societies are interlaced with voluntary organizations—Rotary clubs, Bible study groups, private schools—and thus have "social capital," which makes for the growth of large corporations in highly technical fields. Low-trust societies—France, Italy, China—tend toward small, family-owned businesses in basic goods. Social capital is not necessary for growth, but its absence tempts governments to intervene in the economy and imperil competitiveness.

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The history of intelligence since World War I shows no dividends resembling the miracles of spy-thriller fiction. The benefits gained by fielding a worldwide team of secret agents are not worth the exorbitant cost. Spies sometimes provide useful information on weapons development and other long-term threats; usually their information is outdated or irrelevant. The CIA should stick to its strengths: analysis for policymakers and high-tech surveillance. Cloak-and-dagger foreign policy tempts presidents into shirking the hard work of diplomacy and politics. The practice has blackened America's reputation and subverted its democracy.

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Ichiro Ozawa, a former power broker in the Liberal Democratic Party, has become a seminal figure of Japan's reform movement. A leader of the up-and-coming New Frontier Party, in 1993 he wrote an influential bestseller, *Blueprint for a New Japan*,

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that helped define the national debates over democratic reform, social issues, and foreign policy. He views himself as Meiji-type leader, trying to awaken Japan to the changes in the outside world. But many of the Japanese are wary of the savvy backroom dealmaker. In any case, his views are helping chart Japan's diplomatic course: a more engaged global role coupled with a resilient U.S. partnership.

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The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

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Comments

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Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Tokyo in March 1994, laughing at a reporter's suggestion that trade disputes with Japan had become a "crusade."

In the past, deeds drove words. Today, words are driving deeds.

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Passing Grades *Mathea Falco* 15

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Rhetoric Before Reality

Loose Lips Sink Ships

Jonathan Clarke

In a wry comment in early 1932 on American reluctance to translate its indignant rhetoric protesting the September 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria into anything more forceful, British statesman Stanley Baldwin commented, "You will get nothing out of Washington but words—big words, but only words." This complaint rings true today. Fine promises abound in American foreign policy, but delivery—as the Bosnian government and others have discovered—is not guaranteed. With the exception of the Persian Gulf War, a consistent characteristic of recent U.S. foreign policy has been rhetoric outdistancing deeds. Expectations of decisive American action, even on supposedly vital national interests, have been raised, only to be dashed. This has been the pattern with China, Japan, Europe, Russia, and especially Bosnia.

In some ways the phenomenon is not new. A predilection for soaring oratory lies at the heart of the way the United States comports itself overseas. The rest of the world speaks unashamedly of the balance of power, the national interest, and spheres of influence. Americans have traditionally preferred a more altruistic and millennial style of oratory. Former president Richard Nixon lamented in 1980 that the American people did not respond well to the "cold cynicism of Old World Realpolitik."

WORDS DRIVING DEEDS

In an environment where oratorical excess is the norm, to convict the Clinton administration of rhetorical overkill—as many have done—is not a novel insight. However, the Clinton administration faces a more serious charge. Its rhetoric may inflict lasting damage on American interests overseas. Today's policymakers are not just participating in a slightly disreputable but time-honored national tradition of overexuberant salesmanship and self-righteous preaching. Instead, they have reversed the legacy of American diplomacy.

In the past, deeds drove words. A hardheaded reading of reality was seen to require certain policies. Those policies were then defended and sold with extravagant

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

rhetoric. Today words are driving deeds. Rhetorical devices—terms like "leadership," "credibility," "engagement," "sole remaining superpower," "moral ascendancy," and "American values"—have taken on a life of their own, a virtual reality that prompts policy decisions separate from any calculation of American interests. For instance, promises not to "coddle" the Chinese issued during the 1992 presidential campaign drove the incoming Clinton administration, almost against its own wishes, to adopt a trade policy toward China that was unsustainable. This betokens a dysfunctional state of affairs. If American interests cannot be identified for what they are rather than for what big words make them seem, sensible formulation and orderly execution of foreign policy become impossible.

PAST BUMPER STICKERS

In earlier, more successful periods of American diplomacy, rhetoric and reality worked well together. The sound bites of past statesmen would have been a fair match for the television age: Jefferson's "no foreign entanglements" to safeguard the early republic; "America for the Americans" to cleanse the Western hemisphere of European interference; "Manifest Destiny" to justify the Mexican War; John Hay's "Open Door" to assert the American role in China; Wilson's "the world must be made safe for democracy" to justify entering World War I.

Like a secret agent's cover story, these catchy phrases provided a facade behind which U.S. presidents could advance their true foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson's warnings about entanglements, for example, are usually cited as the first stirrings of American isolationism. Yet his words were rooted in practical calculations of the national interest: an alliance with one European power would have exposed the United States to retribution from another. James Polk may have been elected on a Manifest Destiny pledge to acquire the whole Oregon country, including modern British Columbia, but he quickly accepted a compromise deal along the 49th parallel with the British so that he could concentrate on war with Mexico. The rhetoric of these statesmen emanated from a national purpose. The phrasemaking—the "public

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diplomacy" phase—came after the substance of the policy was determined.

The contrast with today's practice is striking. All too often the slogan comes first, the substance second—as revealed in Clinton's candid comment in January 1994 that his administration had not come up with the right "bumper sticker" around which to fashion its policy toward Russia. Policymakers reach first for the sound bite tested in focus groups—"enlargement" of democracy, "lift and strike," "dual containment," "shock therapy"—and then try to construct a policy that fits it.

This is even more damaging when associated with the notion that the United States has a moral calling that sets it apart from other nations. American exceptionalism is one of the most pervasive aspects of the self-perception of U.S. foreign policy, yet it is one of the most misunderstood, particularly by contemporary practitioners.

Commonly called Wilsonianism, this sentiment began permeating foreign policy rhetoric at the turn of this century when the influences of missionary Christianity and Anglo-Saxon supremacy were added in. Typical of the time was U.S. Senator Albert Beveridge's comment that God had "marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world."

George Bush sensed that the end of the Cold War brought a need to downplay this redemptive mission. In his inaugural address he proclaimed cautiously that America had more "will than wallet." In general his administration adopted a case-by-case interest-based foreign policy.

Clinton followed a very different approach. He embraced themes of high morality, and in doing so turned back the rhetorical clock. In his first full statement on foreign affairs in August 1992, Clinton said the central question of foreign policy is, "What are our values?" Two months later, Clinton repudiated what he called the "cynical calculus of pure power politics." In his inaugural address he declared that the United States would take action not to defend its interests as other nations do but "when the will and conscience of the world is defied."

CLINTON'S FAUX WILSONIANISM

These words seem reminiscent of such declarations by Wilson as "the force of America is the force of moral principle" and "[America] has a spiritual energy in her which no other nation can contribute to the liberation of mankind." In fact, Clinton's words illustrate a widespread modern misunderstanding of a key part of the Wilsonian legacy: they omit the need to back up declarations of moral rectitude with a willingness to take practical, and if necessary, forceful action on the ground.

Past statesmen did not make this mistake. President William McKinley, for example, may have claimed the annexation of the Philippines was motivated by a desire to "civilize and Christianize" the inhabitants, but he never lost sight of the main prizes—trading with Asia and forestalling German advances—nor that in order to win these prizes he needed to expand the navy.

Woodrow Wilson himself was careful to ensure that, notwithstanding the high moral tone of his rhetoric, his real-world interventions followed hardheaded calculation of the American interest and were backed by sufficient force to ensure victory. Despite his denunciation in 1913 of William Howard Taft's "dollar diplomacy" in Central America, Wilson continued Taft's

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policies when he became president, forcing Nicaragua, for example, to cede the United States sole rights for a trans-isthmian canal. Wilson's decision to intervene in Haiti in 1915 had as much to do with a desire to protect American financial interests as it did with a desire to spread democracy.

For all his moral revulsion over the German destruction of the Belgian city of Louvain in 1914 and his declaration that "America stands ready to help the world," Wilson realized early on that it would take a direct threat to American interests to justify entering World War I. His tough-minded ability to balance the demands of morality and national interest is shown in the fact that he could hold back during three years of trench warfare, until the Zimmermann telegram and German submarine successes in 1917 brought the threat home and prompted America's entry into the war.

In other words, Wilson knew how to steer between the contending poles of moral idealism and prudence. This skill is well established in American diplomacy. For example, in 1824 Representative Daniel Webster, a future secretary of state, counseled against military intervention in the Ottoman Empire, despite his strong support for Greek independence from Turkey. The national interest was remote. Webster said that had the national interest been more immediate (for example, had the problem been in Latin America) he would have advocated a different course on the grounds that "our duty to ourselves, our policy, and wisdom might indicate very different courses as fit to be pursued by us in the two cases."

Webster's careful differentiation between competing priorities is missing today. Those who advocate placing morality at the center of American foreign policy—regarding Bosnia, for example—remember Wilson's uplifting sense of moral purpose, McKinley's rhetorical flourishes, Roosevelt's imposing cadences, even Reagan's stark distinctions between good and evil, but forget that these presidents did not operate through words alone. High moralists overlook those presidents' adherence to the national interest (national rights, as Wilson termed it) and their understanding that without troops on the ground, fine words count for nothing. The calculations of traditional power politics were not as alien to those presidents—including Wilson—as some would-be Wilsonians care to admit. Nor did they disdain the cold mentality of realpolitik.

Failure to understand this properly has led to a faux Wilsonianism ruling the roost—that is, a diplomatic culture that imagines that high-flown words matter as much as or more than rational calculation. By focusing on the public words of earlier generations of American diplomats rather than on their actions, this culture traduces their legacy.

CHEST-THUMPING ON BOSNIA

The damaging effects of this misunderstanding may be seen most clearly in the way that rhetoric on Bosnia from the 1992 presidential campaign has lived on to bedevil American policy in the Balkans.

Clinton was not out of order in attacking Bush on Yugoslavia in mid-1992. Bush's record was neither consistent nor virtuous, with the president adopting contradictory positions on Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and on whether to recognize the new state of

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Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bush policy also appeared pusillanimous, considering the scale of the fighting.

But the Bush approach did have one merit: it aligned America's commitments with its no-longer-bottomless resources. Having decided at an early stage of the Yugoslav crisis that he would not commit American troops to the area, Bush saw that America's advantage lay in giving primacy to the peace efforts of the European Union (EU). "Europe has the most at stake in this crisis," Bush administration official Ralph Johnson stated. "European leverage is greater."

Clinton's campaign rhetoric dispensed with this equation balancing commitments and resources. Discarding Bush's interest-based caution, Clinton embraced moral activism. Shortly after winning the Democratic nomination in July 1992, he demanded that the United States show "real leadership" on Bosnia. Abandoning Bush's neutrality, Clinton said that the "renegade regime of Slobodan Milošević," the Serbian president, had committed "crimes against humanity under international law." He called for the use of American air power.

A month later Clinton described Milošević as "emerging as one of the bloodiest tyrants in Europe." He criticized Bush for undercutting American ideals by siding with "familiar tyrants rather than with those who would overthrow them." In October he faulted Bush for having "embraced stability at the expense of freedom." In January 1993, following his election as president, he stated that his administration would be "more assertive" regarding Bosnia and would adopt "much more aggressive positions" than his predecessor.

RHETORIC MAKES POOR POLICY

Had Clinton prepared to turn his rhetoric into reality, it would have been unobjectionable. It would have meant a controversial American commitment to resolve the Bosnia problem, but it would have been clear and consistent.

The Clinton administration's first pronouncements on taking office made clear that no calculation of this path's costs had been made and that instead officials were now going to try to produce a policy that fit the rhetoric. Facing demands to spell out specific policy steps that reflected Clinton's aggressive campaign and preinaugural speeches, the incoming secretary of state, Warren Christopher, could say only that in Bosnia he had "inherited one of the most difficult foreign policy problems that can be imagined" and was still "gathering the data." It was as if Churchill, having harried Chamberlain from office in May 1940, had announced that the German problem was more complex than he had thought.

The immediate decision facing the new administration was whether to endorse the newly released second version of a peace plan devised by Cyrus Vance and David Owen, the U.N. and EU negotiators, whose work was at a delicate stage. The plan was far from perfect, as its originators acknowledged, but at the time there were no alternative ideas in play.

Criticism of the plan was therefore fair. The question was how to criticize while staying within a rational framework for mediating the conflict in Bosnia. Sadly, the administration's campaign rhetoric conditioned it to make the same mistake: to critique the plan with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative. Clinton stated that what was at stake in Bosnia was

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"standing up against the principle of ethnic cleansing." Christopher framed the debate in similar terms, declaring that on the question of "whether ethnic cleansing is a policy that the world will tolerate, our answer must be a resounding no."

The effect of this language, intended or not, was that the Vance-Owen plan gradually became a dead letter—but without any substitute being proposed by the administration. The new administration's first diplomatic intervention on Bosnia revealed it to be a paper tiger. Drawing on their campaign rhetoric of "real leadership," American policymakers placed themselves at the center of the Bosnian negotiations. However, they were unwilling or unable to support this leadership claim with hard resources or even a peace plan that they would forcefully try to sell to the other great powers.

AMERICAN CREDIBILITY

This contradiction laid the foundation for the stalemate that continues to either paralyze policy or send it in logic-defying directions. Aside from the minor success of brokering the February 1994 Croatian-Bosnian federation, the administration has been unable to help its presumptive client, the Bosnian government, or to intimidate the increasingly alienated Serbs of Serbia and Bosnia into making concessions.

The Europeans have drawn ever-more-negative conclusions about the administration's seriousness. The June 1995 vacillation over American support for the funding of the U.S.-sponsored rapid reaction force exemplified the confusion that has made coordination of allied policy difficult. The consequences of this lapse and others have devastated American mediation efforts in Bosnia and diminished America's influence in world affairs.

Miscast rhetoric is not the only explanation for this state of affairs, but it has certainly played a significant part. Therefore it is worth drawing attention to the role of rhetoric in the Bosnia debacle and applying its lessons to help determine which rhetorical poses might work best for future American foreign policy. These lessons become especially appropriate today, with the onset of the presidential election cycle, when temptations for fresh rhetorical posturing will assert themselves anew.

The Clinton administration's key failure in Bosnia and elsewhere has been to ignore the example of American history that rational calculation must precede rhetoric. Few mind if American foreign policy is presented to the world in the shining vestments of allegorical righteousness. But American decisions will not command support at home or respect overseas unless reality comes first.

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The End of Progressivism

A Search for New Goals

Eisuke Sakakibara

The Cold War was nothing but a conflict between two extreme versions of progressivism—socialism and neoclassical capitalism. Both ideologies set a rapid increase and fair distribution of material welfare as their goal. According to socialists, the way to achieve such a goal is state planning; according to neoclassicists, the market.

In 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, RAND analyst Francis Fukuyama and economic historian Robert L. Heilbroner separately pronounced the end of history and the victory of capitalism. But history has not quite ended. With the demise of socialism and the end of the Cold War, this rosy neoclassical dream has been tarnished. The reasons are primarily twofold: globalization and environmental constraints. Instead, what we seem to be witnessing today is the end not of history, but progressivism, the belief that there is only one ideal end, the unique path to which human beings can recognize.

The former Soviet Union and the United States could be classified together as experimental states, which provided the world with clear-cut alternative ideologies for progress. The dominance and severe military confrontation of these ideologies during the Cold War relegated cultural and historical diversities in all countries to a relatively secondary position and transformed almost all major political problems of the world into ideological confrontations. As political scientist Samuel Huntington appropriately pointed out in the Summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "The conflicts between princes, nation-states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, 'Western civil wars' as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries." The Cold War was nothing but another civil war within the West or, more precisely, within the Western ideology of progressivism. The demise of socialism and the end of the Cold War released the world from a Western civil war over differing versions of progressivism to confront the more fundamental issues of

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environmental pollution and the peaceful coexistence of different civilizations.

The 21st century will be an age in which multiple civilizations compete, interact, coexist, and confront the need to admit the rights of nature. Indeed, clashes will be possible if the principles of tolerance and moderation are not practiced by civilizations. And cohabitation of human beings with nature becomes possible only when tolerance rather than impetuous belief, balance rather than progress, are respected. In this regard, progressivism, which has been the dominant ideology for the past 200-odd years and particularly the past 50 years, has to be and is, in fact, ending. In premodern times, when progressivism was not the dominant ideology, the coexistence of vastly diverse civilizations was the norm, and the destruction of nature by human beings was relatively limited. This does not, of course, imply that we should go back to the premodern age. Universal modern technologies, institutions, and organizations should be retained and fully utilized. Civilizations of the postmodern age can and should share these neutral technologies and institutions while retaining diverse cultures and traditions.

THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM

The events unfolding in the 1990s do not bear out the end of history. Modern Western civilization, with the explosive increase in productive capacity accompanying the Industrial Revolution, has succeeded over the past century in radically transforming social and economic systems in both developed and developing countries, but it has also seriously affected global ecological systems.

With such material and political success, progressivism, particularly neoclassical capitalism, seemed to have become the dominant world ideology. But leading democratic capitalist countries of Europe, the United States, and Japan have experienced prolonged economic slumps and political instability. These issues seem chronic, and recent economic recoveries in some countries are not likely to solve structural problems. Income and wealth are polarizing as the rich get richer and the average family loses ground. Even the remarkable comeback staged by corporate America has only been possible at the expense of household America. European unemployment, despite some improvement, still hovers between 8 and 12 percent. Japan, muddling its way out of asset deflation, is now confronted by potential and hidden unemployment.

Moreover, various forms of political corruption plague these countries. Money scandals have toppled Japanese and Italian governments, while scandal-triggered resignations by key cabinet members are an almost everyday occurrence in most of the Group of Seven. Journalist Kevin Phillips proposes a fundamental overhaul of the present American political system, and French Ambassador to the Western European Union Jean-Marie Guéhenno has declared that the nation-state in this global and borderless networking age has become so powerless that democracy is obsolete, and some imperial arrangement is needed to replace it. Moreover, events in the former Soviet Union seem to have shattered the extreme optimism of 1989. Russia's experiment in shock therapy, which was aimed at swiftly establishing democracy and neoclassical capitalism, has been an utter failure.

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Paths to democracy and neoclassical capitalism are not necessarily unique and depend upon the historical phase that the particular economy happens to be in. As such, policies may be modified and, for example, a more gradualist approach adopted. However, a more fundamental issue is whether or not democracy and neoclassical capitalism are the only or ultimate goals, or even whether any goal needs to be established. China has set its sights on establishing a socialist market economy and, relative to Russia, has so far succeeded in introducing many facets of market mechanisms without major economic or political upheaval. While it may still be too early to pass final judgment on the recent Chinese experiment, it does at least provide a realistic alternative goal and methodology. Vietnam, India, Myanmar, and Central Asian countries following in China's wake seem to be searching for such alternative goals and paths that fit their own historical and cultural backgrounds.

THE NEOCLASSICAL PARADIGM

Many Western philosophers and historians have subscribed to the belief that there has been only one civilization, namely the Western civilization, because of its dominant position in modern history. Other civilizations have either disappeared in the sand or flowed into the mainstream of modern Western civilization.

The advent of the Cold War and the relatively smooth economic performance of the developed countries of the West and Japan seemed to have rendered nonprogressivist thinking out of fashion. What emerged in its place were the neoclassical theories of capitalism that made over the classical model with esoteric sophistication in mathematics and statistics. On the surface, this face-lift looked scientific, mimicking the methodology of natural science. The United States played the leading intellectual role in this process of reformulating the neoclassical paradigm in economics and related social sciences. U.S. dominance in both politics and economics contributed to this intellectual leadership, and the singular nature of the United States as a relatively new country of immigrants made it possible to experiment somewhat freely in abstract and simple principles of progressivism.

The neoclassical paradigm postulated as the antithesis of socialism after World War II had some obvious attractions and was thought by many to have solved the problems of classical capitalism. Through the mass production of such consumer goods as automobiles, appliances, and electronics and turning workers into consumers, mass consumption markets were created. The emergence of consumers at the center of the socioeconomic system laid the basis for a middle-class society, providing the necessary stability for society as a whole. Neoclassical capitalist economies emphasized consumer sovereignty as the basis of democratic choice of the mix and quantity of economic goods against the bureaucratic economic decision-making under socialism. The same consumers constituted the centerpiece of democracy, casting votes to ensure their political sovereignty.

In the United States, luxuries that had once been available only to European aristocrats were now within the reach of many Americans. A pleasant suburban house with a car and a garden were now feasible for a vast number of consumers. This American dream quickly spread throughout the noncommunist developed

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countries of Europe as well as Japan. Although Europe retained some aspects of its elitist tradition, mass consumption and mass democracy made it possible to construct welfare states to the satisfaction of the general public. Japan too very quickly Americanized its economic and political systems and became, in some ways, more American than the Americans in creating a mass-consumption, mass democracy, middle-class society, while at the same time retaining some elements of traditional culture.

THE SHORTCOMINGS

Economic prosperity seemed everlasting, and human progress toward equitable material welfare seemed feasible. Economics, dedicated to the efficient allocation of resources or the optimization of material welfare, has come to occupy a central position in the various disciplines of the social sciences. Mechanical and electronic engineering have also significantly improved their relative status among disciplines of the natural sciences. Technological innovation and economic growth became the key concepts in this neoclassical mass consumption world. National income statistics centering on the flow of goods from production to consumption have been compiled in all the major developed countries, and economic policies have focused their attention on GNP and its components. As long as engineers and corporations continuously churned out technological innovations, and policy authorities properly managed macroeconomic matters, the everlasting progress of the neoclassical capitalist regime was thought to be guaranteed.

But this model has two major shortcomings. First, the notion that essentially laissez-faire economic management leads to consumer sovereignty is based on various assumptions, the most important of which is that factors of production, labor and capital, do not move across borders. The globalization of financial capital as well as the relatively free movement of what Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has called "symbolic analysts" directly violate this assumption. This globalization with economies of scale leads to oligopolization of the world market, inviting strategic trade rather than free trade. More important, the interests of multinational corporations and those of workers and consumers start to diverge, and the cohesion of the nation-state as an economic unit disintegrates.

In a regime where movements of factors of production are relatively scarce, gains obtained by trading corporations are distributed to a certain degree to workers and consumers. Even under globalization, oligopolistic competition takes place despite some economic concentration, and one can argue that consumer benefit remains. However, the outcome is uncertain, and even with consumer benefit, the new polarization is a major blow to the stability of mass consumption societies. Consumers essentially have to earn income by working, and the loss of income by some workers divides consumers into two categories, the affluent and the poor, thus undermining middle-class society. According to the 1994 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development jobs study, unemployment in OECD countries was below 10 million in the 1950s and 1960s but started to climb in the mid-1970s, reaching 25 million in 1990. By 1995, unemployment is expected to reach 35 million. In the

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mid-1970s, the share of wages in GNP in Europe, the United States, and Japan started to decline. The European Union share in 1995 is projected to stand at 62 percent as opposed to 75 percent in 1975. Wage discrepancies between skilled and unskilled laborers has widened in the United States, Canada, and Australia, and real wages for unskilled workers in the United States declined more than one percent between 1980 and 1989.

The second problem is that environmental constraints have become visibly binding, and a further explosion in population and geometric increase in energy consumption seems unsustainable. Although environmental damage is said to have started approximately 10,000 years ago with ancient agricultural civilizations, the speed and extent of the damage accelerated geometrically after the Industrial Revolution, particularly in the twentieth century. World population was only 500 million in 1650, and its annual rate of growth was 0.3 percent, reaching 800 million in the eighteenth century before the Industrial Revolution. With Western industrial civilization this number doubled in the following 100 years to 1.6 billion and tripled in less than 100 years in the twentieth century to 5.5 billion. World population is now expected to reach 10 billion by the middle of the 21st century. When world population tripled during the twentieth century, world production jumped from $0.6 trillion in 1900 to $15 trillion in 1990, a 25-fold increase. Consumption of fossil fuels also surged 11-fold from 0.7 billion tons in 1900 to 7.8 billion tons in 1990. This precipitous quantitative increase in resource consumption has been matched by the adverse impact of technological innovation and new materials such as plastics and fluorocarbon gases, which are destroying the ozone layer.

Optimists argue that the causality between greater human activity and environmental destruction is not well established, and that environmentally friendly technological innovation will eventually solve these problems. This is a typically arrogant progressivist view. The knowledge that humans have accumulated about nature and human beings themselves is quite limited. Because natural science tries to understand vast systems from only minute observations, it will never be able to assess accurately the impact of human activity on the environment, much less solve environmental problems through technological innovation. Technological progress may, in a small way, compensate for some human impact on nature or, at best, delay the destruction for a very short time.

THE ALTERNATIVES

The progressivists' confidence in human competence and technology could properly be termed a myth because there is no logical reason to believe such path-breaking technological change will occur. It is akin to believing that someday the savior will come down to earth in the form of technological innovation and for some reason reverse all the problems that past progress has wrought. This myth of technological innovation parallels unswerving faith in economic growth. Despite the structural nature of the problems of inequality and pollution at hand, many economists and politicians paradoxically believe or try to convince themselves that economic growth can solve them. But is this really a logical proposition? It is precisely because of

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economic growth that the population explosion, rapacious energy consumption, and environmental destruction have proceeded so rapidly and that polarization of the world population into the affluent, poor, and abjectly deprived seems to be reaching its limit. Rather than relying on myths and blind faith, it is time to face up to the reality of the situation and reexamine environmental problems in a more diffident and logical manner.

The rapid erosion of the neoclassical paradigm throws us back to the pre–World War II situation where people and nations tried to identify themselves with civilizations rather than progress. Huntington is right when he says that "civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interaction among seven or eight civilizations." But the reemergence of civilization consciousness is directly related to deep disillusionment with the ideology of progressivism.

Civilizations do indeed rise and fall and often clash with each other, but more important, they have interacted and coexisted throughout most of history. The universality of technology is often seen as the universality of Western civilization. But it is now well known that black gunpowder, the compass, and typeset printing, which were thought of as inventions of the Western Renaissance, originated in Sung China. This view that Western culture is singular while some technologies are universal was widely adhered to by Japanese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who advocated modernization through "Western technology and Oriental philosophy." It should also be noted that a modern standing army and well-organized bureaucracy existed in the eighth-century Abbasid Islamic empire.

Not universality but domination has produced the ascendance of the West. The clash of civilizations is not the unavoidable result of coexisting civilizations, but rather the result of contact with Western progressivism. In the past, civilizations have peacefully coexisted. The Abbasid and following Islamic empires were relatively tolerant regarding the cultures and religions of the peripheral parts of their empires: for example in India, Hinduism and the caste system were retained to avoid confrontation with Indian tradition. Muslim merchants engaged in global trade from Africa to China. The Abbasid and following Islamic empires were probably the first civilizations where the commercial activities of merchants occupied a central place in society, along with the wide use of money and joint-venture corporate organizations. The Asian continent was therefore characterized for a period of more than 1,000 years by the interaction and coexistence of various civilizations. The major dominance-subjugation relationship emerged only when these Asian civilizations encountered modern Western civilization.

Similarly, the progressivist dominance of nature, or anthropocentrism, must be confronted head-on. Given the severity of environmental constraints, harmony and cohabitation with nature rather than conquest and development should be respected. The urbanization that started with the rise of civilization created an artificial environment detached from nature and encouraged an anthropocentric attitude. The large-scale destruction of nature started with the advent of

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agricultural civilization and urbanization. Destructive activities accelerated dramatically after the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of modern Western civilization. Cartesian rationalism reemphasized human beings as the center of nature, culminating in Marx's extreme anthropocentric belief in natural science and everlasting progress.

By contrast, premodern philosophies and religions, particularly Eastern ones, respect nature and the environment. In Japanese Shintoism there is no clear-cut demarcation between nature and human beings. In certain sects of Buddhism, forests and woods are considered sacred places, and many temples are built deep in the forests where monks undergo spiritual training.

The premodern Asian experience of relatively peaceful coexistence between civilizations as well as with the environment should be remembered. Moreover, conflicts or clashes between various civilizations must be avoided in view of the detrimental impact of modern wars, possibly including nuclear and chemical weapons, on the environment. In view of this more than 1,000-year experience, it seems possible that diverse civilizations can coexist peacefully if tolerance and moderation are practiced.

THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS

Asia, which has the oldest and most diverse civilizations in the world, will probably become the main stage for action in the 21st century. It is well suited for this experiment because it has the longest history of such competition and interaction. The coexistence of diverse civilizations before the eighteenth century was possible due to the global networking of Islamic, Indian, and Chinese merchants—in other words, a system of exchange akin to global capitalism encompassed a large number of very diverse civilizations. In this sense, globalization amid diversity is nothing new, and the prospects for success are not unduly small.

However, civilizations such as the West and Islam must practice tolerance. In particular, the West must abandon sectarian progressivism in favor of respect for the environment and tolerance for other civilizations. Today's ongoing globalization is quite different from past versions in that, as a result of revolutionary technological progress in information and communications, it involves simultaneous or real-time transfers of information and technology. This contributes to the acceleration of changes due to globalization and may cause substantial difficulties for the adaptation of cultures to technology. Compared to past periods of globalization with cultural diversities, environmental constraints are more absolutely binding.

These constraints will make mutual accommodations between civilizations more difficult, particularly between the affluent and less affluent. To the extent that these new conditions exist, this is a new experiment in again making globalization compatible with cultural diversity. During the Cold War, two versions of progressivism suppressed the most important process of history, interaction and accommodation between diverse civilizations. After some 50 years, the normal process of history has started to move again. What we are witnessing is not the end of history but a fresh start.

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Passing Grades

Branding Nations Won't Resolve the U.S. Drug Problem

Mathea Falco

In the evolving foreign policy of the post–Cold War world, Americans increasingly demand that U.S. diplomacy advance domestic interests. Nowhere is this more striking than in the most recent development in the U.S. drug war: the assigning of annual pass-fail grades, known as "certifications" or "decertifications," to other countries for their anti-narcotics efforts. The consequences of failure appear severe: the cutoff of U.S. aid, U.S. opposition to World Bank and other multilateral development loans, and the stigma of being branded a drug-trafficking nation.

A CHANCE TO FLEX

Although the annual certification process has attracted little attention in the United States, it is big news overseas, particularly in Latin American and South Asian countries where drug production proliferates. For U.S. officials, certification provides an opportunity for unilateral action and a display of power at a time when many foreign observers are questioning the leadership role of the United States.

Certification was imposed on the executive branch by Congress in 1986, the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic that swept American cities and made drug abuse the public's top concern. The intent was to put teeth into U.S. international drug control efforts by, among other things, requiring the president to determine each year whether the governments of major drug-producing countries have fully cooperated with the United States in curtailing illicit production and trafficking. Countries deemed cooperative are certified, and those that are not are decertified.

However, in cases where a cutoff of U.S. and multilateral aid would jeopardize vital U.S. interests, a "national interest" exception is allowed for countries that would otherwise be decertified. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which makes the initial certification recommendations to the secretary of state and the president, explains these decisions at length in the International Narcotics

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MATHEA FALCO, President of Drug Strategies, a nonprofit policy group in Washington, D.C., was Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters from 1977 to 1981.

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Control Strategy Report, published in March of each year.

SUPPRESSING THE SURGE

Blaming foreigners for America's drug epidemics is not new. Since the early decades of this century, when laws prohibiting heroin and cocaine possession and use were passed, drugs have been viewed as essentially a foreign problem best controlled through law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication in drug-producing countries. The Hague Opium Convention of 1912, which committed nations to restricting opium production, established an enduring assumption for U.S. enforcement strategy: tough international measures to destroy drugs at their foreign sources curtail domestic drug abuse.

When illegal drug use surged across the United States in the mid-1960s, the government responded by stepping up international drug control efforts. In 1969 President Richard Nixon's Operation Intercept closed a key U.S.-Mexican border crossing to pressure the Mexican government into taking action against marijuana and opium producers. Several years later a U.S. senator publicly threatened to have the United States bomb Istanbul if Turkish opium farmers continued to supply heroin to the infamous French Connection. The Turkish government eventually outlawed opium production and, with assistance from the United States and the United Nations, found alternative livelihoods for traditional opium poppy farmers. But Turkish opium was quickly replaced by opium made from the crops in the mountainous Golden Triangle areas of Laos, Burma, and Thailand, and the American heroin epidemic continued to worsen.

Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush shared their predecessors' faith in the policy of combating the nation's drug problems by trying to suppress drug smuggling directed at the United States. Both presidents greatly increased interdiction efforts, particularly against cocaine, which had become increasingly popular during their tenures. During the Reagan-Bush era, federal funding for interdiction jumped from $350 million in 1981 to $2 billion in 1992. As the fall of the Soviet Union diminished a primary threat to national security, the Defense Department was enlisted in the battle. At the same time, support for programs to suppress drug production and trafficking in source countries increased from nearly $67 million in 1981 to more than $660 million in 1992. Still, several Government Accounting Office studies found that interdiction—even with military involvement—had not reduced the flow of heroin and cocaine into the country. By 1992 these drugs were cheaper and more plentiful than they had been a decade before.

GOING TO THE ROOT

Under President Bill Clinton, international drug control efforts are continuing, but with a shift in emphasis from interdiction to eradication and enforcement in producing countries. Given doubts about the results of the multibillion dollar Reagan-Bush interdiction campaign, these source country programs have seemed more promising. As Lee Brown, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, explained to Congress in March, "It is more effective to attack drugs at the source of production where illicit production and transportation activities are

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more visible and thus more vulnerable." Nonetheless, funding for interdiction and source country programs declined from $2.6 billion in 1992 to $1.6 billion in 1995, and Congress is pushing for more cuts.

Voter sentiment remains strongly in favor of America's foreign drug war, despite its apparent failure to reduce drug supplies. A survey last year by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 85 percent of the American public believes that "stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States" should be a "very important" foreign policy goal—ahead of protecting American jobs, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing illegal immigration. Yet voters are reluctant to invest tax dollars in international drug control programs, particularly those in producing countries. National polls by Peter Hart Research Associates this year and last found that two-thirds of the public prefers spending money for drug prevention, treatment, and enforcement in their own communities rather than for interdiction or foreign eradication and enforcement programs.



SCHRANK/CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

CERTIFIABLE THREAT

Certification has emerged as a convenient response to voter ambivalence and congressional pressure: it gives officials an opportunity to get tough on source countries without spending more money. Under Bush, whose international drug strategy relied on massive interdiction and source country spending, the certification process was predictable and largely unnoticed. Decertification was reserved for countries with which the United States had limited relations, such as Iran, Burma, Laos, Afghanistan, and Syria, which together produce 90 percent of the world's opium, as well as Noriega's Panama in 1988 and 1989. All other countries, including the Andean nations that supply all America's cocaine, were certified.

Under Clinton, the process has become more rigorous. Last year he decertified Nigeria for its failure to stem pervasive heroin trafficking and money laundering—the first time a country in which American business had important interests was so penalized. Several large U.S. oil companies lobbied against decertification, arguing that a drug dealer label would undermine investor confidence in the companies' legitimate activities there. The decertification decision held, and as a result the United States canceled $10 million in bilateral aid for 1994 and opposed $315 million in multilateral

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development bank loans (which were approved anyway). Nigeria was again denied certification this year. Nonetheless, that country's prominent role in the worldwide heroin traffic has not diminished.

RULES FOR THE EXCEPTIONS

To date, other countries heavily involved in narcotics production and trafficking but with important ties to the United States have not been decertified. But the Clinton administration has used the national interest exception as a diplomatic lever to try to compel improved performance without actually cutting off assistance. In 1994 Peru and Bolivia, the world's largest coca growers, were granted national interest exceptions. In 1995 Colombia, a major source for both cocaine and heroin; Paraguay, a cocaine transit country; and Pakistan, a prime producer of heroin, were added to the list. The principal justification given for these exceptions was the importance of continued cooperation in stemming the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

With this new emphasis on curtailing foreign drug supplies by attacking the source of production, eradication of opium and coca crops generally has become the benchmark for measuring cooperation. By setting specific eradication goals, the Clinton administration has chosen a standard that is difficult for many governments to meet and has minimal impact on the U.S. drug scene.

In countries where drug crops are the principal source of income for thousands of small farmers, the threat of massive eradication campaigns can undermine already fragile democracies and foment violence. For example, Peru, the world's largest coca producer, has made substantial strides against major trafficking organizations under President Alberto Fujimori but has refused to take on large-scale coca eradication without increased development assistance to provide viable economic alternatives for coca growers. The Shining Path insurgency, which paralyzed the country for almost a decade, drew much of its strength from disaffected farmers whose support Fujimori needs to rebuild effective government after his dissolution of Peru's congress in 1992.

Bolivia, the world's second-largest coca producer, has also refused to impose eradication on politically powerful, well-organized coca growers. A brief eradication operation in February 1994 encountered violent opposition. The government subsequently sought to appease the growers by promoting legitimate uses of coca to the international community. Although it gave Bolivia a national interest exception earlier this year, the U.S. government privately issued an ultimatum—the first of its kind—threatening to decertify Bolivia if it failed by June 30 to eradicate 1,750 hectares of coca, which amounts to about three percent of its total coca crop.

Decertification would have eliminated $81 million in U.S. assistance for 1995 and jeopardized $350 million in Inter-American Development Bank loans. For Bolivia, whose $680 per capita GNP makes it one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, those losses would be calamitous. By paying farmers to destroy the coca quota by June, the government was able to meet the U.S. deadline. However, eliminating the additional 3,300 hectares of coca demanded by the United States by the end of the year may well require forcible eradication, which could bring down the

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government. "Our big problem," President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada points out, "is that the Bolivian people are against narco-trafficking, but they are for these farmers."

PAYING THE PRICE

Although it can be waved as a big stick in U.S. drug diplomacy, what does the certification process achieve? So far decertification has had no impact on drug production or trafficking: the handful of countries designated as decertified are largely beyond the reach of U.S. and multilateral pressure and continue to be major drug suppliers. Countries given a national interest waiver face severe consequences if they are decertified. Even with the threat of an aid cutoff, their compelling domestic constraints have meant that none has undertaken and sustained large-scale eradication.

In the United States, eradication of lucrative drug crops also encounters formidable obstacles: despite federal and state enforcement campaigns, marijuana is now the second-largest cash crop in this country, supplying as much as half the illegal domestic market. Even if the producer countries were willing and able to wipe out a substantial portion of their drug crops, it would have little impact on drug availability in the United States. The supply-side theory that has driven American drug policy for almost a century is fatally flawed. The administration's source country programs aim to make drugs more expensive for American consumers. Yet the largest drug profits are reaped inside our borders, not in foreign poppy or coca fields. The total cost of growing, refining, and smuggling cocaine into the country accounts for only 13 percent of its retail price in the nation's cities. If the United States were able to eliminate half the coca grown in South America, prices in American cities would increase by five percent, not enough to discourage cocaine use. (In fact, coca production doubled between 1987 and 1994.)

UNCLE SAM'S HABIT

As long as high levels of drug consumption persist in the United States, there will be no shortage of foreign drug suppliers. Even if one source—such as Turkey in the 1970s—disappears, other growers quickly fill the gap. In recent years Central Asian republics, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have emerged as important new heroin sources, and the drug trade there is operated by drug trafficking and organized crime networks that are rapidly expanding across the former Soviet Union. Closer to home, Colombia has become a significant opium poppy grower and heroin producer, in addition to refining 90 percent of America's cocaine.

The administration's focus on source country supplies is largely futile, but there are vital U.S. interests to be served by a more effective international drug policy. As one can see in Mexico and Colombia, drug-related corruption threatens government stability, economic growth, and public safety. As a top priority, the United States should work with other governments—bilaterally and through multilateral organizations—to go after the major traffickers and their extensive financial assets. Court reform and the strengthening of judicial institutions could help governments take effective action against drug criminals. Extradition treaties can provide political cover for governments

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unable to impose stiff sentences in their own countries. The recent arrests of Colombian drug kingpins Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santacruz Londoño and 62 other members of the Cali cartel give hope that the Colombian government will be able to break the stranglehold of the drug lords that has so damaged the country.

Durable answers to America's drug problems have to be found here at home, not abroad. Cocaine use in U.S. cities can be attacked far more cheaply and directly by treatment than by interdiction or source country eradication, according to a 1994 RAND Corporation study. The study determined that $34 million invested in treatment reduces cocaine use as much as $366 million invested in interdiction or $783 million in source country programs. The United States should share what it has learned about reducing drug demand with other countries now experiencing epidemics of their own. The worldwide drug problem requires cooperation among producer and consumer countries as well as a sense of shared responsibility. The certification process perpetuates the myth that supply rather than demand is at the heart of America's drug problems.

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Essays



The difference between the factions in the Balkan war is more power and opportunity than morality.

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Making Peace with the Guilty

The Truth about Bosnia

Charles G. Boyd

> English persons, therefore, of humanitarian and reformist disposition constantly went out to the Balkan Peninsula to see who was in fact ill-treating whom, and, being by the very nature of their perfectionist faith unable to accept the horrid hypothesis that everybody was ill-treating everybody else, all came back with a pet Balkan people established in their hearts as suffering and innocent, eternally the massacree and never the massacrer.
>
> Rebecca West
> *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon,* 1938

Rebecca West loved the peoples of the Balkans, but she is not the only traveler to return from there with some measure of cynicism. For more than two years, I have found myself increasingly consumed and frustrated by events in the former Yugoslavia. I have traveled to the region on several occasions and have had the advantage of hearing the personal views of young men and women in Croatia and Macedonia assigned to the American forces, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

The views I share here are the product of seeing this war up close,

---

General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (RET.), was the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, from November 1992 to July 1995. A fighter pilot and combat veteran of Vietnam, he held many senior command and staff positions throughout his 35-year military career.

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almost continuously, in all its ugliness. These views differ from much of the conventional wisdom in Washington, which is stunted by a limited understanding of current events as well as a tragic ignorance or disregard of history. Most damaging of all, U.S. actions in the Balkans have been at sharp variance with stated U.S. policy.

The linchpin of the U.S. approach has been the underinformed notion that this is a war of good versus evil, of aggressor against aggrieved. From that premise the United States has supported U.N. and NATO resolutions couched in seemingly neutral terms—for example, to protect peacekeepers—and then has turned them around to punish one side and attempt to affect the course of the war. It has supported the creation of safe areas and demanded their protection even when they have been used by one warring faction to mount attacks against another. It has called for a negotiated resolution of the conflict even as it has labeled as war criminals those with whom it would negotiate. It has pushed for more humanitarian aid even as it became clear that this was subsidizing conflict and protecting the warring factions from the natural consequences of continuing the fighting. It has supported the legitimacy of a leadership that has become increasingly ethnocentric in its makeup, single-party in its rule, and manipulative in its diplomacy.

All factions are pursuing the same objective: not to be a minority.

To take one example: recently more than 90 percent of the Serbs in western Slavonia were ethnically cleansed when Croatian troops overran that U.N.-protected area in May. As of this writing this Croatian operation appears to differ from Serbian actions around the U.N. safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa only in the degree of Western hand-wringing and CNN footage the latter have elicited. Ethnic cleansing evokes condemnation only when it is committed by Serbs, not against them.

We must see things in the Balkans as they are, not as we wish them to be. We must separate reality from image. Is it possible that all sides have legitimate interests and fears, or does legitimacy remain the special province of only one or two factions? We need a healthy skepticism about accepted "wisdom," and above all, we need to tell the truth, if only to ourselves.

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THE OBJECTIVES

ALL FACTIONS in the former Yugoslavia have pursued the same objective—avoiding minority status in Yugoslavia or any successor state—and all have used the tools most readily available to achieve that end. For the Croats that meant a declaration of independence from a Yugoslav federation increasingly dominated by Serb nationalism and an appeal to the European Union for recognition. The new state identified itself and full citizenship within it as Croatian and claimed sovereignty extending to the boundaries of the old Croat Republic of the Yugoslav federation. Bosnia's Muslims had no such option as they were a plurality, not a majority, on their territory. They were also considerably less enthusiastic about leaving the federation, recognizing that with its explosive population mix, Bosnia seemed to make more sense as part of a larger multiethnic Yugoslavia than as a stand-alone entity. The secession of Slovenia and Croatia left a rump Yugoslavia formed around Serbia and Montenegro an even less hospitable home, however, and Bosnia's Muslims too opted for secession.

In recognizing the new Bosnian state, the international community demanded, and Bosnia's Muslims (and some of their Serb and Croat neighbors) delivered, a commitment to democracy and individual rights that made the nations of the West comfortable with their own commitment to the new Bosnian state. Their approach was tactically sound and, as a practical matter, the only course available to Bosnia's well-educated but under-armed Muslim plurality if it was to preserve its newly proclaimed independence. Pointing this out does not diminish the essential nobility of this course, nor the obvious moral advantage it gave the new state in comparison with some of its neighbors.[1]

In this atmosphere of fear, uncertainty, and resurgent nationalism, first the Croatian and then the Bosnian Serbs—with Serbian sup-

[1] Regrettably, the Bosnian polity had organized itself into political parties based largely on ethnic identity. As the world moved toward recognition of the Bosnian state, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović's Party of Democratic Action and its Croat and Serb counterparts exercised near-absolute control over regions where their ethnic groups were in the majority. Izetbegović's party today runs Bosnia as a one-party state.

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port—took up arms to do what international recognition had done for the Croats of Croatia and the Muslims of Bosnia: ensure that they would not be a minority in a state they perceived to be hostile. What is frequently referred to as rampant Serb nationalism and the creation of a greater Serbia has often been the same volatile mixture of fear, opportunism, and historical myopia that seems to motivate patriots everywhere in the Balkans. Much of what Zagreb calls the occupied territories is in fact land held by Serbs for more than three centuries, ever since imperial Austria moved Serbs to the frontier (the Krajina) to protect the shopkeepers of Vienna (and Zagreb) from the Ottomans. The same is true of most Serb land in Bosnia, what the Western media frequently refers to as the 70 percent of Bosnia seized by rebel Serbs. There were only 500,000 fewer Serbs than Muslims in Bosnia at independence, with the more rural Serbs tending toward larger landholdings. In short, the Serbs are not trying to conquer new territory, but merely to hold on to what was already theirs.

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These are not minor historical points. The twin poles of much of Western diplomacy in the Balkans and elsewhere have been self-determination and the inviolability of borders. In the cases of Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Slovenia and Macedonia, Western nations suffered a temporary lapse in their concern over borders, accepting the dissolution of a U.N. member nation in favor of self-determination. That policy contributed to stability where the will of the population was most clear—ethnically homogeneous Slovenia—and led to catastrophic destabilization where the will of the population was most ambiguous—ethnically mixed Bosnia. One-third of Bosnia's population boycotted the referendum on independence and made it unmistakably clear that it would take up arms if the new state was created and recognized.

There are legitimate concerns over what constitutes an appropriate unit of self-determination; the United States cannot possibly support ever-shrinking pockets of ethnic preference. But the United States hobbles its understanding of this conflict if it imputes its global concerns to the local players. As one Serb officer confided to a mem-

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ber of my staff, he did not understand why his people had been "satanized" for insisting on the same right of self-determination that had been accorded virtually all others in the former Yugoslavia.

War in Bosnia and Croatia was not the inevitable product of centuries of ethnic hatreds. It was created from ambition, fear, and incompetence—local and international.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

No one of conscience can ignore the moral dimension of this crisis. Unspeakable acts have been perpetrated on the innocent. I have flown over Bosnian villages and seen the results, not of combat, but of ethnically based criminal violence, homes within a village selectively and systematically destroyed as the majority population—Muslim, Serb, or Croat—cleansed its community of now unwanted minorities. I have walked the streets of villages like Gornji Vakuf and seen the faces of angry, armed young men staring at one another across city squares and streets transformed into ethnic confrontation lines. No one can visit Mostar and witness the city's historic center—made rubble by small arms fire—and not feel and fear how thin the veneer of civility must be for us all. And as one turns every corner in Sarajevo to be greeted by more destruction, it is difficult to escape the questions, what manner of man is in those hills, and what possessed him to pull the lanyard on his artillery?

But to make rational judgments of policy requires a depth of understanding that goes beyond a transient image or sound bite. For some, the war in Bosnia has become a tragedy of proportions that parallel the Holocaust, an example of plain good against stark evil. For these people, the Serbs are the forces of darkness, responsible for most if not all of the atrocities, the ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, concentration camps, and indiscriminate killing.

Regrettably, that behavior is not unprecedented in Balkan conflicts, and to say that it is peculiarly Serb behavior says more about the observer than the Balkans. If one comes into the movie in 1991 or 1992, a case can be made that the Serbs indeed are the villains of this picture, but to ignore the previous reels will, at a minimum, impair divining the ultimate plot line. And let me dare to suggest that my

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observations tell me that even today's picture is more complex than is generally regarded. The public view of this war has come largely through the eyes of one party, a people, as Rebecca West warned, whose status as victim has been a valuable and jealously protected tool of war. Make no mistake: Serb behavior has been reprehensible. The question is how bad? On what scale? And how unique? Analysis of what has happened is not a claim of moral equivalence, nor is it a justification for the actions being examined.

How bad has this war been? When one drives past the destroyed speed-skating rink and the Olympic stadium in Sarajevo, the eye involuntarily turns to row upon row of markers atop fresh graves dug in the new and largest cemetery in the capital. Clearly, thousands have died in Sarajevo. How many people have died in this war overall? Nobody knows. The Bosnian government has an interest in portraying the number as high as possible: it is a testament to the savagery of their opponent, a cry for assistance and at the same time an indictment of a cautious international community. Until recently the government claimed the number of dead and missing to be about 250,000. Many have been skeptical of that figure, with some suggesting the real number could be as low as 25,000, although other estimates—including my own—are more frequently in the 70,000 to 100,000 range. In April the government lowered its estimate to just over 145,000, about 3 percent of the prewar population. That is a sobering number, but even accepting it at face value and granting that it is unevenly distributed across the population, does that total after 38 months of warfare make charges of genocide a meaningful contribution to policy debate?

Sarajevo is instructive. The government estimate puts the death toll in the capital just above 10,000. Someone has calculated that the city has been hit by 600,000 shells, and some 60 percent of its buildings have been destroyed or severely damaged. Recent fighting, shelling, and harassment of humanitarian convoys have once again increased the city's suffering and isolation. What normalcy that exists there is a tribute to international relief efforts and, above all, the courage and resilience of the city's population.

The city's actual suffering, however, does not change the reality that the image of Sarajevo, battered and besieged, is a valuable tool

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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for the Bosnian government. As that government was commemorating the thousandth day of the siege, local markets were selling oranges, lemons, and bananas at prices only slightly higher than prices in western Europe. At the same time the commercial price of gasoline in Sarajevo was 35 percent cheaper than gasoline in Germany. A World Food Programme survey in May 1994 found that, after a tough winter for Sarajevo, no one in the city was malnourished, and only a small percentage of the population was undernourished. Even the rate of violent deaths had gone down considerably in 1994 (324 for the year according to the United Nations; the per capita rate was comparable to some North American cities and slightly lower than Washington, D.C.), although press coverage and government statements gave the image of unrelenting siege.

Some of the city's suffering has actually been imposed on it by actions of the Sarajevo government. Some were understandable policies, like the restriction on travel to prevent the depopulation of the city during those periods when movement was possible. Others were the by-product of government weakness, like relying on the Sarajevo underworld for the initial defense of the city, thereby empowering criminal elements that took their toll on the population, especially Serbs. Still others were intentional; whether out of individual greed or official policy is unclear. Government soldiers, for example, have shelled the Sarajevo airport, the city's primary lifeline for relief supplies. The press and some governments, including that of the United States, usually attribute all such fire to the Serbs, but no seasoned observer in Sarajevo doubts for a moment that Muslim forces have found it in their interest to shell friendly targets. In this case, the shelling usually closes the airport for a time, driving up the price of black-market goods that enter the city via routes controlled by Bosnian army commanders and government officials. Similarly, during the winter of 1993-94, the municipal government helped deny water to the city's population. An American foundation had implemented an innovative scheme to pump water into the city's empty lines, only to be denied permission by the government for health reasons. The denial had less to do with water purity than with the opposition of some Sarajevo officials who were reselling U.N. fuel donated to help distribute water. And, of course, the sight of Sarajevans lining up at water distribution

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points, sometimes under mortar and sniper fire, was a poignant image.

The war has also redrawn the demographic map of Bosnia; fear, combat, and nationalist extremism have displaced upwards of two million people. Much of this displacement has been forced population movements, the engine for much of which has been Serbian—Serb fear, Serb security demands, and Serb cruelty. When the Serbs took up arms in the spring of 1992, their immediate aim was to secure their communities from real and imagined threats from their non-Serb neighbors. With this accomplished, they moved to connect Serb areas with secure lines of communication through locations in which other ethnic groups were dominant. In both operations, non-Serbs were viewed as security threats and cleansed from the territory in question. In a campaign that appeared to reflect central direction and planning, Serb excesses were common and well documented.

Less generally known are Serb population movements. During a visit to Sarajevo in February a senior U.N. official told me that there may be as few as 500,000 Serbs on Serb-held territory in Bosnia. Combined with the 200,000 Serbs that he estimated are living on Bosnian-controlled land, the Serb population in Bosnia may be only about half its prewar total. Like their former neighbors, Bosnia's Serbs can point to fear, combat, and forced expulsion as the reasons for their movement, although the proportions are likely different.

Serbian people have suffered when hostile forces have advanced, with little interest or condemnation by Washington or CNN correspondent Christiane Amanpour. Late in 1994, when the Bosnian V Corps broke out of the Bihać pocket, they burned villages as they went and forced several thousand Serbs to flee. The same happened when Bosnian Croat forces pushed up the Livno valley shortly thereafter. If anyone doubts the capacity of Bosnia's non-Serb population to inflict ethnic cruelty, let him or her visit the Croat enclaves around Kiseljak or Vitez. The scarred shells of Catholic churches and Muslim mosques as well as thousands of private homes give ample testimony to the barbarity of Muslim and Croat violence, and these Muslim and Croat troops likely did what they did for much the same reasons as their Serb neighbors: revenge for real and alleged sins of the past and the perceived demands of present security. There are times when the distinctions among the factions appear more a question of power and opportunity than morality.

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THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE WAR

THE STRATEGIC situation on the ground has changed substantially since the war began. Three years of fear, combat, and crime masquerading as battle have effected great change. With their enclaves largely preserved, Croats see their future more in their relationship with Zagreb than with Sarajevo. And with the 1993-94 combat and atrocities a fresh memory, they view their Muslim federation partners with distrust, frequently echoing Serb fears of the encroachment of Islam into Christian Europe. Bosnia's Croats joined the federation to get out of the Bosnian war (which they were losing) and have little interest in joining any sustained campaigns against Bosnia's Serbs. This is not true of Bosnia's Muslims and Serbs. Without question, these factions each intend to win this war. The Serbs think they have won already and want the war to end. The Muslims know they have not and are seeking ways to continue it.

Serbs suffer from the general depopulation of the areas they control; economic activity is depressed, and they are hard-pressed to marshal forces. The popular image of this war is one of unrelenting Serb expansion, but much of Bosnia has historically been Serb, and the recent Serb moves against the eastern enclaves represent the only significant changes in their area of control in nearly two years.

Muslims have been largely forced into the central core of the country. This has provided the Sarajevo government with a strong base and internal lines of communication with which to take the fight to extended Serb units. The refugee population that forms the core of the Bosnian army guarantees a numerical advantage (150,000-200,000 to 80,000) and ensures a continued will to fight to recapture lost territory.

Even the Serb advantage in heavy equipment is not what it once was. The closure of the Serbian border by Belgrade is incomplete and imperfect but nonetheless real. It has affected Bosnian Serb access to fuel and equipment. Meanwhile, the flow of armaments passing to Bosnian forces continues almost unremarked upon by the international community. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole's much-trumpeted desire to lift the embargo would be amusing but for the fact that it would almost certainly lead to the introduction of U.S. ground forces. The embargo has been lifted in all but name, to the delight of

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much of the U.S. policy elite. To be sure, since supplies must pass through Croatian territory, Zagreb controls the types of weapons that pass to Bosnia and continues to deny the heavy weapons that could challenge it in renewed Muslim-Croat fighting. Nonetheless, the Muslims' forces are vastly better off than they were earlier in the war. The armies in Bosnia—Serb and Muslim—are asymmetrical in their military power, but they are very closely matched. Serbian successes against the eastern enclaves in July were small-scale operations against isolated, demoralized units. That Serbian units did not attack the government army in central Bosnia—Sarajevo's real center of gravity—is a reflection of this new balance. And time is quite likely on the side of the Muslims.

The distinction among the factions is more power and opportunity than morality.

It is a remarkable achievement of Bosnian diplomacy, and one reinforced by the government's rhetoric after the fall of Srebrenica, that the Muslims have been able to gain significant military parity with the Serbs, while nonetheless maintaining the image of hapless victim in the eyes of much of the world community. It is all the more remarkable since, before the Srebrenica attack, the Muslims had been on the strategic offensive for more than a year.

In this campaign the Muslims have consistently tried to use the United Nations and NATO (with the attendant safe areas, no-fly zones, exclusion zones, and demilitarized zones) as a shield, allowing themselves to weaken their forces in one area—depending on the United Nations or the international community to protect it—while concentrating their forces elsewhere. In the winter of 1993-94 the Sarajevo government stripped the capital's defenses to release troops to fight against the Croats in central Bosnia, counting on their public diplomacy efforts to manage the risk to Sarajevo. It was a near-run thing, but in the end the city was protected by the threat of NATO air strikes and the imposition of a heavy-weapons exclusion zone.

This spring and summer the Muslims excoriated the United Nations for failing to protect Sarajevo, or as one U.N. official privately put it, for failing to do their fighting for them. Almost immediately after the Serb shelling of the tunnel under the Sarajevo airport—the only route open for Muslim military supplies and commercial goods—

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the Bosnian government demanded NATO air strikes, attacked the passive attitude of UNPROFOR, and complained that the genocide was continuing; Sarajevo was still a death camp. Holocaust-like rhetoric was even more prominently featured in government statements following the mid-July fall of Srebrenica.

All of this is designed to enlist active military intervention in support of Muslim war aims. To date this campaign appears to have been successful in guaranteeing the Bosnian government against catastrophic failure in continuing to pursue the military option. The Bosnian army may suffer casualties and even significant defeats, but neither the existence of the Bosnian state nor its control over the core of its territory can be seriously jeopardized without provoking a sharp international response. Beyond this, the Sarajevo government hopes to prod NATO and particularly the United States into even more active intervention. French President Jacques Chirac's challenge to President Clinton to help the Bosnians defend Goražde and the latter's willingness to consider helicopter and air support for the operation suggest that the effort might yet bear fruit.

Last fall's action around Bihać—a portion of which is a U.N. safe area—is particularly instructive. The situation in this pocket is complex, even by Balkan standards. The Bosnian government unit there, the V Corps, was opposed by both Bosnian Serb forces and troops loyal to Fikret Abdić, usually described in Western press accounts as renegade Muslim units. Actually Abdić, a powerful local businessman, was a member of the Bosnian collective presidency (he outpolled Izetbegović in national elections) and had been expelled from the government (or broke with it, depending on your point of view) when Sarajevo rejected an internationally brokered peace agreement. Eager for profit and familiar with operating on the gray side of the law, Abdić established his own state and mutually profitable relationships with his Serb and Croat neighbors. These ties were one of the few examples of successful multiethnic cooperation in the Balkans.

The Bosnian V Corps was still a fighting force, however, and in a series of well-conducted campaigns it defeated Abdić's largely mercenary army. The V Corps then turned its attention to the Bosnian Serb forces that surrounded it, broke out of the pocket, and captured several hundred square kilometers of territory from a shaken Serb opponent.

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

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

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Serb forces were hard-pressed, and to mount a counterattack they had to rely not only on forces in Bosnia but units in the Krajina of Croatia as well. Slowly the Serbs pushed the V Corps back to approximately the original lines of confrontation. The V Corps gave ground but was never defeated and remains an effective fighting force to this day. During the counterattack, however, the Bosnian government and many in the international community demanded that the United Nations and NATO protect the Bihać safe area from Serb aggression. A common theme was the impending humanitarian catastrophe if strong steps were not taken—even though this was a fight that the Muslim army had picked, there was limited damage to the safe area, and Bihać was the headquarters and garrison town of the Bosnian units that had mounted the attack. Finally, rather than work toward a cease-fire to fend off the looming tragedy, Bosnian government actions were clearly orchestrated to create the conditions for NATO air strikes, not a cessation of hostilities.

HOW TO MAKE PEACE

I BELIEVE that the U.S. approach to the war in Bosnia is torn by a fundamental contradiction. The United States says that its objective is to end the war through a negotiated settlement, but in reality what it wants is to influence the outcome in favor of the Muslims. The United States, for example, watched approvingly as Muslim offensives began this spring, even though these attacks destroyed a ceasefire Washington has supported. This duplicity, so crude and obvious to all in Europe, has weakened America's moral authority to provide any kind of effective diplomatic leadership. Worse, because of this, the impact of U.S. action has been to prolong the conflict while bringing it no closer to resolution.

The United States recognized the secession of Bosnia reluctantly, but having done that, it embraced the new state and both praised and supported its multiethnic character. Whether this character was ever real or had a reasonable chance of success is a fair subject of debate, but no reasonable person can believe that a unitary, multiethnic Bosnia is possible today. Nonetheless, Washington treats the Bosnian government as it—and perhaps the best of the Bosnian leadership—

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hoped and dreamed the country would be. It is not. It is the representative of one warring faction.

More balanced American diplomats admit privately that the Bosnian Serbs—like their Muslim and Croat neighbors—are not without legitimate interests and concerns in this conflict. The United States rarely addresses the problem in this light and for much of the past three years has based its approach more on excluding than including the Serbs. Former President Jimmy Carter made this point following his December visit to Sarajevo and Pale when he commented to the author that negotiating with one side, condemning the other, and issuing ultimatums was unlikely to lead to any agreement.

The United States says it wants to stop the war but really wants to influence the outcome.

It is worse than that. Isolation and privation have helped legitimize in the eyes of Serbs the worst of the Serb nation, to make acceptable to the broader population the faction that said the world was their enemy, that they were history's victims and Europe's protectors, that so great was their danger that any measures were appropriate to their defense. Demonization has unleashed demons.

How then is the United States to make tomorrow better than today? The most imporant change is to start telling the truth. The result will be, aside from restoring some moral stature, to reduce the fighting.

To think with clarity about the former Yugoslavia that exists rather than the one the U.S. administration would prefer and then to speak with honesty about it will be very difficult given the distance this government has traveled down the road of Serb vilification and Muslim and Croat approval. But until the U.S. government can come to grips with the essential similarities between Serb, Croat, and Muslim and recognize that the fears and aspirations of all are equally important, no effective policy can possibly be crafted that would help produce an enduring peace. This truth, however difficult to acknowledge publicly at this late date, must at the very least be recognized privately so that a revamp of policy can proceed from clear and accurate premises.

The first step is for the United States to announce, and then follow through by its actions, that it really does oppose a military solution. That would require a cessation of all the nonsense rhetoric about lifting an embargo that has in reality long since been lifted and about lev-

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eling a playing field that is as nearly level as it is likely to get. As long as the free flow of arms through Croatia to Bosnia continues to be taxed by the Croats in terms of a percentage of the total plus a prohibition on most heavy weapons (which the Croats understandably do not want to face the next time they square off against the Muslims), the strategic balance that now exists in Bosnia will likely remain.

By turning a blind eye to these arms deliveries while screeching at Belgrade to stop whatever still continues across the Drina to the Bosnian Serbs, the United States does two things: one, it disqualifies itself as the fair and balanced intermediary in the peace process, and two, it sends a powerful signal to the Muslims that a military solution is acceptable and perhaps preferred, notwithstanding solemn public statements in support of the diplomatic process.

Once established as actually supporting the arms embargo, the United States can gain credibility by opposing military activity irrespective of the source. Strong public denunciation must follow all attacks by Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian government forces, or for that matter Croatian campaigns such as that against the Krajinian Serbs in the western sector. The quiet approval by the United States when the Muslim forces broke the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement must change to condemnation just as stern as that directed at the Bosnian Serbs as they captured Srebrenica. Moreover, an absolutely impartial use of NATO air power against any faction that violates a U.N. sanction, not just the Serbs, must also become the expected response that the United States supports if the antagonists are to be persuaded that violence is not acceptable. This, if nothing else, will certainly help reduce the dying.

The second step is to reinforce peace and cooperation where they are found. The Bosnian federation is a starting point. The slow progress of building Muslim-Croat cooperation highlights the difficulties ahead, but the major failing of the federation is not the pace of its progress but its biethnic nature. It includes none of the Serbs in Bosnia, many of whom live in government-controlled lands. If the United States is not anti-Serb—merely against criminals and those who would choose war over peace—it must address the status of these citizens. Making peace with the Serbs in federation territory and giving them an identity, political voice, and the potential for constitutional options comparable to

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Bosnia's Croats would send a powerful signal to those in Bosnian Serb territory that there are options beyond war and isolation.

The third major step is to restart the negotiation process. In the Washington agreement that led to the federation, the United States treated Bosnia's Croats and Muslims as separate entities, accorded their leaders legitimacy, brokered a deal between the two that largely stopped the killing, sought the ratification of that deal from a foreign power (Croatia), and recognized the validity of constitutional ties from one of those ethnic communities to another state (again, Croatia). The Contact Group's approach to Bosnia's Serbs (largely driven by U.S. pressure) has been decidedly different—a take-it-or-leave-it map. Under these circumstances there are no incentives for the Bosnian government to negotiate or compromise. That leaves the Serbs with three choices: accept the Contact Group plan, respond to government military action, or drastically increase the level of violence to force a military decision. The current map is unacceptable, so the fighting continues.

A key to restarting the negotiation process may lie with the nation that has quietly, but continuously, been marginalized: Russia. The United States' apparent desire to minimize Russia's involvement in the peace process is difficult to comprehend but may be rooted in two fears: that Russia would balk at using the peace process to advance for the Muslims diplomatically what they could not achieve militarily; and that Russia, currently on the sidelines in the international community, would gain considerable prestige and renewed diplomatic status from a success in brokering a solution to the conflict.

Whether these fears existed or were justified in the past is no longer relevant. The United States has now reached the point where the Russians may be its best hope for facilitating a diplomatic solution. The United States, for reasons of credibility, cannot do so; it can talk effectively with only two sides and therefore is not in a position to lead the diplomatic effort. Likewise, the United States has co-opted the other players of the Contact Group, except Russia. In this regard, the Russians are untainted and have more credibility with the Serbs. Perhaps only they can address the Serbs' deepest fears and give them the confidence no other party has been interested in providing. And the Russians may like this new role. It would give them foreign policy stature in the wake of their debacle in Chechnya and a chance

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to prove their willingness and ability to play a constructive diplomatic role. More important, it would give the West new hope for settling the conflict diplomatically where no other option seems viable. This significant role comes with a risk, but at this stage it is a worthwhile price the United States may have to pay to stop the war. If the marginalization of Russia has not alienated the latter beyond redemption, the United States should seek its full partnership immediately.

The hour is late in Bosnia. By the time you read this, the United States may not be able to prevent the withdrawal of U.N. forces; it may even be beyond its ability to resist the pressures to deploy American ground troops, goaded by a strangely bellicose press and anxious allies. But if the United States is to insert itself, it should do so without illusion. Without a determined policy choice to the contrary, it would in fact be entering not to reinforce the peace, but rather to help one faction win, a faction that has been maneuvering for such intervention since the Bosnian state was created. It would be allowing its European allies who, until now, have had the lead militarily in the Balkans, to transfer the tar now stuck to their fingers to the United States' and force America to assume the moral responsibility for the outcome of the conflict.

Only large numbers of troops on the ground can make a difference.

All this will be at considerable cost because in this conflict only very large numbers of troops on the ground will make a difference. Despite its appeal to the amateur strategist, a reliance on air power alone—the strike option—in this type of terrain with these kinds of targets has never held any real promise of conflict resolution. Given the political dynamics that developed after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and as Goražde seemed threatened, a strong response from NATO was necessary if further erosion of its credibility was to be avoided. And indeed, the use of "robust" air power can have an effect on Serb behavior, particularly if it is used without regard for civilian casualties. But it cannot make the Serbs want to live as an ethnic minority in a nation they perceive to be hostile. It can only reinforce the paranoia that drives them to continue the fight so relentlessly even now.

Pushing NATO to agree to the robust use of its air power, then, as with most of the other U.S. policy moves in the former Yugoslavia, is

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linked more to the immediacy of the evening newscasts than to a rational overall political objective. For that reason it can have no more than a near-term effect. At the end of the day the United States must face the reality that it cannot produce an *enduring* solution with military force—air or ground—only one that will last until it departs.

There is an alternative: proceed from the premise that all factions to the conflict have legitimate needs, not just Muslims and Croats. Leverage Belgrade and Zagreb equally to stop the flow of arms to Bosnia. Denounce the use of military force with equal indignation toward all perpetrators. Pressure the Bosnians to negotiate in good faith or risk true abandonment. Enlist the Russians both to represent and dampen Serb demands. Enforce a ceasefire impartially.

There need be no illusions about the future. Given the horrors of the last three years, rebuilding trust in Bosnia will take a very long time. True healing is beyond our means. The best we can hope for is to create the conditions for Bosnia to heal itself. The U.S. can aid in this process but only if it is willing to be honest, at least to itself.

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The U.N. Idea Revisited

Abba Eban

THE SLOW DEATH OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS was born 50 years ago amid such euphoria that a fall from grace was inevitable. Its founding conference at San Francisco in April 1945 resounded with slogans of redemption and hope. Many who attended the sessions may have felt that expectations were being set exaggeratedly high, but few would have predicted that after five decades the peace organization would resemble the chorus in a Greek drama, expressing consternation at events it has no power to control.

Disappointment would be less sharp if the U.N. founders had been content to claim that they were contributing an additional technique to the repertoire of diplomacy. But they were not in a mood to accept such a modest role. They were inspired by a utopian vision. "Inexorable tides of history," one delegate proclaimed, "are carrying us toward a golden age of freedom, justice, peace, and social well-being." Another 1945 orator soared to biblical heights: "The U.N. Charter has grown from the prayers and prophecies of Isaiah and Micah."

Even statesmen renowned for their pragmatic temperament were caught up in the intoxicating rhetoric. The U.S. secretary of state until 1944, Cordell Hull, a Tennessean of austere mien, had never been known to express an enthusiastic emotion. But he saw the establishment of the United Nations as a messianic transformation: "There

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ABBA EBAN represented Israel at the United Nations from 1948 to 1959, serving concurrently as ambassador to the United States (1950-59). He was Foreign Minister from 1966 to 1974.

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will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, balances of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

This must surely rank as one of the more ill-considered statements in diplomatic history. International organization, which after all is a mechanism, not a policy or principle, was portrayed as a magic spell that would render all previous politics and diplomacy obsolete.

These salvational hopes were based on the illusion that the American-Soviet-British alliance that had won the victory would command the future—a notion any serious historian could have refuted many months before. But American leaders had evidently convinced themselves that the United Nations, by the mere fact of its existence, would cause a new story, never heard or told before, to unfold across the human scene.

By contrast, the practitioners of traditional diplomacy have never spoken of themselves in the exalted tones adopted by the devotees of international organization. Professional diplomacy is dominated by a sense of limits proceeding from a somber view of human nature. It pursues relatively modest goals, like prolonged stability, rather than a new era in the governance of humankind. It accepts that conflict is endemic to human relations at all levels and that the most that can be done in the international field is to keep conflict within tolerable limits. Diplomats, schooled in their own traditions, know that war prevented is a kind of peace, perhaps the only peace that many nations will ever know. They inhabit a middle ground between excessive skepticism and inflated hope. They understand that in a world without a universally accepted law diplomats will usually have to compromise between what justice demands and what circumstances permit.

The movement for international organization was born in revolt against this unambitious view. Its devotees insisted on nothing less than world peace under law. The theme was collective security. The central premise of this doctrine is that all nations have an equal interest in opposing specific acts of aggression and are willing to incur identical risks in opposing them. This idea, however, is so contrary to all of international experience that nothing short of charismatic authority could ever have brought it to term.

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
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

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Trygve Lie, elected the first secretary-general in 1946, envisioning a global role for the United Nations after World War II.

Like all new religions, international organization had a prophet who was deemed to speak consecrated words, and his name was Woodrow Wilson. But Wilson was so assiduous in seeking European support for collective security and its instrument, the League of Nations, that he failed to notice the lack of endorsement for them back home.

The Europeans who thronged the streets of Paris and London in 1919 to greet Wilson as he arrived for the peace talks after the First World War responded ecstatically to the tall, grave American who doffed his top hat in salute. Presidents of the United States were an unknown species to them; none had made such a pilgrimage before. Here was a man representing the greatest power ever to exist who

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had pledged himself to the most ambitious moral theory any statesman had ever articulated.

But the Europeans were not sold on Wilsonianism. They observed that self-determination had not been extended in America to the red man or the black, or to the southern states. They noted that the American empire had been won with overpowering force. The Europeans thought it natural to prefer the imprecisions of their own system to the vague idealism of a new system that Americans might fail to apply even to their own continent.

The founders believed the United Nations would render all previous diplomacy obsolete.

The truth is that no one outside America has ever taken the theory of American exceptionalism seriously. The theory rests on the assumption that America has an anticolonialist lineage. But the difference between ravaging populations and conquering vast territories within a continent, and conquering them in colonial fashion by sending armies overseas, has never struck non-Americans as a moral distinction.

American leaders who had qualms about their own rectitude sometimes resolved them by appeal to divine judgment. When in 1897 President William McKinley wanted to annex the Philippines, he spent a whole night on his knees praying for celestial guidance. It is certain that he would not have accepted an answer in the negative. The Heavenly Will worn down by presidential persistence, the United States made war against Spain and moved into the Philippines.

Even the virtuous Wilson, after proclaiming his vision of "open covenants," went on to organize the most closed and conspiratorial peace conference in history. He closeted himself with the British, French, and Italian leaders—David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Vittorio Orlando—and the Big Four in a vengeful mood drafted a treaty destined to prepare the ground for a new war. A contemporary writer described Wilson as "living on terms of such intimacy with his conscience that any little disagreement between them could always be arranged."

Wilson died a sad man amid the ruins of his vision, his own country having refused to join the League of Nations, but this did not deter the U.N. founders from seeking a second chance for collective security. In the aftermath of World War II, the hope that the new international

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organization would have more success than its predecessor seemed well founded. For one thing, the United Nations was assured of universal membership. There were no signs of the American separatism that had spelled weakness for the League of Nations. Since American reservations had been regarded as the main cause of the league's failure, it was too innocently assumed that American participation would ensure the league's successor thrived. That the world's three most powerful leaders—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill—spent long hours at Yalta discussing the U.N. blueprint in meticulous detail lent majestic strength to the internationalist cause.

The U.N. founders had an additional reason for optimism. The new peace organization, they said, would not be toothless like the League of Nations but would be able to enforce its decisions. This idea received expression in Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. A military staff committee composed of members from the five major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France) would work out a plan for the mobilization of U.N. forces to be held ready under the command of the Security Council. For the first time in history collective security would be institutionalized. In 1945 high officers from the armies of the five great powers gathered to discuss the U.N. force.

The conventional wisdom in the West tells us that right-minded states wanted to create an enforcement mechanism but were frustrated by the persistent Soviet veto. This argument, developed at the height of the Cold War in the early 1950s, is flagrantly untrue. As Cordell Hull told the Senate, the veto provision was an absolute condition for American participation in the United Nations and the small and medium-sized countries regarded the veto as a crucial defense against irresponsible majorities. A conscious decision was taken at San Francisco to avoid any attempt to subject the major powers to collective coercion. A representative of Sweden in 1952 declared that the willingness of the small states to accept the obligations of the new security system was "dependent upon their assurance, derived from the veto provision, that there could be no U.N. call to action against a major power." The Mexican delegate at San Francisco said, cogently, that under the U.N. Charter, "the mice would be disciplined, but the lions would be free."

It is too often forgotten that the charter, signed in June 1945, was

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written by men unaware that nuclear weapons existed. If they had known, surely they would not have advocated bringing American and Soviet forces into proximity in areas where the two countries' interests conflicted.

In 1947 the negotiations on Article 43 collapsed, as was inevitable. The five generals and eight admirals of the military staff committee, brilliantly uniformed and bemedaled, would hold ritual meetings a few minutes long at the beginning of each month. The chairman would call them to order, announce that no speakers were scheduled, and propose adjournment. A new chairman would take office the next month according to alphabetical rotation. A talent for perpetuating defunct institutions was to bedevil the United Nations in future decades. In this case the monthly meetings were stopped before the farce became too patent.

With the demise of Article 43, the United Nations had renounced the special quality that was intended to distinguish it from its predecessor. It had become, like the League of Nations, an arena of debate, with a capacity, still untested, to promote negotiated settlements, not by coercion but by consent. Collective security as a formula for world order was dead.

EARLY BLOOM

FOR A BRIEF period the United Nations appeared to be fulfilling a central role without the illusion of coercive force. In 1946 the Security Council ordained the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and of French forces from Syria and Lebanon. In 1947 it played a major part in the decolonization of Indonesia. It resolved a potentially explosive dispute over Bahrain. In 1948-49, after some failures, it instituted a durable cease-fire followed by a prolonged armistice between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Meanwhile in 1947 the General Assembly had adopted a decision for the partition of Palestine that has been fiercely debated ever since but cannot be denied to be a strong, daring act free from the obscurity and procrastination usually ascribed to the international organization.

The disposition of the former Italian colonies (Eritrea, Somalia, and Libya) was decided in 1949 by votes in the General Assembly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted at the end of 1948, may not have directly influenced the behavior of states but is nevertheless a bold and proud document illuminated by a vision of humanity in its more compassionate and rational aspect.

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Strangely, Israel turned out to be the nation that benefited most from a U.N. action, although few Israelis or Jewish leaders acknowledge this today. The Jewish people presented themselves to the world community in the aftermath of World War II at the lowest ebb of their fortunes. Six million of them, including a million children, had been slaughtered in Europe. The fame and dignity of the Jews had been dragged down in a decade of Nazi calumny. The promised homeland in Palestine was assailed by regional violence and international alienation.

The United Nations responded to the holocaust with an endorsement in 1947 of the Jewish claim to statehood in a partitioned Palestine. A year and a half later, in May 1949, the world body revolutionized the juridical status of the Jewish people by admitting Israel to membership in the United Nations.

The subsequent spate of anti-Israel assaults in General Assembly resolutions had fewer durable effects than did the United Nations' initial stimulus to the consolidation of Israel's status. No historian has ever suggested a scenario in which Israel's sovereignty could have been recognized so quickly in a world that lacked an international organization to fill the vacuum that the end of British power left in the region.

But if the years 1945 to 1950 were the United Nations' half-decade of innovation, they held a premonition of marginality. All the major powers, including the United States, were determined to ensure that their own vital interests would not be submitted to U.N. jurisdiction. The Marshall Plan and the establishment of the NATO alliance were carried through in total disregard of the world organization. The Security Council, with great pomp and circumstance, established the Atomic Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, but by 1949 both bodies had become inactive; it was evident that if Washington and Moscow ever intended to discuss arms control seriously, they would seek each other out in the privacy of traditional diplomacy.

In the Korean War of 1950-53, the Security Council could pretend to be the commander of the U.N. forces under American leadership, but this fiction was sustained only because the Soviet Union, obtusely absent from its seat, could not wield its veto in the Security Council. In any case, President Harry S Truman preceded his recourse to the United Nations by a typical unilateral decision to send forces first and

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explain their dispatch afterward. In Europe, the Common Market and the other institutions of the European Community were born without any relationship to the United Nations.

THE HOLLOW DOCTRINE

IT IS very unlikely that collective security will ever regain preeminence as an aim of international politics. Its reputation was based on six assumptions, none of which is valid in any contemporary context or any foreseeable future context.

The first assumption is that states will identify their own security with the existing world order to such an extent that they will be prepared to defend that order by involvement in situations seemingly remote from their particular national interests.

The second is that states will be able and willing to agree on the determination of aggression in a particular situation.

The third is that the aggressor will be so weak or lonely that it will be possible to confront him with a superior international force.

The fourth is that states, inspired by the objective principles of collective security, will be willing to punish their closest allies as severely as they would their distant adversaries. Alliance, affinity, and common culture will simply melt away.

The fifth is that nation-states will renounce their power of separate decision in the disposition of their armed forces in areas in which their national interests are not involved.

The sixth is that public debate in a permanent international conference will prove a more effective technique for reaching accords than the traditional method of discreet negotiation between the interested parties alone.

None of these six assumptions is even remotely correct. Still less do they together constitute a realistic model for international behavior.

First, the loyalties built around the nation-state are not transferable to any notion of world community.

Second, what is aggression for one is self-defense for another and national liberation for a third.

Third, many small and medium-sized countries like Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Ukraine now have the sort of firepower

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an international force would find hard to overcome. Even the Bosnian Serbs with their antiquated weaponry have been able to intimidate U.N. peacekeepers and NATO air forces.

Fourth, nations, like human beings, are not immune from the laws of human nature; they do not react with equal and objective rigor, or indulgence, toward adversaries and allies.

Fifth, statesmen will not surrender their discretionary response on such crucial issues as the use of their country's armed forces. Even the relatively innocuous use of forces for agreed peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes arouses strong resentment when casualties are incurred.

Sixth, a half-century of experience has demonstrated that traditional diplomacy, with limited participation and the occasional recourse to reticence and secrecy, offers better chances of reaching accords than does a United Nations committed to public debate with participation on a vast scale.

My conclusion is that collective security failed to take root as the central principle of international life not because its opponents were of small mind or ignoble disposition, but because it did not reflect the spirit of the age. It came on the scene in a world of nation-states, yet called on states suddenly to behave in a way that states had never behaved in the whole of human history.

International law does not give any sort of lead. One of the most tormenting aspects of collective security is that decisions of immaculate legality become harmful if isolated from the chain of consequences. The Anglo-French decision in early 1940 to resist the Soviet invasion of Finland provides an example. The action against the Soviet Union, including its expulsion from the League of Nations, was juridically correct in terms of the league covenant; Finland was entitled to receive international aid against aggression. But Britain and France nearly found themselves at war with Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union simultaneously! Thus the Anglo-French action, while exemplary in legal terms, would, if maintained, have prevented the eventual defeat of Hitler.

Once it became evident in 1947 that the United Nations lacked the enforcement powers envisaged in Article 43 of the charter, that body should logically have considered its future course. No such deliberations took place. Today it is still not clear what the United Nations

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wishes to be: an instrument for solving conflicts or an arena for waging them. The choice is between the parliamentary and the diplomatic principle. The diplomatic principle tells me I need my adversary's agreement. The parliamentary principle tells me I don't need his agreement, since I can defeat and humiliate him by a majority vote. The two techniques call for totally different psychologies and procedures. The unhappy choice of the parliamentary principle ensured that the General Assembly would have a virulently polemical character.

The Wilsonian tradition praised collective security for its emphasis on publicity ("open covenants openly arrived at") and its rejection of secrecy ("everything shall proceed always frankly and in the public view"). But these are not aids to agreement; they are prescriptions for deadlock. Without phases of secrecy and avoidance of publicity, agreements are virtually impossible. The role of secrecy in negotiation is not a mere relic of tradition. It is crucial. If a nation hears of a concession its representatives have offered without hearing of a corresponding concession from the other party, indignation will erupt at the wrong time, with explosive results. A wiser Woodrow Wilson would have opted for "open covenants secretly arrived at," as Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson later suggested.

TURN OFF THE MICROPHONE

With the Cold War over, the world seems to lack a strong incentive to reform its institutions. Nuclear arms have not been used in anger since World War II, the major powers have avoided confrontation, and some regional disputes have been solved. The international system, controlled by the power balance and negotiation, has not been ideal, but it has not been so intolerable as to encourage U.N. members to seek new systems and procedures. The prediction that the choice for humankind would be between international organization and world war has been discredited.

But prudent diplomacy in the traditional mold is a serious alternative, and here there has been important progress. Leaders of nations are now engaged in civil discourse with those whom they would have spurned a few years ago. De Klerk and Mandela bringing apartheid to an end; Rabin and Arafat laying foundations for a Middle East

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breakthrough; the British government negotiating with the Irish Republican Army; Israel in open contact with Jordan leading to a peace treaty; the Vatican overcoming theological inhibitions and sending a goodwill mission to Jerusalem—it is the era of odd couples, and humankind breathes more freely because of it.

Frustrated by the failure to construct a universal security system, international activists have sought compensations in other fields. One of the consolation prizes was alleged to be strong resonance around the globe. But the United Nations can no longer claim to be the world's most powerful microphone. Reporting on its debates is scanty and few news media maintain the U.N. press bureaus they once did. The addresses of foreign ministers in General Assembly debate pass from the orators' lips to oblivion without so much as a temporary resting place in *The New York Times*.

The relatively meager results for conciliation under U.N. auspices must be considered against the more impressive achievements of conventional diplomacy. The years since the end of World War II have been fruitful for international conciliation, and most of the successes have been scored outside the United Nations. The Austrian State Treaty, which prohibits Austria from possessing nuclear weapons; the termination of the Berlin blockades; the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Union; the end of Algeria's war for independence from France; the American opening to China; the conclusion of the SALT I arms limitation agreement; the Panama Canal settlement; the Ostpolitik agreements orchestrated by German Chancellor Willy Brandt, leading to the recognition of the European frontiers; the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe settlement; the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki; the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty; the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization; the British-Irish dialogue; the Israeli-Vatican reconciliation; the new agreements between the republics of the former Soviet Union and the Western states—these make an imposing list. They offer empirical evidence for a judgment that the public multilateral approach has been much less effective in conflict resolution than traditional negotiating techniques.

One of the main weaknesses of the United Nations is its predilection for public debate in vast audiences with massive participation.

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Wilson eulogized the idea that "the great things remaining to be done can only be done with the whole world as a stage and in cooperation with the universal interests of humankind." As with many Wilsonian utterances, this is a victory of eloquence over logic. The "whole world" is not really the most effective arbiter of disputes. There is more to be said for negotiation between concerned parties whose destinies will be harmed by failure and served by success. As things stand, countries in the United Nations with no crucial interests in a dispute may band together to outvote states whose very survival is at stake.

Collective security failed because it did not reflect the spirit of the age: the age of the nation-state.

It is staggering to recall that only three years ago many expected the West's success in resisting Iraqi aggression against Kuwait to lead to a new world order in which the United Nations would preside over a tranquil globe. A cascade of events heralded the triumph of democracy and the market economy over the squalid repressions of the communist system. The collapse of communist ascendancy, symbolized by the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, encouraged the belief in a new order.

But this vision flowed from a basic misunderstanding of the previous decades. The West had considered the Soviet Union responsible for instigating all the tensions troubling the world, which led it to fatefully underestimate all other sources of tension and violence. Nationalist rivalries, religious fanaticism, unsolved territorial disputes, ancient prejudices and enmities, a sense of exclusion and discrimination afflicting underdeveloped countries that had thought their political emancipation would be followed by spectacular improvement in their daily lives—these had all been squeezed into a Pandora's box. The end of the Cold War set these tensions free; they can now explode in their own right and seek their own horizons. The Cold War, with all its perils, expressed a certain bleak stability: alignments, fidelities, and rivalries were sharply defined. But since no sane person would long for a return to those times, there is an urgent need for a serious appraisal of the new international situation.

It is tempting but unfair to blame the United Nations for the world's recent disappointments. The brain and heart of the organization are in the possession of its component parts; the power of

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

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correction lies not in the headquarters on the East River but in the capitals of the member states.

Not much time had to elapse before it became evident that the U.N. decision to protect oil-rich Kuwait did not create any commitment to uphold the rights of oil-free Bosnia or to bring sustained assistance to starving Somalia or Rwanda. All governments take their decisions in the name of national interest and then explain them in terms of self-sacrificing altruism. The central truth in diplomacy is that there are no collective solutions to individual crises.

CURSED ARE THE PEACEKEEPERS

IT WAS at least feasible that the United Nations might transcend the eclipse of collective security by emphasizing its peacekeeping role. This dimension of the world organization was born during the crisis over the Suez Canal and Sinai in 1956-57. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche, and Canadian leader Lester Pearson won merited honor for establishing the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza and the Strait of Tiran.

Peacekeeping—the use of international forces to monitor the peace between states that have already agreed to maintain peace—does not have a heroic sound. It is so much more modest than "peacemaking" or "peace enforcement" that it gives the impression of "a poor man's U.N." But in the Suez crisis and dozens of other troubled situations in the following years, peacekeeping measures have had stabilizing effects. The dozens of volunteer soldiers who sacrificed their lives nobly under the U.N. flag have left humankind in their debt. A real flowering of the peacekeeping dimension would give the United Nations a much-needed injection of prestige.

Unfortunately this prospect does not appear attainable. Since the end of the Cold War there have been useful peacekeeping missions in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Haiti, but these have been overshadowed by the abject flight of the peacemakers from Somalia, and even more by the dramatic fiasco of peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia.

Britain and France provide the bulk of the 40,000-troop peacekeeping operation in the Balkan region. These troops, despite their

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proud military lineage, are mocked, harassed, and humiliated by Serb warlords who block the arrival of U.N. relief convoys and impose starvation, as well as cruel bombardment and "ethnic cleansing," on Muslim populations in Bosnia. The modest aim of the peacekeepers is to ensure that food and medical aid reach Sarajevo and other urban centers, but this cannot be achieved without the United Nations occasionally fighting its way in to the aid recipients and sometimes calling on NATO for air strikes against Serb artillery.

In mid-June the United States strongly pressured its European allies to carry out an air attack on the Bosnian Serb forces. As might have been predicted, the Serb response was to take hundreds of British, French, and Canadian peacekeepers hostage. The peacekeeping commanders meekly suspended the air strikes for several weeks. The hostages were subsequently released, but the spectacle of U.N. officers and soldiers overpowered and threatened by the arrogant Serbs stripped the United Nations of the deference its flag had previously been accorded by member states, even when its power was being defied. The United States maneuvered itself into an intolerable moral position by advocating military action and then passing the consequences on without exposing itself to danger, since it is an American axiom that American lives must not be risked in non-American contexts. Sending lightly armed peacekeepers to areas where there is no peace to keep has brought international discredit to the U.N. system.

At this writing the United Nations faces grave erosion of its effectiveness and authority. Its flame is burning low. In the ruins of what was once Yugoslavia, Serb armies mount brutal assaults that have been the main cause of approximately 200,000 deaths. They carry out the policy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, starving and torturing their Muslim opponents and inflicting on the civilized world, represented by the U.N. peacekeepers, the worst torment and humiliation ever directed against international emissaries. Ironically, the perpetrators of these attacks on the international order are not powerful armies, to whose tyranny weaker powers have been accustomed to submit. They are from a less than medium-sized semi-nation that could have been subdued by the forces of any one of the several nations that have sent peacekeepers into action. Bosnia demonstrates not a failure of power but a paralysis of will among the European nations and the United States.

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In July 1995 Britain and France, in a rare gesture of resolve, announced their intention to establish a U.N. rapid reaction force to protect the Muslim "safe areas" in Bosnia, but the Serb armies overran Srebrenica and threatened Zepa and Bihać before any U.N. action could be concerted. At a meeting in London on July 21, the United States, France, and Britain resolved to resist Serb "aggression," to reinforce the U.N. peacekeeping mission, to refuse to be intimidated by hostage-taking, and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to Bosnia "by all means." This was the most emphatic commitment yet by the Western leaders, but it remains to be seen whether they will act to rescue their governments from the credibility crisis created by similar brave declarations in the past.

THE YEAR OF THE PLANET

IF THERE is no hope for a real collective security system, and if traditional diplomacy is more effective than public rhetoric, what is left for the United Nations to do?

It is easier to diagnose the world's problems than to find a solution, and easier to formulate solutions than to get the public to accept them. I believe, however, that U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali would elicit a positive response if he proclaimed this the Year of the Planet and devoted the 1995 General Assembly to problems whose solution is beyond the capacity of individual states.

The inhabitants of the earth now number 5.3 billion and at the present rate of increase will number 7 billion by the end of the century. More than half the globe's people suffer from malnutrition. Life expectancy, which exceeds 70 years in developed countries, is as low as 30 in parts of Asia and Africa. Hundreds of millions of people are afflicted by water-borne diseases for which remedies exist. Some 800 million adults throughout the world are illiterate. The most affluent countries are 3,000 percent more prosperous than the least affluent. Science, technology, and industrial progress are still largely confined to the advanced countries, which are home to less than a quarter of the human race. Some of the world's energy resources are nearing depletion, while the atmosphere and many water sources are suffering wholesale pollution.

Planetary interests may now be the arena most congenial to dis-

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cussion in multilateral agencies. When disasters occurred in Somalia and Rwanda it would have been logical for the U.N. secretariat to have visibly led the humanitarian effort. Yet the U.N. was marginal even in those two cases. There are many issues that are everybody's business and, therefore, nobody's responsibility.

Balked in its quest for a decisive role in international security, the United Nations can be credited with one momentous triumph for its labors: it has given stalwart and audacious support to the pageant of decolonization that has swept scores of new states into the world community. Nothing does more to excite the identity of new nations than the sight of their flags and names around U.N. tables. It is impossible to narrate the story of the end of apartheid and the South African revolution without paying tribute to the U.N. role.

Congress' retreat from its devotion to world community is the greatest threat to a revived United Nations.

The United Nations must face the central political anomaly of our age—the multiplicity of nation-states in a world where sovereignty has lost a large measure of its meaning. Social history describes the expansion of the sense of community, from family to tribe, from tribe to village, from village to city, from city to nation-state. At every stage people have sought larger arenas in which to express their sense of solidarity and cohesion. For some reason the expansion of community seems to have got stuck at the nation-state level. But the idea of a world community of independent states is alive in the human imagination, though not yet in the world of action. Along with the proliferation of the nation-states in their guise as the most important actors in today's international system goes a countertendency to transcend nationhood through larger units of cooperation. Regional and multilateral bodies are multiplying. The world is integrating and fragmenting at the same time.

Yet there is little hope of a revival for international institutions without a strong impulse for change from an outside power. Under present conditions this impulse can come only from the United States. But at precisely the moment when the United States has virtual command of the U.N. system, it appears to be turning its back on the multilateral idea. The new Congress in Washington is cutting support for U.N.

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peacekeeping and placing strangling restraints on the use of American manpower for international service. The current administration, which came to power amid strong expressions of support for multilateral frameworks, has accepted limitations beyond anything that previous administrations were prepared to envisage. An esteemed liberal voice, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in the July/August 1995 *Foreign Affairs,* reminded us that the United States stands twentieth on the list of nations contributing troops to U.N. operations—"well behind such world powers as Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nepal." America has cut back its budget allocation for the United Nations to a mere 0.15 percent of GDP, putting it last among the 21 wealthiest industrial nations. Congress' retreat from its previous devotion to world community is by far the greatest threat to the hope of a revived United Nations.

The world organization had the misfortune to be born with a grossly inflated vision of its interventionist power. Yet if expectations are reduced it might still be possible to reach a positive balance between vision and reality. It would be ridiculous if the first era of planetary interdependence were to find the world without a unitary framework of international relations. With all its imperfections, the United Nations is still the main incarnation of the global spirit. It alone seeks to present a vision of humankind in its organic unity.

At no other time have so many people crossed frontiers and come into contact with people of other faiths and nationalities; the new accessibility is steadily eroding parochialism. In light of these slow but deep currents of human evolution, the idea of an international organization playing an assertive role in the pacification of this turbulent world may have to bide its time, but it will never disappear from view. History and the future are on its side.

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Reforming the United Nations

Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett

A BETTER INSURANCE POLICY FOR THE WORLD

FIFTY YEARS AGO the free nations of the world met in general assembly to begin the task of establishing a postwar order that would secure the peace, advance global prosperity, alleviate poverty and unemployment, and promote human rights worldwide. These were lofty goals, but the founders of the United Nations system were utter realists. Having lived through the economic crisis of the 1930s, the rise of fascist aggressor states, and the horrors of World War II, these statesmen, from Winston Churchill to the formidable Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg, were committed to creating new international structures to deal with problems that were international by nature. Part of their realism was the conviction that they had a responsibility to try to make things work better in the future through such structures.

A half-century later it is proper that the governments and peoples of the world should want an assessment of the United Nations' performance. The record is mixed at best, and in recent years the world organization has been much criticized. It has suffered great humilia-

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PAUL KENNEDY is a Professor of History and BRUCE RUSSETT a Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Since 1993 they have served as Co-Directors of the Secretariat to the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, supported by the Ford Foundation. The views expressed here are their own and should not be attributed to the Working Group or any of its members.

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tions in Bosnia that have eclipsed its peacekeeping successes elsewhere. It is only just beginning to implement effective global social and economic policies, and its development strategies are under attack from many quarters. It is widely regarded as bureaucratically unwieldy, unnecessarily expensive, and weakened by poor personnel recruitment. These sentiments are particularly strong in the United States, reflecting that country's current politics of frustration, but they are echoed in many other parts of the world.

Yet even if the United Nations' administrative and personnel weaknesses were corrected, the world body would still require reshaping so that it could better respond to the stresses of the early 21st century. In every one of its activities, from peacekeeping to development, from monitoring human rights to overseeing environmental accords, it has been pressed by member states and their publics to play a larger role and to assume fresh responsibilities. During the early 1990s the number of U.N. peacekeeping personnel in the field increased tenfold, as did the cost of peacekeeping operations. Strains on the social fabric of many nations bring calls for concerted U.N. policies of assistance. In the economic realm, too, the world organization is being asked to produce greater security, equity, and prosperity for all human beings, not just a privileged minority.

These operations, hopes, and expectations far exceed the capabilities of the system as it is now constituted, and they threaten to overwhelm the United Nations and discredit it, perhaps forever, even in the eyes of its warmest supporters. Fifty years old, the United Nations finds itself at a critical juncture, which should be honestly confronted by the member states who are its proprietors and who endowed it with its present features. Two paths lie before the world community. Countries should decide either to reduce their demands on the United Nations, thus giving it a decent chance of carrying out reduced policies with its existing resources, or they should recognize the necessity of improving its capacities and grant it greater resources, functions, and coordinating powers. Avoiding a decision risks condemning not just the organization but the world to a deeply troubled future. This is a much more fundamental issue than improvements to specific parts of the system, welcome though the latter would be.

In light of global circumstances, it would be wiser to take the sec-

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ond of these two paths and improve the United Nations for the benefit of future generations. A half-century ago member states recognized that a set of international instruments to achieve aims they could not secure by themselves was very much in their national interest. The world of 1995 is clearly a vastly different place than that of 1945, and the gathering pace of technological change, global demographic growth, and environmental pressures will make the world of 2045 (or even 2020) radically different from that of today. As the demands on states and governments increase, the need for the world organization is growing, not shrinking.

The chief reason effective international instruments are required is an eminently practical one, as the founders realized. Simply put, states, people, and businesses need an international system to provide physical, economic, and legal security. They need some form of international police force to deter terrorists and other breakers of the peace; bodies like the World Trade Organization to head off trade wars; institutions like those developed at Bretton Woods to assist emerging economies; international human rights organizations to guarantee individuals' basic freedoms across the globe; and a myriad of agencies and offices to ensure such basics as telecommunications and safe air traffic. If the United Nations system did not exist, much of it would have to be invented.

POLITICS ON A GLOBAL SCALE

REFORMERS will have to reckon with the fact that there are many different United Nations—or, at least, that different interest groups and governments look at the world body differently. The media in Europe and North America sees the United Nations as mainly taken up with peacekeeping and security issues in places like Bosnia. To finance ministers in Latin America or Southeast Asia, the United Nations is a complex, multiheaded creature whose World Bank and International Monetary Fund offer (often contradictory) advice on economic development along with carrot-and-stick incentives. To women's groups and associated nongovernmental organizations preparing for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing this September, it is a set of agencies dealing with education, reproductive

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rights, health care, and the like. To international lawyers and human rights advocates, it is an array of legal instruments and offices that advance the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent protocols and agreements. To isolationist critics, it is a bloated bureaucracy that is wasting taxpayers' money. For true believers, it is the embryo of Tennyson's "parliament of man, the Federation of the world."

Moves toward reform must take into account that the very different political and ideological stances of member governments, interest groups, and voters will critically influence whether specific proposals succeed or fail. Indeed, unless governments can agree on basic principles regarding the roles of the United Nations and are ready to compromise on changes in the system, years of international gridlock could lie ahead.

To isolationists, it is a waste of money; to true believers, the "parliament of man."

Finally, there is the touchy issue of states' sovereignty. Although the original members agreed in 1945 (and countries that joined later concurred by subscribing to the charter) to bind themselves in various ways for the common good, they emphasized national sovereignty and prohibited intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." What they constructed was not an embryonic world government but an international corporation, so to speak, with the nation-states as shareholders. The concern with sovereignty is no less strong today, whether among conservative Americans or governments in Beijing or New Delhi, and any schemes to enhance the United Nations will have to reckon with that sentiment. The organization can only be as effective as member governments, in agreement, desire it to be.

Yet global forces for change are weakening the traditional authority of the sovereign nation-state in ways unforeseen in 1945. For example, if your American dollar or French franc is freely traded in East Asian markets in the middle of the night, to what extent is it still your currency? How can single governments deal with threats to the national interest that may come in the form of global environmental degradation or international terrorism or drug trafficking? How can citizens expect today's beleaguered governments to handle these matters, when authority and influence in many spheres is being relocated

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away from the national centers, either downward to the regions or upward to transnational actors?

This steady loss of sovereignty will probably make countries more jealous of their autonomy at first. But the only chance U.N. members have in dealing with the cluster of transnational problems is to work out a cluster of transnational responses. This requires creating and empowering more effective international structures and operating procedures, not as ends in themselves but as means to satisfy national needs. But until states arrive at that conceptual breakthrough, efforts to enhance the U.N. system will be checked.

Threats today come in international forms. So how can national governments cope?

Those who favor improving the world organization should stress that proposals for a U.N. rapid-reaction force to handle the Rwandas of the future and the many other schemes for reform are intended not to reduce the freedom of member states but to buttress the real sovereignty of societies everywhere. By "real sovereignty" is meant the ability to influence outcomes, nationally and internationally, and it has declined in recent decades in countries like France, India, Argentina, and even the United States. Nations will not recover it until they are willing to sink their differences and work together toward common ends.

This notion, however, is immediately tested once one turns to some of the specific areas in which reform of the United Nations is suggested. For purposes of brevity, only five fields for reform are discussed here, and many other important dimensions (human rights, reform of the Secretariat, and on and on) are not considered. But these five illustrate both the problems and the possibilities of reform.

MAKING ROOM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPANDING the Security Council seems like one of the more reasonable ways to improve the representative character—and thus the legitimacy—of the world organization in the eyes of its 186 members and their people. Increasing the council's overall size from the present 15 members would allow more nations to participate on a rotating basis in decision-making by this critically important organ. And adding to the permanent membership would permit the Security

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

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

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Council to reflect the changes in the global balance since the five victorious powers of 1945 insisted that the charter include special provisions upholding their status and interests.

Yet proposals to promote certain countries to permanent membership are quickly enmeshed in political objections. For example, Japan and Germany have strong claims, as the second- and third-largest contributors to the U.N. budget, but would their neighbors be happy with the change? And given the special responsibility of the permanent members to maintain peace and security, should permanent membership be granted to Japan, whose constitution restricts it in sending forces abroad?

Then, since admitting a Germany or Japan to permanent membership would unduly increase the influence of the "North," it would be necessary to compensate by including a number of states from the "South," especially larger regional powers like India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa. Yet this suggestion provokes criticism from those countries' neighbors. Why not consider instead permanent regional membership on the Security Council, whereby different countries take turns representing their part of the world?[1] Yet how likely is it that Britain and France would cede their historical status as permanent members and trust their interests to a European representative?

Nations will not recover their sovereignty until they sink their differences and work toward common ends.

The veto right of each permanent member further complicates prospects for Security Council reform. The drafters of the U.N. Charter assumed that the Big Five were to be chiefly responsible for maintaining the peace and defeating aggressors, and therefore should control the use of United Nations forces. Moreover, it was vital that the great powers not opt out of the organization—the shadow of the U.S. absence from the League of Nations loomed large here—so their governments had to be reassured that at least in matters of war and peace their interests would not be overruled. Over the subsequent half-century, however, the veto has been invoked in many other cir-

[1] See the interesting discussion in *Prospects for Reform of the United Nations System* (Italian Society for International Organization, Cedam-Padova, 1993), pp. 445-449.

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cumstances, such as blocking resolutions and opposing nominations. If the number of permanent members on the Security Council was increased, would that not increase the risk of many more vetoes in the future? One solution might be to deny the newer permanent members the veto, but that would confuse things by introducing a third membership category. Some have proposed that the veto be abolished—a splendidly egalitarian idea, but highly unlikely to win approval by the Permanent Five.

The best that can be hoped for is a compromise after negotiation in the General Assembly. An increase in the number of both permanent and rotating members of the Security Council, and a restriction of the veto to questions of war and peace as the founders intended, would not crimp the Security Council's effectiveness but would make it less like the old boys club of 1945.

GIVING PEACE A CHANCE

THE WORLD organization must have better access to well-trained forces to implement the peacekeeping missions agreed on by the Security Council, and such missions must be differentiated from peace enforcement operations so that the confusions that occurred in Somalia and Bosnia will not be repeated. These are the two most important issues in what is one of the United Nations' most important functions: securing the peace.

The first immediately brings up the problem of sovereignty again. Member states always reserve the right to decide whether they will respond to the secretary-general's request to donate troops or other forces to any peacekeeping operation. In this as in everything else the United Nations depends on the whim of governments, and there is definite evidence of donor fatigue, partly because of the embarrassment of the triple crisis of Somalia/Bosnia/Rwanda but more generally because of the unprecedented number of missions undertaken and peacekeepers deployed since 1989. The Security Council is going to have to be more selective in the field operations it authorizes, although deciding what criteria to apply in evaluating a request for intervention could be excruciatingly difficult. Clearly, to approve no additional missions would undermine the purposes

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of the United Nations and set the scene for future horrors.

Had the world body been able to summon battle-ready troops as the tragedy in Rwanda unfolded, the swift interposition of peacekeeping units might have saved tens of thousands of lives. Calls for remedying the situation have led to two alternative proposals: endowing the United Nations with its own rapid-reaction forces, or, through negotiation with member governments, creating within national armed services units ready for immediate deployment for U.N. purposes.

What should the United Nations do when bad guys are committing atrocities?

In terms of operational speed and coherence, the first option is superior. U.N. standing forces, sent to a crisis zone on the resolution of the Security Council alone, could quickly carry out an array of peacekeeping and humanitarian actions. The secretary-general would not have to beg governments for peacekeeping contingents on an ad hoc basis, and governments would not be periodically confronted with the delicate choice of whether or not to commit national units. Critics raise objections about costs (a standing force of 10,000 could cost $500 million a year) and logistics (where would it be stationed?, for instance). But the greatest obstacles are political. Are governments willing to let the world organization have its own army of peacekeepers, making it appear to have acquired one of the attributes of statehood?

If not, the best alternative would be the creation of specially earmarked national units ready to be dispatched once the government in question had agreed to the secretary-general's request for a troop contribution. That, of course, is the rub, for delays as governments ponder that request may see a potential tragedy turn into a full-blown disaster. And as the separate national units grapple with language and coordination problems during the operation, they will still be subject to constant scrutiny by their home governments, which naturally will want a say in operational decisions. A U.N. standing force would be far preferable; standby national units are a halfway measure.

The question of distinguishing peacekeeping work from peace-enforcement missions cannot be separated from the above objections. Indeed, the reluctance of many governments to contribute

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forces to the U.N. stems from their concern that they might become embroiled in an operation whose purposes are changed from time to time. The lessons of Bosnia and Somalia must be heeded, as well as those from more successful missions like the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The original elements of a peacekeeping operation, evolved by the United Nations through hard experience, were clear enough; Brian Urquhart describes them in his 1987 book *A Life in Peace and War*, after four decades of traveling the world for the secretary-general. Both sides (usually governments or putative governments) requested international assistance in maintaining peace, lightly armed blue helmets were interposed impartially, and the good offices of the secretary-general or his representative were used to negotiate a political settlement. However, things are much less clear when the world organization is offering humanitarian aid in circumstances where authority has collapsed or is collapsing, factional struggles are under way, and some of the warring parties refuse to cooperate. What should the United Nations do when bad guys are interfering with humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and carrying out atrocities?

Are governments willing to let the U.N. have its own army, just like them?

The kaleidoscopic and unpredictable nature of such conflicts ensures that no set formula will assist the Security Council when it considers future requests to intervene. But a few prerequisites must be insisted on should a local crisis in which U.N. peacekeeping forces are involved deteriorate and a request be made for *enforcement* of the peace. The entire issue should be carefully examined by the Security Council and concerned member states before the mandate is changed, the peacekeeping troops must be pulled out of harm's way or given adequate protection, sufficient funding (if need be, an open-ended commitment to get the job done) must be assured, and Security Council members and other participating governments must be resolved to enforce the peace. If the above conditions are not present, the proposal for peace enforcement should be resisted. These may seem commonsense requirements, but their absence explains the debacles in Bosnia and Somalia.

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ADVANCING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

THIS RUBRIC comprehends a vast panoply of U.N. activities, including those of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization, and accounts for by far the largest portion of the world organization's expenditures. The United Nations' portfolio of duties in this domain rests on the lofty language of 50 years ago, whereby the founding governments pledged "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." They established the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to coordinate the work of the specialized agencies in international economic, social, health, and related matters and to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms and the advancement of international cultural and educational cooperation.

It is not surprising that the United Nations' role here has been controversial. Some laissez-faire ideologues suggest canceling the entire U.N. economic and social agenda, seeing no sense in reducing government at home while paying for international agencies and programs abroad. The United Nations, which like all public organizations today operates under intense pressures to reduce costs and trim programs, must constantly justify itself to the richer countries that contribute a large portion of its funds. At the same time, the organization is under attack from governments and nongovernmental organizations in developing countries, and their sympathizers in developed nations, for what seem to them its failures in pursuing the noble economic and social goals set out in the charter. Funds for development, these critics say, are completely inadequate, and the world economic order is still stacked in favor of a few countries and companies possessing a disproportionate amount of capital. The constant preaching about the free market from affluent countries, they say, ignores the fact that dire social conditions and lack of infrastructure in developing regions make it difficult to attract investment. The austerity measures mandated by the World Bank and the IMF sometimes lead to cuts in already ill-funded education and social programs.

No agenda for peace is complete without an agenda for development.

The whole time the gap between richest and poorest around the globe

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is widening. More radical voices demand a redistribution of wealth, and U.N. controls on Bretton Woods institutions. Moderate reformers recall the 1960s, when global economic growth and a far stronger commitment by the North to reducing the divide gave developing countries hope.

Assuming that neither free market enthusiasts nor supporters of the "new international economic order" succeed in imposing their views of what the United Nations should do or cease doing in this sphere, how might a few substantive reforms help?

Most reform studies have recommended abolishing the unwieldy ECOSOC and erecting new, more effective organs in its place.[2] New permanent intergovernmental organs should be empowered by the member states to develop policies to handle the complex and interrelated socioeconomic matters that confront the world. This implies that the World Bank, the IMF, and other specialized agencies whose autonomy had undercut ECOSOC would be brought into a closer relationship with the rest of the U.N. system. This would occur not through any direct takeover—the major treasuries and finance ministries would oppose that—but simply because the governments that are their chief shareholders finally see that if common tasks are to be carried out effectively greater coordination and consultation is required among all the entities dealing with economic and social affairs.

Such consolidation depends on member states adopting a more holistic view of how to use international machinery to improve the condition of the planet. Like that of the U.N. founders, this view would recognize that real security cannot be achieved without the eradication of poverty. Like Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reports in 1992 and 1994, it would assert that no "agenda for peace" is complete without an "agenda for development." But the latter agenda would concern itself as much with turbulence in global currency markets as with rising unemployment among youth, and be as committed to reducing protectionism as to lowering female illiteracy, for it would see that humankind's prospects are hurt by all these threats to well-being.

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[2] See, for example, the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; and the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, *The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century: The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations,* New York: Ford Foundation, 1995.

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RESCUING COLLAPSED STATES

When the U.N. founders drafted the charter, they were emerging from a war in which many nations had lost their independence because of the aggression of foreign states and during which the United States (though not Britain or France) had been anticipating the independence of colonial territories. The focus was on state-building and the need to ensure that no member states, especially smaller ones, would suffer outside interference. Yet 50 years later, after Cambodia, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Rwanda, it is evident that a key challenge to international stability is the phenomenon of internal conflicts in which authority implodes, ethnic and religious conflicts erupt, many lives are lost, and millions flee across international borders. Without subscribing fully to prophecies of widespread chaos by writers like Robert Kaplan and Martin Van Creveld, it is not hard to see that a combination of demographic pressures, resource depletion, internal migration, and social stress could lead to the disintegration of other states.

Rescuing failed nations will be expensive, further straining U.N. budgets. Moreover, going in will always be an extremely sensitive proposition politically, both inside the collapsing society and in the developing world, where such collapses are more likely to occur. Many governments in developing nations regard with suspicion the prospect of rescue actions by a United Nations still in their eyes dominated by the richer countries; talk in the Western media of trusteeship and mandates fuels their fears that this could be a form of neocolonialism. They even frown on the use of the term "failed state," suggesting as it does that a country's sovereignty can disappear.

The original concern was state-building; now, it's states collapsing.

Any motion for intervention, therefore, will have to be phrased extremely delicately. It might be pleaded on ethical grounds that the international community has a duty to assist disintegrating societies and to forestall the widespread breaches of human rights that attend such chaos. In some cases the argument that large-scale cross-border migrations constitute a threat to international stability could be made, as in the U.S. request for action in Haiti last year.

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If anything more is to be done in this field, the United Nations must establish procedures open to public view concerning the decision to intervene (it must come at the request of some or all of the contending parties and be approved by the Security Council, adequately funded, subject to review by the General Assembly, etc.) and the rescue process itself. Specified U.N. agencies with clear lines of responsibility must be accountable for the temporary guardianship and recovery mechanisms, and the United Nations must work with the domestic parties and nongovernmental organizations toward restoring full sovereignty and returning the country to membership in the community of nations.

Should the world body be granted a separate income? Some want to keep the right to cut off funds to make a point.

Before all this happens, however, governments will need to understand another political paradox, which is that the only purpose of the intrusion by the world organization is to help the peoples concerned recover their real sovereignty—that is, their capacity to influence their own fate and to conduct their own affairs peacefully.

BALANCING THE CHECKBOOK

CHARGES that the United Nations misspends the contributions of its members are widespread, and critics insist that eliminating superfluous agencies, trimming perquisites, and improving management throughout the organization would yield great savings. Defenders point out that the United Nations spends relatively little considering all that it is expected to do—its regular budget in 1994 was $1.3 billion, with peacekeeping consuming another $3.3 billion—but most everyone would concede that there is room for further efficiency measures. Some, such as eliminating various staff positions, have already been carried out, following recommendations in the 1993 Thornburgh Report, and Boutros-Ghali appears committed to more. But proposals by the secretary-general's office to cut agencies and personnel have frequently been blocked by member states. Most important, no amount of savings will permit the world organization to be solvent if members, especially those in the Security Council, keep adding to the

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United Nations' tasks and operations. Responsibility, in other words, must also be shouldered by the governments.

This applies even more directly to the late payment or even nonpayment of countries' annual contributions. The two worst sinners here, to their discredit, are both permanent members of the Security Council and founders of the United Nations: the United States, and Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union. But other countries add to the arrears so that these typically total up to about half of both the regular and the peacekeeping budget. This keeps the United Nations in fiscal crisis—what would be regarded as an impossible operating situation for any private company and for most member governments. The very least that members might do would be to recommit themselves to pay their assessments fully and on time, as they are legally obliged to do. But this should be accompanied by agreement to revise the formulas for assessing contributions (especially the formula for peacekeeping costs), which are out of date and disadvantage certain powers, notably the United States.

More ambitious reformers suggest, considering the vagaries of the present system and the prospect of increased demands on the organization, that the United Nations be assured an income flow that is larger but also independent of member governments' willingness or capacity to pay on time. Two camps are against this: conservatives who fear that it would free the world body from the displeasure of governments and the threat to withhold assessed contributions, and what might be termed U.N. fiscal constitutionalists, who declare that since the organization is the possession of member states, the latter should be fully responsible for financing it (except for agencies like UNICEF that collect voluntary contributions).

The historic moment should not be missed. The heads of state should seize it in New York in October.

Yet the case for funding an innovative and reliable revenue flow for the United Nations is strong. The organization ought not to have its work delayed and diminished by fiscal uncertainties. Moreover, governments might welcome not having to cajole reluctant legislatures each year to vote their national assessment, and states in economic distress would be relieved that funding came from a source other than their exchequers. There is no lack of ideas on potential

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new sources. Most involve taxes on the use of the global commons (a small levy on currency transactions or tickets for international airline flights, for example). Since international business, tourism, and communications rely on international governance structures, the argument goes, a modest contribution to the latter's operating costs seems appropriate. That said, however, all the proposed global taxes raise technical and legal issues that would require detailed study and negotiation through the General Assembly. The question remains: would member states at last permit the United Nations a revenue source other than their own contributions?

ACT NOW OR BE PUSHED LATER

THESE ARE breathtakingly large problems, and in the present political climate readers may doubt that what has been proposed above could ever be achieved, even if they themselves subscribe to such ideas. Yet they might also recall that, despite setbacks, the United Nations has altered and evolved in ways that were striking at the time but are now taken for granted. Meanwhile, decade by decade we move closer to worrying demographic, ecological, fiscal, and socioeconomic thresholds. The world faces a blunt choice between initiating prudent and substantive improvements in the next few years or being forced into emergency measures if and when the situation deteriorates. Since no one can know our global future, is it not worthwhile to invest a small amount of humankind's capital in a worldwide insurance policy—which is what the United Nations is intended to be?

There are really only two paths to follow. Critics can deride the United Nations, its secretary-general, its "bloated bureaucracy," its failures in Bosnia, and so on. After all, there is a subtle argument that the world community needs a scapegoat for its setbacks and embarrassments, and since democratic governments have to deflect criticism from themselves, one of the United Nations' functions is to take the heat. As societies collapse, peacekeeping missions founder, and social stresses mount, there will always be someone to blame—the United Nations.

The alternative is to take advantage of the world organization's fiftieth birthday and the meeting of the heads of state and government in New York in late October during anniversary celebrations, to develop a

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process for considering substantive improvements in the system. While the United Nations is not the inefficient, incompetent body unfair critics depict it to be, it clearly requires a serious overhaul to prepare it for the years ahead. The process has already begun with the formation of study groups in the General Assembly and with the publication of reports on the United Nations' past, present, and future timed to coincide with the organization's half-century. Member states, acting through their permanent missions in the General Assembly, must now push ahead with a sustained examination of the various reform proposals, understanding that no single one will be perfect but that a distillation and then an advancement of the better ideas is urgently required. The historic moment should not be missed. The world owes it to the generations yet to come.

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The Sorrows of Egypt

Fouad Ajami

A TALE OF TWO MEN

A GENERATION after that day of October 6, 1981, when Anwar al-Sadat was struck down, a strange bond has been forged between Sadat and his assassin, Khalid Istanbuli. A place has been made in the country's narrative for both men. The history of Egypt, her very identity, is fluid enough to claim the wily ruler who swallowed his pride to deal with Israel and the United States, and also the assassin appalled by the cultural price paid in the bargain. In a sense, Sadat and Istanbuli are twins, their lives and deeds one great tale of the country's enduring dilemmas and her resilience amid great troubles, about the kind of political men Egypt's history brought forth when her revolutionary experiment of the 1950s and 1960s ran aground.

It is not hard for Egyptians to recognize much of themselves and their recent history in Istanbuli, the young lieutenant who proclaimed with pride that he had shot the pharaoh. He was in every way a son of the Free Officer Revolution of Gamal Abdel Nasser, of July 23, 1952, when Egypt cast aside her kings and set out on a new, nonaligned path. Istanbuli was born in 1957, a year after the Suez Crisis, during what seemed to be a moment of promise in the life of Egypt. He was named after Nasser's oldest son. His father was a lawyer in a public-sector company that was a product of the new, expanding government. He was ten years old when calamity struck Egypt in the Six Day War, and the Nasser revolution was shown to be full of sound and

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

PETER TURNLEY/BLACK STAR

"At the heart of Egyptian life there lies a terrible sense of disappointment."

fury and illusion. The country had been through a whirlwind and Istanbuli's life mirrored the gains and the setbacks.

He had not been particularly religious; he had attended a Christian missionary school in his town in Middle Egypt. Political Islam entered his life late in the hour, not so long before he was to commit his dramatic deed of tyrannicide. An older brother of his, a religious

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activist, had been picked up in a massive wave of arrests that Sadat ordered in September 1981. All sorts of political men and women had been hauled off to prison: noted men and women of the elite, from the law, journalism, the universities, former ministers, Muslims and Copts alike. The wave of arrests had been a desperate throw of the dice by Sadat and it had backfired. It broke the moral contract between Sadat and his country. In taking revenge, Istanbuli did what normal society could not do for itself. "Khalid," an admiring author wrote in tribute to the assassin, "I spoke and you did, I wished, and others wished, and you fulfilled our wishes."

But Sadat too has a place, and an increasingly special one, in the country's memory. Sadat, it is true, had died a loner's death. Presumably victorious in October 1973 in the war against Israel, he was yet judged a lesser figure than his predecessor, who was defeated in 1967. But a certain measure of vindication has come Sadat's way: he had broken with Arab radicalism, and the years were to show that Arab radicalism's harvest had been ruin and bankruptcy. He had opted for peace with Israel; the Palestinians and other Arabs, so many of them shouting treason and betrayal, had followed in his footsteps. The crafty ruler, to his fingertips a wily man of the countryside with a peasant's instinctive shrewdness and wisdom, was able to see before it was evident to others that the Soviet Union was no match for American power.

It has not been lost on his people that Sadat had foreseen American primacy and had placed his bets on American power, making the sort of accommodation with America that his proud predecessor would have never been able to pull off. Then there is of course the gift he bequeathed his country: the liberation of the land that his legendary predecessor had lost in 1967. Indeed, ten days after Istanbuli was put to death with four of his fellow conspirators on April 15, 1982, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty.[1]

This tension in the psyche and politics of Egypt will persist:

[1] Sadat's legacy was given its due in a recent work of fiction by Naguib Mahfouz, *Before the Throne.* In the novella, the country's rulers, from the time of King Mina to Sadat, appear before a panel of judges drawn from their own ranks. The court is presided over by Osiris, chief deity in the Egyptian pantheon, and his wife, Isis. Sadat's rendition shows him as a simple Egyptian who held deep within himself the spirit of patriotism. Akhenaton greets him as a kindred spirit who opted for peace in his time as Akhenaton had

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

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

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
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

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between Sadat's world, with its temptations and its window on modernity, and Istanbuli's world, with its rigors and its furious determination to keep the West at bay. A fissure has opened, right in the heart of Egypt's traditionally stoic and reliable middle class. A wing of this class has defected to theocratic politics. The rest are disaffected and demoralized. There is no resolution in sight for this dilemma.

But we misconstrue Egypt's reality and the nature of its malady if we see it as another Islamic domino destined to fall, if we lean too hard on the fight between the regime and the Islamicist challengers. For all the prophecies of doom and the obituaries written of the Egyptian state, the custodians of political power have ridden out many storms. This is a country with a remarkable record of political stability. Only two regimes have governed modern Egypt over the last two centuries: the dynasty of the Albanian-born Muhammad Ali, the soldier of fortune, who emerged in the aftermath of the chaos unleashed by Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of the country in 1798, and the Free Officer regime of Nasser and Sadat and their inheritors. The sorrow of Egypt is made of entirely different material: the steady decline of its public life, the inability of an autocratic regime and of the middle class from which this regime issues to rid the country of its dependence on foreign handouts, to transmit to the vast underclass the skills needed for the economic competition of nations, to take the country beyond its endless alternation between false glory and self-pity.

THE THEOCRATIC CHALLENGE

WE MUST NOT exaggerate the strength of the theocratic challenge or the magnitude of the middle class' defection. In our fixation on the Iranian Revolution—the armed imam chasing Caesar out of power—we have looked for it everywhere and grafted its themes and outcomes onto societies possessed of vastly different traditions and temperaments.

done. Amenhotep III sees in Sadat his own love of glory and splendor but pities him because Sadat ruled during a time of poverty. Only Nasser audits Sadat harshly, rails against his shameful peace with Israel, his betrayal of the poor, the rampant corruption of his regime, the breach of faith with the revolution of 1952. The final words, though, belong to Isis and Osiris. Isis welcomes Sadat as a faithful son of the land of Egypt who restored Egypt's independence; Osiris grants him a place of honor among the immortals.

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There never was a chance that Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian preaching fire and brimstone in Brooklyn, would return to his land, Khomeini-like, to banish the secular powers and inherit the realm. Even the men who gunned down Sadat were under no illusions about their own power in the face of the state. No fools, these men knew the weight of the state, the strength of all they were hurling themselves against. They sought only the punishment of "the tyrant," sparing the lives of his lieutenants (Hosni Mubarak included), who stood inches away on the reviewing stand. Sadat's inheritors, the assassins hoped, would be humbled by what they had seen; they would refrain from playing with fire and from the kinds of violations Sadat (and his wife Jihan) had committed against the mores of the land.

Nor should we project Algeria's descent into hell onto Egypt. Look at Algeria with its terror and counterterror: armed Islamic groups campaigning against all perceived Francophiles, secularists, and emancipated women, reprisals by the state and its "eradicationists" who pass off their violence as the defense of modernity itself, state-sponsored killer squads, the ninjas with their ski masks. This politics of zeal and cruelty, so reminiscent of Argentina and Chile in the 1970s, is alien to the temperament of Egypt. The chasm between the Francophiles and the Arabo-Islamicists at the root of the terror in Algeria has no parallel in the experience and the life of Egypt. Contempt for the government there is aplenty in Egypt today, but the political and cultural continuity of the place has not ruptured. No great windfall was squandered by the Egyptian elite the way the nomenklatura in Algeria blew the oil revenue of the last three decades. Most important, unlike the shallow roots of the Algerian state—a postcolonial entity that rose in the 1960s—central authority in Egypt reaches back millennia.

The recent troubles began in 1992 when a small war broke out between the state and the Gamaat Islamiyya, the Islamic groups, as the loosely organized underground of the forces of political Islam call themselves. The armed bands treated the country to a season of wrath and troubles. But the state fought back; it showed little mercy toward the insurgents. It pushed their challenge to remote, marginal parts of the country, provincial towns in Middle and Upper Egypt, the country's poorest areas. There, beyond the modernity of Cairo and Alexandria, away from the glare of publicity, the running war between the police and

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the Islamicists degenerated into the timeless politics of vengeance and vendettas, an endless cycle of killings and reprisals. The campaign of terror against foreign tourists, the targeting of men of letters, the killing in the summer of 1992 of Farag Foda, a brave secularist commentator, the attempt on the life of the venerated and aging Naguib Mahfouz two years later—all played into the hands of the state. Men of the regime were also targeted by the insurgents. In 1993 there were three separate attempts, over the space of some six months, on the lives of the minister of information, the minister of the interior, and the prime minister.

Thus faced with a relentless campaign of subversion, the regime responded by showing no mercy. The state apparatus was given a green light to root out armed Islamic groups and to do it without the kinds of protections and restraints a society of laws honors and expects. The governors and police officers dispatched to Middle and Upper Egypt, the hotbeds of religious strife, have invariably been men known for their willingness to use force. Massive searches and arrests have been routine there, as they have been, when deemed necessary, in the poorer and more radicalized parts of Cairo. The military tribunals were swift. Nearly 70 death sentences were decreed and carried out.

Tough police work was one side of the response to the terror of the Islamicists; the other was a discernible retreat on the part of the regime from secular politics and culture. Historically the agent of social change, the one great instrument for transforming this old land and pushing it along, the state now seems to have slipped into a cynical bargain with some devoted enemies of the secular idea. It granted these preachers and activists cultural space as long as the more strictly political domain (the police power of the regime, its hegemony over defense and foreign affairs) was left to it.

The custodians of the state drew a line between the legitimate and moderate Islamic groups and the armed Islamicists. While the regime hunted down the latter, it made its peace with the former. A regime anxious for religious credentials of its own and for religious cover bent with the wind. Preachers and religious activists drawn from the ranks of the old Muslim Brotherhood, an organization now sanitized and made respectable in comparison with the younger, more uncompromising members of the Gamaat, were given access to the airwaves and the print media and became icons of popular culture. They dabbled in incendi-

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ary material, these respectable sorts, careful to stay on the proper side of the line. They advocated an Islamic state but said they would seek it through legitimate means. They branded as heretics and apostates noted secular figures in politics and culture. (One such influential preacher, Sheikh Muhammad Ghazali, a figure of the original Muslim Brotherhood and its clone, so branded all believers in Western law.) They hounded the Copts and made no secret of their view that the best the Copts, a community of no less than six million people, could hope for in a would-be Islamic state was the protected but diminished status of a subordinate community.[2] To all this the state turned a blind eye.

Fear of a fundamentalist takeover plays right into Mubarak's hands.

The country's leading center of Islamic learning and jurisprudence, al-Azhar University, has been given greater leeway and authority than it has possessed at any time this century. Where al-Azhar had been on the defensive during the Nasser years as an institution that had to be modernized and reformed, it now speaks with self-confidence on the social and cultural issues of the day. A wide swath of the country's cultural life is now open to the authorities of al-Azhar. The theological alternative has seeped into the educational curriculum. Until the state caught on a year or two ago and set out to reclaim some of this lost ground, whole schools had been ceded to the Islamicists. There the advocates of political Islam, their apparent zeal and devotion a marked contrast to the abdication all around, had gone to work, weaning the young from the dominant symbols and outlook of the secular political order. In schools captured by the Islamicists the national anthem and the Egyptian flag were banned for they were, to the religious radicals, the symbols of an un-Islamic state. "Political Islam had been checked in its bid for power," the shrewd analyst and observer Tahseen Basheer said, "but the Islamization of society has gained ground."

It did not come on the cheap, this victory of the state over the political

[2] The demographic weight of the Copts is one of the great riddles of Egypt. "We count everything in Egypt: cups, shoes. The only thing we don't count are the Copts. They have been two million since 1945. No one has died; no one has been born," political historian Rifaat Said observed. The political Islamicists prefer a low estimate of two million Copts. The number was given to me by Adel Hussein, a noted figure in the Islamic political movement. Other estimates run as high as ten million.

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Islamicists. The country feels trapped, cheated, and shortchanged in the battle between an inept, authoritarian state and a theocratic fringe. The tough response of the state did its work, but important segments of the population in the intellectual, political, and business classes drew back in horror at the tactics. Some of the very men and women sheltered by the regime against the fury of the Islamicists were taken aback by the number of executions ordered and the speed with which they were carried out. "Mubarak orders the executions but loses no sleep over them," a prominent figure of the opposition said to me. It has come down to this because the regime has little else in its bag. It is no consolation to Egyptians that they have been spared the terror visited on less fortunate places like Syria or Iraq or the Sudan. This is a country where lawyers and the rule of law had an early footing, a society with a rich syndicalist tradition and associational life and an independent judiciary with pride in its legacy. The terror had given Mubarak a splendid alibi and an escape from the demands put forth by segments of the middle class and its organizations in the professional syndicates—the lawyers, the engineers, and the journalists—for a measure of political participation. Mubarak had done order's work; it had become easy for him to wave off the tangled issues of economic and political reform.

ET IN ARCADIA EGO

AT THE HEART of Egyptian life there lies a terrible sense of disappointment. The pride of modern Egypt has been far greater than its accomplishments. The dismal results are all around: the poverty of the underclass, the bleak political landscape that allows an ordinary officer to monopolize political power and diminish all would-be rivals in civil society, the sinking of the country into sectarian strife between Muslim and Copt, the dreary state of its cultural and educational life.

A country of 60 million people, the weekly magazine *al-Mussawar* recently revealed, now produces a mere 375 books a year. Contrast this with Israel's 4,000 titles, as the magazine did, and it is easy to understand the laments heard all around. *Al-Ahram*, the country's leading daily—launched in 1876 and possessed of a distinguished history—is unreadable. There is no trace of investigative journalism or thoughtful analysis on its pages, only the banal utterances of political power. No less a figure than the great novelist Naguib Mahfouz, a product of the

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ancien régime (he was born in 1911), has spoken with sorrow and resignation about this state of affairs. "Egypt's culture is declining fast," he wrote. "The state of education in our country is in crisis. Classrooms are more like warehouses to cram children in for a few hours than places of education. The arts and literature are barely taught in these institutions, which are run more like army barracks than places where cultural awareness and appreciation can be nurtured." In more apocalyptic terms, the commentator Karim Alrawi warned that the modernizing imperative that has dominated and driven Egypt since the early 1800s after its encounter with Europe is being reversed.

Out of disappointment, a powerful nostalgia for Egypt's bourgeois past has emerged.

It is out of this disappointment that a powerful wave of nostalgia has emerged for the liberal interlude in Egyptian politics (the 1920s through the revolution of 1952), for its vibrant political life, for the lively press of the time, for the elite culture with its literati and artists, for its outspoken, emancipated women who had carved a place for themselves in the country's politics, culture, and journalism. Some of this is the standard nostalgia of a crowded, burdened society for a time of lost innocence and splendor; some, though, is the legitimate expression of discontent over the mediocrity of public life. Egypt produced better, freer cinema in the 1930s than it does today. Its leading intellectual figures were giants who slugged out the great issues of the day and gave Egyptian and Arabic letters a moment of undisputed brilliance. When the critic and writer Louis Awad, a Copt, a prolific and independent man of letters born in 1915, died in 1990, an age seemed to come to a close. The Egypt of the military has produced no peers for Awad and Mahfouz and their likes.

Curiosity about this bourgeois past and about its contemporary relevance led me to the home of Fuad Pasha Serageddin, a nearly legendary figure of that era, born in 1908, a man of the ancien régime, who was the boy wonder of his time, rising to become a minister at age 32. On the eve of the Free Officer revolt, he was the ancien régime's largest landholder: he was secretary-general of the Wafd Party, the repository of bourgeois Egyptian nationalism from 1919 until the military revolt of 1952. The Free Officer regime had imprisoned and then exiled him; he had returned in the 1970s when Sadat opened up the life of the country; in no time his political party, under its revered old name, the Wafd,

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became a force to reckon with. It was in many ways a natural home for the professionals and the Copts and the men and women of private industry and commerce. Sadat had derided the Pasha, had called him Louis XVI, but the figure from the prerevolutionary past made a place for himself in the new political order.

The Pasha—the country knows him by no other name—lives in a palace in Garden City, one of Cairo's neighborhoods that still has patches of what the city was in more quaint and less crowded times a half-century ago: villas once grand but now shabby and covered with dust, homes with gardens where the great bourgeois families once lived secure in their sense of place and order. The Pasha's palace, built by his father in 1929, speaks of bygone splendor. Dark and decaying inside, with the threadbare furniture of the era, it has the grand entrance and the marble columns of its time. The staff and servants, too, old and bent by the years, must have been with the Pasha's household since better times.

A scent of old Egypt, the Egypt of the grand tour, the country celebrated by Lawrence Durrell in his *Alexandria Quartet,* blows in with the Pasha when he enters the reception room. He has spanned decades and worlds of Egypt's contemporary history. Nostalgia and a scathing judgment of the military regime drive the Pasha's vision. He ridicules the government-controlled press; he now reads *al-Ahram*, he says, for the obituaries of his old friends; there is nothing else to read in the subservient press. He has a jaundiced view of the American role in Egypt. The Americans, he believes, feel quite comfortable with authoritarianism. The American fear of a fundamentalist takeover, he observes, plays into the hands of Mubarak's regime.

The Pasha's world, the world of his Wafd Party, has deep roots in this conservative land. But after a moment of genuine enthusiasm, the Wafd lost much of its lure. A bargain it made to contest the parliamentary elections back in 1984 in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood seemed like a betrayal of the party's secular heritage. The Pasha's age was another handicap. The memories his presence evoked were increasingly his alone. He reintroduced into the political world a measure of courage in the face of the state and launched a daily paper infinitely better than the official organs of the regime, but Egypt's troubles seemed beyond his scope. Sixteen million people have been added to the population since Mubarak came to power in 1981. This

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increase alone is more than the combined total populations of Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. The facts of Egypt's poverty and need are so well known that one hardly need state them. One set of figures reveals the trouble: 400,000 people enter the job market every year; 75 percent of the new entrants are unemployed; 90 percent of these people have intermediate or higher education diplomas. That is why some of Mubarak's critics concede the burden the regime has to carry. The task of keeping the place afloat and intact is like plowing the sea. This crowded land has gone beyond that pleasant bourgeois age and its houses with gardens.

THE PAST IS ANOTHER COUNTRY

IN ONE OF the country's best recent works of fiction, *War in the Land of Egypt*, Yusuf al-Qaid, a novelist of the younger generation, expresses the sense of siege and failure among his contemporaries:

> Every generation has a particular fate, and our fate, we the sons of Egypt, is that our ambitions were greater than our possibilities. We stepped forward but we found no ground underneath us; we lifted our heads to touch the clouds and the sky disappeared from above us. And at the very moment we divined the truth of our time our leader [Nasser] deserted us with his death right when we needed him. Let us look carefully at our land and our country. It is a strange place, at once dangerous and safe, hard and accommodating, harmonious and full of envy, satiated and hungry. The age of wars has ended; in Egypt today it is the age of words, and because words feed off one another the land of Egypt will only know the reign of words.

This is a jaded country that has known many false starts and faded dawns. Modern Egyptian history telescopes easily: from the time Napoleon Bonaparte's armada turned up off the coast of Alexandria in the summer of 1798, Egypt's history has in the main been its Sisyphean quest for modernity and national power. The ease with which the modern artillery of the French shredded the Mamluk soldiers who had conquered and possessed Egypt was the great dividing line in Egypt's history and the great spur of its political class. A quintessential romantic who knew texts and understood the power of memory, Bonaparte evoked Egypt's former splendor and greatness: "The first town we shall come to was built by Alexander. At every step we shall meet with grand recollections worthy of exciting the emulation of Frenchmen," he told his soldiers. From Cairo, in a later dispatch, the great conqueror noted a

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paradox: "Egypt is richer than any country in the world in corn, rice, vegetables, and cattle. But the people are in a state of utter backwardness."

The paradox the outsider saw may have been the self-serving justification of a commander who had happened onto a foreign adventure that had gone badly for him and was seeking a way out. But it would be fair to say that this paradox has engaged Egyptians over the last two centuries. Egypt has thrashed about in every direction, flirted with ideologies of all kinds—liberal ways, Marxism, fascist movements, Islamic utopias—but the urge for national progress, and the grief at being so near and yet so far, have defined the Egyptian experience in the modern world.

Dreams of deliverance visited Egypt four times in recent history; each ended in frustration.

Dreams of national power and deliverance have visited Egypt no less than four times in its recent history, and they all ended in frustration. Muhammad Ali (who ruled 1805-1848) made a bid of his own, a classic case of revolution from above, but he overreached and ran afoul of his nominal Ottoman masters and of Pax Britannica; his attempt to build a powerful state and a national manufacturing base came to naught. His descendant, the vainglorious Ismael Pasha (who ruled 1863-1879) gave it another try when cotton was king and a windfall came Egypt's way. Ismael built boulevards, railways, and an opera house; he declared on one occasion, "My country is now in Europe; it is no longer in Africa." But Ismael's dream ended in bankruptcy and ruin and led to the British conquest of Egypt in 1882.

The liberals of the 1920s and 1930s had their moment, flirted with a native capitalist path and parliamentary politics of sorts. But theirs was a fragile liberalism, prone to corruption, outflanked by collectivist ideologies (it was here in this period, in 1928 that the Muslim Brotherhood was formed), a liberalism in the shadow of an occupying foreign power. Then came Nasser's bid, perhaps Egypt's most heartbreaking moment of false promise: import substitution, pan-Arabism, a place in the nonaligned world, a national army that looked imposing and fierce before the whole edifice of Nasserism came crashing down.

Egyptians who know this narrative by heart see all these bids as brushes with success. This is part of the country's self-image. To rule Egypt is to rule against the background of these expectations and dis-

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appointments. Pity the air force officer who now presides over a country groaning under the weight of its numbers, scrambling to pay for its food imports, reconciling its claims to greatness with the fact of its dependence on American power and largess. Egyptians are not blind to what has befallen their country. They can see the booming lands in Asia, countries that were once poorer than Egypt, digging out of the poverty of the past. No way out has materialized for Egypt. The dreams of liberal reform, the hopes for revolution from above, the socialist bid of Nasser all withered away. The country drifts. No Lee Kuan Yew has risen here to make the place orderly and efficient even at a price in political and cultural freedom. The economy remains a hybrid. It combines a wild form of laissez-faire capitalism for the sharks and fat cats who raid the place with subsidies for the poorer classes. There is endless talk of economic reform. But the state has chosen the path of least resistance and stays with the status quo. The push for privatization that raised the share of the private sector from 23 percent of industrial output in 1974 to 30 percent a decade later has stalled. Four decades of positioning the country for foreign assistance from the Soviet Union, the Arab oil states, and the United States have done terrible damage to Egypt. A political economy and a mentality of dependence have set in.

THE GENDARME

CHRONICLERS OF the Mubarak regime may look back at his rule as ten good years followed by lean years of trouble and drift.[3] By his own early accounts and self-portrayal an ordinary man with no claims to greatness, Mubarak appeared to heed the fate of his predecessor. A cautious man, he drew back from the precipice, stitching back together as best he knew how the fault line between the state and the mainstream opposition. He rebuilt bridges to the Arab world burned by Sadat; he gave every indication that the fling with America and the West that had carried Sadat away would be reined in, that a sense of proportion and restraint would be restored to Egyptian politics. He presented himself as a man with clean hands who would put an end

[3] There is material here for the immortals in Mahfouz's fictional court to pronounce on Mubarak when his turn comes.

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

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

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to the crony capitalism and economic pillage of the Sadat era.

But Mubarak was no great reformer bent on remaking the political landscape. To begin with, he labored against the background of an adverse set of changes in the economic domain. The 1980s proved to be a difficult decade for Egypt's economy. The rate of annual growth plummeted; in 1989-90 the economy grew a mere two percent, less than the growth in the population. Egypt dropped from the World Bank's group of lower-middle-income countries to its lower-income category; inflation rose and the real income of industrial workers eroded. A regime unable to reverse this decline fell back on its powers of coercion when the Gamaat took on the state.

In retrospect, the choice that mattered was made by Mubarak with his coronation for a third term in 1993. A modest man (a civil servant with the rank of president, a retired army general of Mubarak's generation described him to me) had become president for life. Mubarak had broken a pledge that he would limit himself to two terms in office. Though outsiders may have a romantic view of Egyptians as patient fellaheen tilling the soil under an eternal sky, in veritable awe of their rulers, in fact a strong sense of skepticism and a keen eye for the foibles of rulers pervade Egyptian political culture. No one had the means to contest Mubarak's verdict; a brave soul or two quibbled about the decision. An open letter was sent to Mubarak by Basheer, one of the country's most thoughtful and temperate public figures, questioning the wisdom of the decision. Autocracy prevailed, but a healthy measure of the regime's legitimacy seemed to vanish overnight.

That keen eye for the ruler's foibles now saw all Mubarak's defects. He had hung around too long. An inarticulate man, he had done it without bonding with the country. The national elections he presided over became increasingly fraudulent and transparent. Worse still, Mubarak ran afoul of his country's sense of propriety by refusing to designate a successor or help develop a process of orderly succession. His two predecessors, much larger historic figures with far greater claims to political legitimacy, their personal histories deeply intertwined with their country's, never dared go that far. Supreme in the political domain, Nasser always ruled with a designated successor in place. And Sadat had chosen Mubarak in homage to generational change. Mubarak had no claim to inheritance when Sadat picked him from a large officer corps; it was Sadat's will that made him.

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In contrast, Mubarak rules alone: the glory (what little of it there has been of late) and the burdens are his. He stands sentry against the armed Islamicists, but the expectations of the 1980s—modernizing the polity, giving it freer institutions, taking it beyond the power of the army—have been betrayed. At heart he is a gendarme determined to keep intact the ruler's imperative. Is it any wonder that those rescued from the wrath and the reign of virtue promised by the Islamicists have no affection for the forces of order and feel no great sense of deliverance?

The defects of a political system without an orderly succession in place and reliant on the armed forces as a last arbiter were laid bare last June when Mubarak, in Addis Ababa to attend a meeting of the Organization of African Unity, escaped unhurt from an armed attack on his motorcade. He rushed back home full of fury against the Sudanese whom he accused of masterminding the attempt on his life; he was eager, as well, to tell of his cool under fire, the man of the armed forces who had known greater dangers. The play of things was given away in the scripted celebrations of Mubarak's safety. The men of the religious establishment hailed Mubarak as a just ruler who kept the faith. The military officers renewed their pledge of allegiance and warned that they were there to ward off the dangers to the regime. The minister for municipalities said that the crowds from the provinces who had wanted to come to Cairo would have covered the "face of the sun." The one obvious lesson that was not drawn, the danger that went unexamined and unstated, was the vacuum, the uncertainty, that would have been left behind had Mubarak been struck down in Ethiopia. Egyptians were no doubt relieved to have Mubarak back: that is not the kind of tragedy they would want for him or for themselves. But no staged celebrations and no display of bravado on the Egypt-Sudan frontier could hide the stalemate of the Egyptian political order.

PAN-ARABISM REDUX

A PAN-ARAB wind, a pan-Arab temptation, has lately emerged in Egypt. It is the return of an old consolation that brought Egypt failure and bitterness. From her pundits and intellectuals can now be heard a warmed-over version of the pan-Arab arguments of the 1960s, a disquiet over the country's place in the region. And for all the vast

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aid the United States has poured into Egypt over the last two decades, there is in the air as well a curious free-floating hostility to American ideals and interests, a conviction that the United States wishes Egypt permanent dependency and helplessness, a reflexive tendency to take up, against America's wishes, the cause of renegade states like Libya and Iraq, a belief that the United States is somehow engaged with Israel in an attempt to diminish and hem in the power and influence of Egypt. The peace with Israel, we know, stands, but it is unclaimed and disowned by the professional and intellectual class in the country, the pharaoh's peace, concluded by Sadat a generation ago and kept to a minimum by his inheritors.

This new version of pan-Arabism, we are told, would be pragmatic whereas the old movement led by Nasser was romantic and loud and strident. Egypt would lead other Arabs, she would help defend the security of the Persian Gulf states (against Iran) and set the terms of accommodation with Israel, but she would do all this without shrillness, without triggering a new ideological war in the Arab world. She would use her skills and her vast bureaucratic apparatus to balance the power of Israel.

In truth, the pan-Arabism that the Egyptian state (and the intellectual class) wishes to revive is a mirage. Egypt's primacy in Arab politics is a thing of the past. Arabs have gone their own separate ways. Egypt was the last to proclaim the pan-Arab idea, the first to desert it. If Egypt succumbs again to that temptation as a way of getting out of its troubles, the detour will end in futility. To borrow an old expression, pan-Arabism will have visited twice: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. Egypt cannot set the terms or the pace of the accommodation in the Fertile Crescent between Israel and each of its neighbors. These terms will be decided by the protagonists. The irony was not lost on the Jordanians when the Egyptians began to deride them for their forthcoming peace with Israel. It was under Egyptian command during those fateful six days in 1967 that Jordan lost the West Bank and east Jerusalem. Jordan then had to wait on the sidelines for an entire generation after the Camp David accords as Egypt garnered the wages of peace and the vast American aid that came with it.

Egypt cannot render services that are no longer in demand: her doomed and quixotic campaign, waged earlier this year, against the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the attempt to hold the

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treaty hostage to new controls over Israel's nuclear capabilities offers a cautionary tale. The campaign rolled together Egypt's panic about its place in the region, the need to demonstrate some distance from American power, and the desire to reassert Egypt's primacy in Arab politics. The regime threw everything it had into the fight. For months it was high drama: Egypt against the elements. But it was to no avail. There were no Arab riders anxious to join the Egyptian posse. The passion had gone out of that old fight.

Nor is there a special assignment for Egypt in securing the sea-lanes of the Persian Gulf or defending the Arabian Peninsula. To balance the two potential revisionist states, Iran and Iraq, the conservative states of the gulf will rely on American power and protection. This is an assignment for an imperial power; it is now America's, as it had been Britain's. In that kind of work Egypt has a minor role, as it did in Desert Storm, providing an Arab cover for American power. There could be gains for Egypt here, but they are at best marginal ones.

Egyptians who know their country so well have a way of reciting its troubles, then insisting that the old resilient country shall prevail. As an outsider who has followed the twists of the country's history and who approaches the place with nothing but awe for its civility amid great troubles, I suspect they are right. The country is too wise, too knowing, too tolerant to succumb to a reign of theocratic zeal. Competing truths, whole civilizations have been assimilated and brokered here; it is hard to see Cairo, possessed of the culture that comes to great, knowing cities turning its back on all that. The danger here is not that of sudden, cataclysmic upheaval, but of the steady descent into deeper levels of pauperization, of the lapse of the country's best into apathy and despair, of Egypt falling yet again through the trap door of its history of disappointment.

Some two decades ago, in the aftermath of the October war of 1973, the influential journalist Mohamed Heikal, Nasser's main publicist, set out to explain to Henry Kissinger that Egypt was more than a state on the banks of the Nile, that it was an idea and a historical movement. Yet that is all that remains. Both the Mediterranean temptation of Egypt being a piece of Europe and the pan-Arab illusion have run aground. To rule Egypt today is to rule a burdened state on the banks of the Nile and to rule it without the great consolations and escapes of the past.

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Social Capital and the Global Economy

Francis Fukuyama

A REDRAWN MAP OF THE WORLD

CONVENTIONAL MAPS of the global economy divide the major players into three groups: the United States and its partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union (EU), and East Asia, led by Japan but with the four dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and the People's Republic of China catching up rapidly. This three-pronged geography is said to correspond to major divisions in the approach to political economy: at one pole lie Japan and the newly industrialized Asian economies, which have relied heavily on state-centered industrial policies to guide their development, while at the other extreme lies the United States, with its commitment to free-market liberalism. Europe, with its extensive social welfare policies, lies somewhere in between.

This familiar map, while not wrong, is today not the most useful way of understanding global economic geography. The most striking difference among capitalist countries is their industrial structure. Germany, Japan, and the United States were quick to adopt the corporate form of organization as they industrialized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and today their economies are hosts to giant, professionally managed corporations like Siemens, Toyota, Ford, and Motorola. By contrast, the private sectors of France, Italy, and capi-

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talist Chinese societies like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the marketized parts of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are dominated by smaller, family-owned and -managed businesses. These societies have had much greater difficulties institutionalizing large-scale private corporations; their relatively small companies, while dynamic, tend to fall apart after a generation or two, whereupon the state is tempted to step in to make possible large-scale industry.

The reasons for these differences in industrial structure have less to do with level of development than with a key cultural characteristic, what the sociologist James Coleman has labeled social capital—that is, the component of human capital that allows members of a given society to trust one another and cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations. In this redrawn map of the world, Germany, Japan, and the United States are societies with healthy endowments of social capital and thus have more in common with each other than any of them do with low-trust countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Italy, or France. The competitiveness literature of the past decade has it wrong when it describes the United States and Japan as polar opposites with respect to individualism and group orientation. In fact, the strong historical propensity of Americans to form voluntary associations is quite similar to that of the Japanese, and it is no accident that these two societies pioneered the development first of the corporate form of business organization and later the smaller, decentralized network.

Virtually all economic activity, from running a laundry to building the latest-generation microprocessor, is carried out not by individuals but by organizations that require a high degree of social cooperation. As economists argue, the ability to form organizations depends on institutions like property rights, contracts, and a system of commercial law. But it also depends on a prior sense of moral community, that is, an unwritten set of ethical rules or norms that serve as the basis of social trust. Trust can dramatically reduce what economists call transaction costs—costs of negotiation, enforcement, and the like—and makes possible certain efficient forms of economic organization that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules, contracts, litigation, and bureaucracy. Moral communities, as they are lived and experienced by their members, tend to be the product not of rational choice in the economists' sense of the term, but of nonrational habit.

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A number of forms of social capital enable people to trust one another and build economic organizations. The most obvious and natural one is the family, with the consequence that the vast majority of businesses, historically and at present, are family businesses. Family structure affects the nature of family businesses: the large extended families of southern China or central Italy have become the basis for rather large-scale and dynamic enterprises. Beyond the family, there are kinship ties like the lineages of China and Korea that expand the radius of trust.

Families, however, are a mixed blessing with regard to economic development. The most important form of sociability from an economic standpoint is the ability of strangers (that is, non-kin) to trust one another and work together in new and flexible forms of organization. This type of spontaneous sociability is frequently weakened by cultures that emphasize family relationships to the exclusion of all others. In many cultures, there is something of a tradeoff between the strength of family ties and the strength of non-kinship bonds. Moreover, if familism is not accompanied by the strong emphasis on education and work in Confucian or Jewish cultures, for example, then it can lead to a stifling morass of nepotism and inbred stagnation.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

TRUST VARIES from one society to another. Japan is typically portrayed as a highly group-oriented society, while the United States is seen as the epitome of individualism. In fact, both societies are quite similar to one another insofar as they have both historically been relatively high-trust societies. American society has always been characterized by a dense network of voluntary associations—private schools, hospitals, choral societies, literary clubs, Bible study groups, and private business organizations both large and small. Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville saw this art of association as a key virtue of American democracy, one that served to moderate the political system's inherent tendency toward individualism by schooling people in social cooperation and public-spiritedness. These countries were among the first, both chronologically and within the time frame of their own development, to form large-scale, hierarchical, professionally managed corporations in which ownership was dispersed and separated from management.

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The significance of social capital to an economy becomes clear when contrasting a high-trust society like Japan with a low-trust society like China. The industrial structure of capitalist Chinese societies, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the market sector of the PRC, is characterized by small scale. In *Fortune*'s list of the 150 largest Pacific Rim firms, only one—a state-owned petroleum company—is Chinese. Taiwan has a GDP 5 percent as large as Japan's, but its 10 largest companies are only 2 percent as large (by revenues) as Japan's 10 largest. There is a strong cultural resistance in Chinese society to bringing in unrelated professional managers; as a consequence, there are relatively few large, hierarchical, professionally managed corporations of a Japanese variety. While some of these businesses, like the empires of Li Kashing or the late Y. K. Pao in Hong Kong, have grown to be enormous, they remain family-managed at the top and pervaded by kinship ties in their management structures.

The reason for the relatively small scale of Chinese businesses is the centrality of the family in Chinese culture. In sharp contrast to Japan, family relations trump all other social obligations. While the level of trust within families and, to a lesser extent, extended kinship groups like lineages, is high, it comes at the expense of trust between people who are unrelated. Hence the extraordinary difficulty that Chinese firms have in institutionalizing themselves once the founding family passes from the scene. Japanese families, by contrast, are smaller and have exerted a much weaker social pull than their Chinese counterparts. Loyalty to groups not based on kinship has eclipsed family relations since at least Tokugawa times, a practice still reflected in the Japanese manager's willingness to abandon spouse and children in favor of work colleagues evenings and weekends.

The contrast between Japan and China is replicated in other parts of the world. Germany is a high-trust society that since medieval times has been crisscrossed by innumerable intermediate associations. Italy, by contrast, has relatively few large private corporations, all of them clustered in the northern industrial triangle. Italy's GDP is two-thirds that of Germany, but its ten largest private companies are only one-third as large as Germany's top ten. The dynamic part of the Italian economy over the past two generations has been the innumerable small-scale family firms that have cropped up in what has

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

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come to be known as la terza Italia, or the third Italy, encompassing the central regions of Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, and the Marche. In certain regions of Italy, the family remains the principal form of social capital; trust among non-kin, as in Chinese societies, is relatively weak and impedes the formation of large, professionally managed corporations. France has never been family-oriented like central or southern Italy but was subject to ambitious centralizing governments that undermined its civil society and created a deficit of intermediate organizations between the family and the state. The French private sector consequently has always been weaker than its German and American counterparts and for many years has been organized around conservative family businesses.



A society may also have neither strong families nor strong associations outside of kinship—in other words, it may be deficient in social capital across-the-board. Edward Banfield, in his classic analysis of a peasant village in southern Italy, described a culture whose families were nuclear, small, and weak. Family businesses remained marginal, and entrepreneurs failed to build factories because they believed it was the obligation of the state to do so for them. The African-American poor in contemporary American inner cities, where single-parent families predominate and larger social groups are weak, are another case. With the destruction of the mir and other traditional communal

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organizations after the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian countryside lost any significant associational life outside of the collectivized state farms, and the Russian peasant family was at the same time troubled and weak. One of the reasons that decollectivization of agriculture in China has been so much easier to implement than in Russia is the enduring strength of the Chinese peasant household, which became the backbone of a revitalized countryside after the economic reforms of 1978. It would appear that in many contemporary African cities, older political structures and family ties have broken down with rapid urbanization but have not been replaced by strong voluntary associations outside of kinship. Needless to say, this kind of atomized society does not provide fertile ground for economic activity, supporting neither large organizations nor family businesses.

One notable thread that runs through such societies is that of delinquent community: the strongest community structures tend to be criminal organizations. It is as if there is a natural, universal human impulse toward sociability, which, if blocked from expressing itself through social structures like the family or voluntary organizations, appears in forms like criminal gangs. Indeed, mafias have appeared as a major form of social organization precisely in places like southern Italy, the American inner city, Russia, and many sub-Saharan African cities, which lack social capital.

This map is not immutable. There are indications that the American art of association has been in serious decline over the past couple of generations and that Americans are becoming as individualistic as they have always believed themselves to be. Social capital, just like economic capital, will be depleted if not periodically renewed.

CORPORATE TRUSTS

IT IS NOT clear that the inability of low-trust societies to create large-scale organizations constitutes a particular constraint on rates of aggregate economic growth, at least in the early phases of industrialization. What small companies give up in terms of financial clout, technological resources, and staying power, they gain in flexibility, lack of bureaucracy, and speed of decision-making. Throughout the 1980s, Italy's economy and those of other familistic Latin Catholic societies

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in the EU grew faster than Germany's. Those who, like Max Weber, argued that Chinese familism would impede economic modernization were simply wrong. Indeed, it is likely that small Chinese and Italian family businesses will prosper more than large Japanese or German corporations in sectors serving fast-changing, highly segmented consumer markets. If the only objective of these societies is the maximization of aggregate wealth, then they have no particular need to move beyond relatively small-scale family businesses.

The primary impact of spontaneous sociability would appear to be not on growth rates but on industrial structure—that is, the number and importance of large versus small corporations in a national economy and the ways in which they interact. Culture inhibits the growth of large companies in some societies, permits it in others, and stimulates the emergence of new forms of economic enterprise, such as the Japanese network organization, in still others. Industrial structure, in turn, determines the sectors of the global economy in which a country participates. The purpose of large corporations is to exploit economies of scale in sectors that are capital-intensive, involve complex manufacturing processes, or require extensive distribution networks. Small companies, on the other hand, tend to be better at organizing more labor-intensive activities and cluster in sectors demanding flexibility, innovativeness, and speed in decision-making. A society hosting giant corporations will gravitate toward automobiles, semiconductors, aerospace, and the like, while those inclined toward small businesses will tend to concentrate in industries like apparel, machine tools, and furniture.

In the absence of a wide radius of trust and an inclination for spontaneous association, a society has two options for building large-scale economic organizations. The first has been exploited from time immemorial: use of the state as a promoter of economic development, often directly in the form of state-owned and state-managed enterprises. Taiwan, for example, has always had a large state sector, which at one time accounted for almost 30 percent of GDP. While declining in importance over time, the state sector was critical to Taiwan's ability to develop industries requiring large scale, like petrochemicals, aerospace, and defense. The Italian and French states have had to step in repeatedly to shore up failing large private companies and the employ-

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ment they created. The state was particularly critical to France's drive to be a player in certain high-tech fields where scale was important. In low-trust societies like Taiwan, France, and Italy, the absence of private, large-scale firms leads to a saddle-shaped distribution of enterprises, with numerous dynamic small firms at one end of the scale and a small number of large, state-supported companies at the other.

Large organizations in a low-trust society may also be built through foreign direct investment or joint ventures with large foreign partners. This route has been taken by many of the fast-developing states of Southeast Asia: a list of the largest companies in countries like Singapore, Malaysia, or Thailand will often include, besides state-owned companies, local subsidiaries of major multinationals. This pattern also holds true in much of Latin America and seems to be developing in parts of the former communist world as well.

One might argue that because the failure to generate large-scale economic organizations in the private sector can be overcome either by the intervention of the state or through foreign investment, the whole issue of spontaneous sociability is, in the long run, not important. In some sense that is true: France, despite the weakness of its private sector, has still managed to achieve front-rank status as a technologically advanced power through its state-owned and subsidized companies. There are, however, important caveats to this line of argument. State-run companies are almost always less efficient than their private counterparts: managements are constantly tempted to base decisions on political rather than market criteria, and strategic state investment may be misdirected because of simple miscalculation. In some cultures state-run companies can be better managed than in others, and mechanisms exist to shield them from political pressures. But though parastatals in Singapore and Taiwan may have been run better than those of Brazil or Mexico, they still have tended to be less efficient and dynamic than their private-sector counterparts.

Foreign direct investment causes problems of a different sort. The technology and management skills brought in by foreign multinationals ultimately diffuse into the local economy. But that can take many years. In the meantime, countries whose leading companies are subsidiaries of foreign corporations face problems starting competitive businesses owned and managed by locals. Many of the fast moderniz-

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ers in Asia like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan permitted inflows of foreign capital but constrained direct investment by foreign multinationals in order to give native businesses a chance to ramp up to global standards.

THE CONFUCIAN COMPLICATION

GIVEN THE sharp contrasts between the economic cultures of China and Japan noted above, there is no single Asian model of economic development and no unified Confucian challenge to the West. There are, of course, aspects of culture common to virtually all East Asian societies. Among these is respect for education, which has been shared equally by Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and the other cultures touched by Confucianism in a significant way. Similarly, all East Asian cultures share a strong work ethic. All these societies have come to terms with the legitimacy of worldly labor; aristocratic or religious values disdaining commerce, money-making, and the dignity of everyday work have largely disappeared. Finally, in most Asian societies, the state has played a rather large and active role in shaping the direction of economic development. That is far from a universal characteristic of Asian development, however. There is wide variation in the degree of state intervention throughout East Asia, from the hyperactivity of the Korean state in the Park Chung Hee period to the almost totally laissez-faire administration of the British colonial government in Hong Kong.

In terms of sociability, however, there are major differences between Japan, China, and Korea, differences that have resulted in distinct industrial structures, management practices, and forms of organization. Many Americans and Europeans tend to see Asia as more homogeneous than it actually is, with Taiwan, Singapore, the PRC, and other states in Southeast Asia rising fast and following the same development trajectory as Japan, only on a later schedule. This view has been reinforced by promoters of the concept of a Confucian challenge from East Asia.

The reality is that Asian countries have been segmented into different sectors of the global economy and are likely to stay there for some time. Japan and Korea, with their large corporations, have moved into areas like automobiles, consumer electronics, and semi-

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conductors that are directly competitive with large North American and European industries. Those sectors are not, however, a natural strength of most Chinese societies, which do better in sectors where flexibility rather than scale is important. There are in fact two rival economic cultures arising in Asia, one Japanese and the other Chinese. Each of these cultures is unified in a literal sense by large network organizations based, characteristically, on generalized social trust in the Japanese case and on family and kinship in the Chinese. These networks obviously interact with each other at many points, but their internal wiring diagrams proceed along very distinct paths.

Japan and Korea, with their large corporations, directly compete with North America.

The difficulties experienced by Chinese societies in establishing large, private, professionally managed corporations are likely to have long-run economic consequences. In sharp contrast to the first half of the twentieth century, when most people believed industrial modernity required gigantic enterprises, the fashion today has swung in the opposite direction, toward the belief that small is beautiful. The latter view, however, drawn largely from the fast-changing computer industry, may well be overdrawn: the future may belong to neither large nor small companies per se, but rather to those societies that can innovate and create the appropriate organizations to meet the needs of 21st century businesses. Japan, Germany, and the United States all have vigorous small companies in addition to their giant corporations. They are more likely to adapt to new organizational requirements than a society like China, in which kinship ties and a deficit of trust continue to act as a constraint. Unforeseen technological developments may restore the prestige of large enterprises, which would create special problems for China.

Moreover, many countries believe that the acquisition of industries in certain key strategic sectors is a good thing in itself, either because they believe that they know better than the market where the best long-run returns will be or else because they are seeking noneconomic ends like international prestige or national security. France and Korea are prime examples, and China is likely to follow suit. The lack of a spontaneous tendency toward large organizations

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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may create particular pitfalls for China because of the problematic character of the Chinese state. The Chinese economy is currently bifurcated into an old, inefficient, and declining state sector (that boasts, among other things, the world's least efficient automobile manufacturing operation) and a new market sector composed mostly of small family businesses or joint ventures with foreign partners. What does not exist in China today is a modern, efficient, private large-company sector. China's astounding rate of aggregate growth in recent years (some 13 percent per year in 1992 and 1993) has been fueled largely by the capitalist small business sector and by foreign investment. These rates of growth have been made possible by the introduction of market incentives into a hugely inefficient command economy. At the moment, China is too poor to worry about the sectoral distribution of its industries; everyone is grateful enough that they are growing at such a rapid rate. There are many basic problems that have yet to be worked out, such as the establishment of a stable system of property rights and commercial law.

But China will face major problems if it catches up to the current per capita income of Taiwan or Hong Kong in the next generation or two. China watchers are familiar with a litany of potential problems that may brake the country's future growth, such as inflationary pressures, absent infrastructure, and bottlenecks from too-rapid development; vast disparities in per capita income between the coastal provinces and the hinterland; and a large number of environmental time bombs that will explode in another generation or two. In addition to facing these problems, however, China will need to develop large, modern, professionally managed corporations. While Taiwan or Singapore might be willing to leave certain high-prestige forms of manufacturing to others while they grow faster along more market-directed lines, the same is unlikely to be true for mainland China. China as a great power is not going to want to be left out of the high end of industrial modernity. China's very size dictates that it eventually develop a balanced economy, including both capital- and labor-intensive sectors; it cannot expect to reach a high level of overall development as a niche player like the small states of East Asia.

The shift from family business to modern corporations is going to be more problematic for the PRC than it was for Japan or the United

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States, and the state will have to play a larger role. China needs, at a minimum, political stability born of a basic legitimacy of its political institutions and a competent state structure prone neither to excessive corruption nor outside political influence. China's communist political structure, however, lacks legitimacy and, increasingly, competence. It is not at all clear to most observers whether China's political institutions will survive the enormous socioeconomic pressures its headlong industrialization has created, or whether there will even be a unitary state by the 21st century. An unstable China, or a China ruled by a nervous and capricious government, will not be a propitious environment for wise economic policymaking. Nor will an economic environment in which a strong state is constantly required to step in to guide development be favorable to the growth of Chinese democracy.

The contrast between Japanese and Chinese economic culture has important implications for Japan as well. With the latter become an economic superpower in recent years, there has been talk among certain Japanese of a Japanese model for the other nations of Asia, if not other parts of the world. And indeed, the Japanese have a great deal to teach other nations of Asia (not to mention competitors in North America and Europe), which have already benefited greatly from Japanese technology and management skills in the recent past. In terms of industrial structure, however, there is a wide gap between Japan and other Asian cultures and some reason for thinking that it will be difficult for Sinitic societies to adopt Japanese practices. The *keiretsu* system, for example, would seem to be very difficult to export to a Chinese society. Chinese firms and entrepreneurs are too individualistic to cooperate in that fashion and in any case have their own kinship networks to fall back on.

THE POVERTY OF ECONOMIC DISCOURSE

THERE IS a cautionary tale embedded in the analysis of the ways in which different societies came by their relative endowments of social capital. A common condition applies to many familistic societies experiencing a low degree of trust between non-kin. China, France, southern Italy, and other low-trust societies all went through a period of strong political centralization, when an absolute emperor, monarch, or

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state deliberately set out to eliminate competitors for power. In such societies, the social capital that existed in the period before absolutist centralization was depleted. Intermediate social structures like the French guilds were first placed in the service of the state and then, after the Revolution, abolished altogether.

By contrast, those societies experiencing a high degree of social trust, such as Japan, Germany, and the United States, never experienced a prolonged period of centralized state power. With political power more dispersed—as in the Japanese and German feudal periods, or as a deliberate result of constitutional structure in the United States—a rich profusion of social organizations could flourish without interference and become the basis for economic cooperation. In Germany, for example, the guilds were never abolished but rather modernized in such a way that they eventually became the basis for that country's much-admired apprenticeship system of industrial training.

The competitiveness literature misses the role of culture.

The foregoing suggests that societies that rely on a powerful and all-encompassing state to promote economic development run a double risk. Not only will state-supported companies be less efficient and risk breaking national budgets in the short run, but the very intervention of the state may weaken the society's underlying propensity for spontaneous sociability in the long run. France, which enjoyed a dense web of civil associations at the end of the Middle Ages, saw them systematically undercut more than 500 years ago by a modernizing monarchy. To this day, despite countless efforts to decentralize political life and energize the private sector, the French continue to have great difficulties associating with one another spontaneously, outside the framework of centralized, bureaucratic, rule-bound authority.

Awareness of the importance of social capital illuminates the poverty of contemporary economic discourse. For the past decade, the central debate over the global economy has taken place between the neomercantilists and orthodox neoclassical economists. The former group, represented by writers like James Fallows, Clyde Prestowitz, and Chalmers Johnson, have argued that neoclassical economists have ignored the central role of the state in promoting Asian economic development, a role they claim invalidates standard

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models of market-oriented development. The neoclassicists, for their part, argue that Asian development happened despite state intervention, and they point to failures on the part of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry and other planning ministries.

What both sides in this debate miss is the role of culture. For all their awareness of the peculiarities of Asian development, the neomercantilists are as universalistic in their policy prescriptions as the neoclassical economists. They argue that America's unwillingness to implement an Asian industrial policy is harming its global competitive position. It is clear, however, that both the need for an industrial policy and the ability to implement one effectively are dependent on cultural factors like social capital. Japan, Germany, and the United States have robust private sectors able to generate large-scale organizations spontaneously; China, Italy, and France do not, so it is perfectly natural there that the state should step in to promote this kind of organization. The ability to manage state-owned corporations or to distribute subsidies effectively is also very much dependent on culture. Asia is distinctive because many of the states there have succeeded in shielding their public authorities from pressure to maintain employment or direct subsidies toward politically influential sectors, something that has eluded public bureaucrats in much of Europe and Latin America. One therefore cannot argue for or against industrial policy on abstract grounds; its chances for success depend on the specific cultural, political, and historical environment in which it is implemented.

We are at the end of a prolonged period in which modern states have been key promoters of economic growth and social transformation. No one would deny that in the past, state intervention in the modernization process has been effective. National governments have abolished entire social classes; engaged in land reform; introduced modern legislation guaranteeing equality of rights for ever larger circles of the population; built cities and encouraged urbanization; educated populations; and provided the infrastructure for modern, complex, information-intensive societies.

This institution-building, however, has reached a dead end with the establishment of liberal democratic political institutions and capitalist economic structures throughout the developed world. While institutional differences between different parts of the developed

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world remain, their scope has narrowed considerably over the past couple of generations as the socialist alternative collapsed and nations became ever more interdependent through trade and investment. The essential meaning of the end of history is not that turbulence has ceased or that the world has become completely uniform, but rather that there are no serious systematic institutional alternatives to liberal democracy and market-based capitalism for the world's most advanced countries. Put another way, social engineering, while at one time the key to progressive government, has today reached a dead end. The most important factors affecting the real quality of life in such societies lie safely beyond what national governments can affect in positive ways. For while state power can effectively undermine civil society by uprooting neighborhoods, abolishing communities, and creating perverse incentives that destabilize two-parent families, it is much less able to promote strong bonds of special solidarity or the moral fabric that underlies community.

Institutional convergence has not, however, meant an end of significant differences between modern societies. In the post–Cold War world, the most important distinctions between nations are no longer institutional but cultural: it is the character of their civil societies, the social and moral habits that underlie institutions, that differentiate them. In this respect, Samuel Huntington has been quite right to assert that culture will be the key axis of international differentiation—though not necessarily an axis of conflict.

The traditional argument between left and right over the appropriate role of the state, reflected in the debate between the neomercantilists and neoclassical economists, misses the key issue concerning civil society. The left is wrong to think that the state can embody or promote meaningful social solidarity. Libertarian conservatives, for their part, are wrong to think that strong social structures will spontaneously regenerate once the state is subtracted from the equation. The character of civil society and its intermediate associations, rooted as it is in nonrational factors like culture, religion, tradition, and other premodern sources, will be key to the success of modern societies in a global economy.

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Does the CIA Still Have a Role?

Roger Hilsman

FROM HUMBLE BEGINNINGS

WITH THE breakup of the Soviet Union, the CIA began to search for new roles to justify its existence—and the money it requires, which totaled $3.1 billion in its request to Congress late last year.[1]

That spring, the CIA had discovered that Aldrich Ames, a career CIA officer and son of a career CIA officer, had for several years been systematically betraying its agents in the Soviet Union, at least 12 of whom were executed for treason. The juxtaposition of the Soviet breakup and the revelations about Ames trigger inevitable questions: Does the CIA have a meaningful role in the post–Cold War world? If so, what is it?

In its early days, the only spies serving the United States were brave amateurs, the most notable among them Nathan Hale. During the Civil War, the federal government hired the Pinkerton detective agency to do its spying, but the agency's success was modest. In World War I, the United States depended on the French and British secret services and made no attempt to launch its own. Only by the beginning of World War II did President Franklin D. Roosevelt ask William J. Donovan, a World War I hero, to set up an American intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

ROGER HILSMAN is Professor Emeritus of Government and International Relations at Columbia University. He served in the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in the mid-1940s and during the 1950s was Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

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Donovan threw himself into the task with boundless energy and enthusiasm, and the result was a lighthearted hodgepodge. Among the earliest branches of the organization were those devoted to research and analysis, whose officers mostly focused on activities like poring over old French engineering magazines in the Library of Congress to winnow out details of the roads and bridges of North Africa. An espionage branch quickly followed, and another devoted to "black propaganda"—the publishing and broadcasting of news purporting to come from the enemy. Donovan then added branches concerned with sabotage, commando operations, guerrilla work with resistance movements, forging documents, and collecting snapshots taken by tourists before the war and analyzing them for military purposes.

After the war President Harry S Truman broke up the OSS. He transferred the research and analysis branch, which employed almost 1,000 people, to the Department of State, abolished most of the more esoteric branches, including the one dealing with guerrilla warfare, and parked the branches concerned with collecting intelligence by espionage and other covert means in the office of the assistant secretary of war to await a final decision.

The decision came with the National Security Act of 1947, which Truman hoped would unify the armed services under a secretary of defense. The major price for "unification" was the transformation of the U.S. Army Air Corps into a separate and independent Air Force; a minor price was the creation of an independent Central Intelligence Agency that would report directly to the president and the National Security Council.

The act clearly intended the CIA to conduct espionage—actually, it intended the CIA to have a monopoly over espionage. The law also clearly intended for the CIA to coordinate all aspects of both the collection and the analysis of intelligence. Almost immediately the CIA

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[1] By mistake, a congressional budget committee published a breakdown of the money to be allocated to the entire intelligence community, normally hidden in the budget of the Pentagon. The documents described $26.7 billion of the estimated $28 billion intelligence budget authorized by Congress. The CIA asked for $3.1 billion, the Pentagon intelligence agencies (the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense Intelligence Agency) asked for $13.2 billion, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and their respective special operations units requested $10.4 billion for their tactical intelligence activities. See "$28 Billion Spying Budget Is Made Public by Mistake," *The New York Times*, November 5, 1994, p. 54.

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

created a research and analysis branch to replace the one that had been transferred to the State Department.

Early in the Eisenhower administration, the CIA succeeded in persuading the president and the National Security Council to allow it to conduct covert political action. The authority CIA officials cited was the clause of the National Security Act directing the agency to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council shall from time to time direct."

Code-breaking has been another intelligence function. In World War II the British broke the German secret codes with their Enigma system, and the Americans broke the Japanese codes with the Magic system. In the postwar era, the responsibility for breaking the codes of potential enemies and for seeing that U.S. codes were secure was given to the National Security Agency.

Still another set of functions has been the so-called esoterics. During the Cold War these included probing the perimeter of the Soviet Union with planes loaded with electronic devices to learn everything possible about Soviet radar, lofting various satellites to monitor other forms of electronic data, and employing fancy gadgets. Within this technological arsenal was the U-2 spy plane, which flew above the reach of Soviet antiaircraft defenses taking pictures of military installations inside the Soviet Union. The U-2 was very successful until May 1, 1960, when pilot Gary Powers was shot down by a greatly improved Soviet surface-to-air missile. Within a couple of years, a successor to the U-2 began flying, the SR-71 Blackbird. The SR-71 flew at a speed of over 2,000 miles per hour at an altitude of over 85,000 feet. It operated from 1964 until 1990, when it was retired, presumably because

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unmanned satellites could do the job just as well and with far less risk.

By the end of the Eisenhower administration the CIA's major roles were espionage, which was monopolized by the CIA; covert political action, also a CIA monopoly; certain intelligence esoterics, such as U-2 surveillance, performed by both the CIA and the Pentagon; and research and analysis, performed by the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of Defense. The question is: After the Cold War, which of these four functions should continue to be performed, and by whom?

THE STUFF OF SPY-THRILLER FICTION

THE MOST important thing to be said about espionage is that even though the take can occasionally be crucial, relatively little information comes from espionage, and very rarely is it decisive. The reasons are obvious. Placing and maintaining agents in spots where they can gather decisive information is an extraordinarily delicate and difficult endeavor. Communicating with those agents after they are in place is intricate and time-consuming. The following examples, taken from World War I materials that are no longer classified, illustrate both these points.

Most of the belligerents began World War I with carefully woven networks of spies. The Germans, for example, had 25 agents in strategic positions all over the United Kingdom before the war formally began. Although Scotland Yard had sniffed them out, to avoid having to repeat a roundup on a new set of agents, the Yard did nothing but watch and wait. Immediately after the declaration of war the Yard arrested 22 of the 25, three having slipped out of the traps set for them and away to neutral countries. Germany was left without a single agent in the United Kingdom. The consequences were fateful. The Germans' Schlieffen plan called for a great turning movement with General Alexander von Kluck's army on the extreme right that would slice through Belgium and take Paris from the rear. But because German intelligence had been blinded, it was only when the Germans ran into British troops that they learned of the movement of the British Expeditionary Force to France—the kind of large-scale movement of men and matériel that is most difficult to conceal.

The counterespionage organizations in France, Russia, Germany,

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

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

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and Austria did not succeed in wiping out whole enemy systems in spectacular swoops, as the British had done, but slowly and methodically they captured one agent after another. In a few months almost all the Allies' secret agents were behind bars, and the few remaining were left without reliable means of communication. Faced with the same problem of starting from scratch, both sides tackled it by setting up bases in neutral countries such as Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden.

Scientific methods of crime detection, postal censorship, systems of identity cards and registration, and the natural suspiciousness of citizens in time of war guaranteed that any big effort at espionage would end in catastrophe. There were only two exceptions during World War I. One was spying on troop movements. The British, for example, succeeded in organizing a network of road- and rail-watchers in Belgium, directed from their embassy in the neutral Netherlands, to report the movement of German troops to the front. Although the casualty rate among agents was ghastly, Britain got a great deal of accurate information.

Weapons take a long time to develop, giving espionage time to work.

A prime reason for the British success was the inherent difficulty of hiding large-scale road and rail traffic, which any farmer can recognize and report accurately. Another was the loyalty of the Belgian people, who were all potential spies. Dutch neutrality, the long Dutch-Belgian border, and the sympathy of the Dutch border guards also helped in communicating intelligence reports.

The other exception to the general failure of espionage in World War I was in the uncovering of the enemy's secret weapons. To give just one example, in the early days of the fighting, poison gas was primarily delivered by creating a lethal cloud that was driven toward the enemy by the wind—which was liable to change direction and send the gas back to one's own lines. Thus, whichever side developed a method of putting gas into artillery shells first would gain a decided advantage. One of the few surviving French agents was Charles Lucieto, whose cover was a business in the Netherlands that required him to make frequent visits to Germany. On a trip to Frankfurt, Lucieto's curiosity was piqued when he noticed a railroad tank car leaving the I.G. Farben chemical works, headed in an unusual direc-

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tion. He followed it to the Krupp munitions factories in Essen.

A few days later a battery of artillery appeared in the vicinity of Essen, followed by several carloads of high-ranking German officers in their spiked helmets. From a nearby hill Lucieto watched the artillery battery fire what appeared to be smoke shells toward a herd of sheep. When the smoke cleared, the sheep were all dead. Waiting until both officers and artillery departed, Lucieto walked over to the field and picked up some shell fragments. He sent them to France, where scientists were able to identify the nature of the gas, develop gas masks to counteract it, and distribute them to the troops before the Germans could capitalize on their achievement.

The explanation for the ability of espionage to uncover secret weapons lies in the difference between a weapon and a diplomatic move or plan for a military offensive. It takes much longer to develop a weapon, so espionage has a longer time to do its work. In addition, information about a diplomatic or military move is useless once the move is made or the attack begins, but information about a secret weapon is valuable whenever it arrives. So, except for intelligence on troop movements through Belgium and secret weapons, espionage netted little during World War I. The difficulty was in communicating with agents and getting their messages in time.

A good illustration is the French experience with their most strategically placed agent, who was in charge of security at German general headquarters. He had easy access to all military information, but most of his warnings arrived too late. His warning of General Erich Ludendorff's offensive in 1918, for example, was received ten days after the offensive had begun. But the greatest irony of all, in view of the years of effort and the lives risked and lost to maintain this single contact, was that on the few occasions when the agent's messages arrived in time the Allies had already learned about the coming offensive through air photographs and interrogation of German prisoners.

More recent examples are hard to come by, but one is the case of the Soviet colonel-turned-spy, Oleg Penkovsky, who made an important contribution to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba. On one of his visits to the West, Penkovsky smuggled out a manual used by missile battalions in setting up medium- and intermediate-range missiles—a manual that was classified secret but not top secret.

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Although the photo-interpreters who discovered the missiles in Cuba had already gleaned much of what they needed from studying U-2 and satellite photos of missiles being put into position inside the Soviet Union, they found the manual useful.

As for the efficacy of espionage in recent years, Aldrich Ames' treason wiped out the take from espionage in the Soviet Union, but the United States was still able to follow events by monitoring Soviet press, radio, and television and by the routine means of diplomatic reporting.

Is the information from espionage worth the enormous cost of fielding secret agents?

Actually it is questionable whether espionage would have made any significant difference in the way the United States reacted during the last years of the Soviet Union. It is even more questionable whether the difference would have been worth the enormous cost and effort of recruiting, maintaining, and communicating with the agents involved.

There is no reason to believe that espionage today is any better than it used to be. Its contribution to wise decisions in foreign policy and defense is minimal. But the cost in lives, treasure, and intangibles is high. Almost every American embassy in the world has its collection of CIA spooks. In some countries their role is merely to be liaison officers to the local intelligence organizations. But in others, even allies, it is much more sinister. And over time the harm that maintaining a CIA detachment in an American embassy can bring is corrosive. When the Kennedy administration came to office it found that a CIA man from the U.S. embassy in Tokyo was in jail in Singapore, having been arrested a few weeks earlier in an act of attempted subversion meant to provide an independent check on information supplied by the CIA's Singaporean counterpart, the Special Branch. With great difficulty the Kennedy administration persuaded Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to let the CIA man go without any publicity. Years later, during another administration, when some tension arose between Singapore and the United States, Lee could not resist the temptation to make the affair public in a bitter denunciation.

Given the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, espionage is obviously something the United States can do without. The costs exceed any possible gain.

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CLOAK-AND-DAGGER GIMMICKRY

A SECOND major function of the CIA has been covert political action. The main exponent of covert action was Allen Dulles, the director of CIA from 1951 to 1961. Citing the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, both of which specified that the United States would come to the aid of countries threatened by communism whose governments requested help, Dulles enunciated a doctrine of his own. He argued for the use of covert political action to foil communist attempts to take over a country whether or not there was a request for help.

In theory, Dulles' position is not unreasonable. If a great power—communist, fascist, militarist, imperialist, or whatever—is openly antagonistic to the rest of the world, and if this hostile power uses subversion to bring down foreign governments, then the countries that are targets of this hostility have a right and a duty to protect and defend themselves, even by covert means. At the very least, they may resort to such methods in cases like those in which covert methods have proved effective and appropriate and in which there is no effective, appropriate alternative.

The trouble is that these two qualifications have not always been observed by the United States. Covert political action became a fad, the answer to every kind of problem, and American agents became as ubiquitous and busy as communist agents.

In the years following the establishment of the CIA, especially after CIA director Walter Bedell Smith made the CIA a more effective organization in 1950-51, the United States for the first time came up against some of the perplexities of the postwar world and the communist threat. It met the direct communist challenge by building up its military strength and maintaining alliances. But again and again the United States had to face problems that did not yield to power alone: ineffective governments, graft, politically apathetic populations, indifferent leaders, communist subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. There were also instances in which the world would have regarded the naked use of power as petty bullying. There was a consensus in the foreign policy community at the time of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, for example, that it would be politically disastrous if the United States were to attack tiny Cuba overtly.

To many policymakers who confronted these dilemmas, covert political action seemed a way out. The United States could fight communist fire

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with fire. Since the action was covert, it promised to get around obstacles: the moral problem of intervention and the political problem of appearing to be a bully. Covert action also had an aura of omnipotence; like James Bond, the fictional Agent 007, it could seemingly accomplish the miraculous. But covert action was really nothing more than a gimmick. In special circumstances it was a potentially useful supplement, but nothing more.

Truman, who had reluctantly acquiesced in the creation of the CIA, lived long enough to express his concern that the agency had become an "operational and, at times, a policymaking arm of the government." He proposed that it be restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the president. "We have grown up as a nation respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society," he wrote in *The Washington Post* in 1963. "There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position, and I feel that we need to correct it."

Covert action has been overused, and the United States' reputation has suffered.

Covert action has been overused as an instrument of foreign policy, and the reputation of the United States has suffered. Covert has usually been defined not as completely secret but as plausibly deniable. But while one action may be plausibly deniable, several hundred are not. And while one action, taken in isolation, might seem worth the cost of slightly tarnishing the national image, the cumulative effect of several hundred blots has been to blacken it entirely, thus corroding one of America's major political assets—a belief abroad in American intentions and integrity. Covert political action is not only something the United States can do without in the post–Cold War world, it is something the United States could have done without during the Cold War as well.

If the United States gets out of the business of espionage and covert political action, it could eliminate all the CIA contingents it now maintains, except perhaps those engaged in liaison, in its embassies all over the world. The dollar savings would be substantial, the gain in political terms greater still.

Since the vast majority of the intelligence information on which U.S. policy depends comes from analyzing the open sources of foreign publications and broadcasts, routine diplomatic reporting, and

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the activities of newspaper reporters, and only a tiny fraction comes from espionage or covert action, the effect on the amount of information available to policymakers would be minimal.

FROM GENTLEMEN'S MAIL TO MESSAGES FROM SPACE

When Henry L. Stimson took over as secretary of state in 1929, he discovered the department had a so-called Black Chamber—a group of people who had broken the Japanese codes. They had been very useful during the negotiations on the London Naval Treaty, but Stimson decided to abolish the Black Chamber anyway. In explanation, he later remarked that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail."[2]

In World War II, when gentlemen were not so easy to find in the various foreign offices, Stimson had no objections to code-breaking. And there should be none today. When it is successful, the product is often very helpful, and there are no risks involved. The same is true of the work of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which monitors and records broadcasts in various parts of the world. It is no different from reading other countries' newspapers. The U-2 and the SR-71 both violated the airspace of other countries, but there is an international consensus today that there must be some limit to national control over outer space and that restrictions should not apply to satellites, whether they are taking pictures or eavesdropping on electronic communications.

The National Security Agency should continue its work in trying to break codes and protect those of the United States, and monitor radio traffic. Clearly, the United States should also continue satellite reconnaissance in all its forms.

AN EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES

The research and analysis function of intelligence in the U.S. government is widely dispersed. The CIA has a research and analysis branch, the State Department has its Bureau of Intelligence and

[2] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York: Octagon Books, 1947, p. 188.

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Research, and the Defense Department has its Defense Intelligence Agency. Modern general staffs have divisions for personnel, intelligence, plans and operations, and supplies—G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4. So the Army has its G-2 to perform the research and analysis function, the Air Force has its A-2, and the Navy its Office of Naval Intelligence. All of these regularly do their own intelligence studies, and all participate in developing the national intelligence estimates and special national intelligence estimates through interdepartmental committees chaired by the CIA. The process culminates at the United States Intelligence Board, which is staffed by the heads of the departmental intelligence organizations and chaired by the CIA director.

Gorbachev failed to predict the fall of the Soviet Union. Why expect that of the CIA?

In producing these estimates, the intelligence organizations analyze and interpret factual information and try to predict what is likely to happen, including whether a particular policy or course of action is likely to accomplish its goal. All policy hinges on such estimates, whether made by an intelligence organization or by a policymaker working without formal input.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the CIA has been criticized for not predicting the breakup of the Soviet Union and that such criticism is unfair. The CIA and many independent analysts had identified the forces of nationalism that worked to break up the Soviet Union as well as the fear of Germany and the West that worked to hold it together. But predicting the timetable is something else again. After all, as head of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev was in a vastly better position to make such a prediction, and he not only failed to make it but enormously hastened the process by his decision to pull back from Eastern Europe.

There is no question that the research and analysis divisions of the CIA, State Department, Defense Department, Army, Navy, and Air Force compile useful reports and analyses. The question is whether analysis can be done more objectively by an agency separate from the one carrying out the resulting policy. A research and analysis office that is part of the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the argument goes, is less likely to be objective than one that is more independent, a part of the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

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

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

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The counterargument is that a research and analysis organization separated from action and policy is less likely to produce studies that are relevant and timely. Moreover, if the policy and action people are biased and emotionally committed to a particular policy, they will not pay attention to the independent group's work in any case. After the last Americans were pulled out of Vietnam, for example, the State Department conducted an internal review of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's written reports on the war. It showed that the bureau had been pessimistic during the entire war, had consistently doubted that the war could be won, and had consistently implied—if not argued outright—that the best policy would be a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Yet the effect those reports had on decision-makers in the State Department and the White House had been slight.

PAST ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

AFTER THE Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy greatly curtailed the CIA's authority to conduct such operations and assigned oversight responsibility to the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The State Department machinery for dealing with CIA proposals for intelligence and covert action was reorganized and given greatly increased power. During the rest of the Kennedy administration, the number and scope of the CIA's clandestine operations were much reduced. But the main proposal for reorganizing the research and analysis function was put aside. That proposal, from the State Department's intelligence bureau, argued that the United States would profit from copying the British system.

The American system was (and is) to have the CIA collecting information through espionage, esoteric means, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and so on. The CIA also has its own research and analysis branch and responsibility for coordinating the research and analysis functions of the other government departments.

In Great Britain the arrangement is quite different. Espionage is conducted by a separate organization that reports to the top level of the British Foreign Office. Research and analysis is conducted by an organization separate from the espionage organization, the Foreign Office, and the military.

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The State Department's reform proposal recommended that the research and analysis branches of the CIA and the State Department be merged into one independent organization that would serve the White House, State Department, and Pentagon. The proposal died.

The United States should get out of the business of both espionage and covert political action. However, the CIA should still have an important role to play as the independent research and analysis organization contemplated in the early 1960s. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, and at least those divisions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence agencies dealing with political questions should be transferred to the CIA, along with the relevant career civil servants. Substantial duplication could be eliminated, for substantial savings. The details can be debated, but it seems obvious that the CIA and the entire intelligence community should be subjected to a thorough examination and some fundamental decisions made about the kind of intelligence organizations the United States needs in an age no longer dominated by a cold war with the Soviet Union.

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Profile

Ichiro Ozawa: Reformer at Bay

Edward W. Desmond

THE LESSON OF CARTHAGE

When Ichiro Ozawa, a longtime Diet member and power broker, published *Blueprint for a New Japan* two years ago, his main goal was to reverse the country's reluctance to play a larger role in world affairs. Ozawa, at that time a senior leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was obsessed with Tokyo's refusal to provide on-the-ground support for the U.S.-led forces during the Persian Gulf War, despite repeated requests from Washington. He called the episode a defeat whose origins could be traced to the "politics of indecision" and the lack of a clear center in Japanese politics. Unless Japanese politicians revised the rudderless postwar system, Ozawa argued, the country would go the way of ancient Carthage, whose "belief that wealth alone could sustain a nation ultimately caused its demise."

Since then, Ozawa's complaints about the failure of Japan's leadership have grown even more acute. The Kobe earthquake, which left more than 5,500 dead in January, is the most prominent and tragic example. Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama vacillated, unsure of his own powers; ministries responded with detachment and little coordination; and the military waited for deployment orders that came too late. In the eyes of the Japanese, the tragedy easily surpassed the Persian Gulf War as a display of systemic paralysis.

Edward W. Desmond is *Time* magazine's Bureau Chief in Tokyo.

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The lack of a sure-handed economic policy is yet another unaddressed crisis. Japan is in its fourth year of near-zero growth, and the strong yen is driving industry offshore at an unprecedented rate. Banks face a bad debt burden estimated at as much as $1 trillion, nearly a quarter of GDP. Japan obviously needs to shed much of its old Japan Inc. thinking and build up the consumer side of the economy through deregulation and market openings. Most banking experts agree that the banks must be bailed out. But these policy shifts are too much to expect from Japan's powerful but narrowly focused bureaucrats.

Before its breakup and defeat in the 1993 general elections, the LDP might have been able to provide the needed leadership on the economy, if only because it was intertwined with Japan's business sector and the bureaucracy. But today that so-called iron triangle is fractured. Scandal after scandal has depleted the credibility of the Liberal Democrats, who are the largest partner in Murayama's coalition. They are divided among themselves and preoccupied with maneuvering for the next lower house election, which must take place by mid-1997. Absent a political center, bureaucrats are freer than ever to pursue narrow agendas, such as trade disputes with the United States or ministry prerogatives. Big business, despairing of a more rational economic policy, is struggling to cope with the strong yen and to preserve the shaky social contract promising lifetime employment.

The uneasiness in Japan is a far cry from the mood two years ago, when Morihiro Hosokawa, the reformist "Mr. Clean," formed the first non-LDP government in 38 years with the help of Ozawa's breakaway group. In a remarkable eight months, Hosokawa and Ozawa delivered much that had eluded several previous prime ministers, including electoral reform, a relatively thorough apology for Japan's actions in World War II, the opening of the rice market, and initial steps toward deregulation. Hosokawa's popularity ratings hit an all-time high, but he stepped down in the face of alleged financial irregularities.

Today the reform agenda is in a deep freeze, but there is little doubt voters want it back. The winners in mayoral elections in Tokyo and Osaka this year are both former television personalities who campaigned as first-time politicians with strong antiestablishment platforms. The incumbent Murayama government represents a lull in the effort to reform Japan's political order, to build what Ozawa calls a

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"normal" nation. But there is little question that the issues *Blueprint* posed two years ago are even more urgent today.

For the moment, and perhaps for good, Ozawa is a reformer at bay. A serious heart attack in 1991 still limits his pace, and a constant hammering in the press, which has never liked the LDP insider, has pinched his popularity. In June 1994 Ozawa, then the chief strategist of the Tsutomu Hata government, made a series of tactical mistakes that shattered Hata's brief rule and brought the Murayama coalition to power. As a result Ozawa is in the political wilderness for the first time in his life, where he is struggling to preserve the unity of his loose-knit group of ex-LDP followers in the New Frontier Party, many of whom are sorely tempted to accept LDP offers to return to the fold. At least until the strong showing of Ozawa's New Frontier Party in upper-house elections in July, most of Japan's political commentators believed that Ozawa was finished and that the LDP was likely to prevail in the next lower-house elections.

Even if they are right, Ozawa can claim credit for the leading role in the opening stages of Japan's efforts to break free of the Cold War mold. He not only identified the issues facing Japan but masterminded the breakup of the LDP and the coalition government that knocked his old party from power for the first time in 38 years. He has given form and movement to ideas that will change Japan, regardless of his own political future.

THE MEIJI PARALLEL

OZAWA IS steeped in the lore of the Meiji era, and he sees strong parallels between himself and the men who overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867. As a youth, Ozawa was reserved, studious, and constantly exhorted by his strong-willed mother to live up to Meiji values, a puritanical code of behavior that stressed modesty and aphorisms like "men don't cry" and "don't complain, don't make excuses." Young Ozawa was particularly attracted to the visionaries who overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate. Even today he maintains that the Meiji era was Japan's finest because his ancestors ventured into the world and adapted for Japan what they found in industry, education, the military, and politics. Ozawa devotes a glowing chapter in *Blueprint*

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SHIGEO KOGURE

Ichiro Ozawa

to the accomplishments of Meiji leaders like Toshimichi Okubo and Hirobumi Ito.

Ozawa shares certain qualities with the men who overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate and launched the Meiji reforms. Like Ozawa, they were privileged members of the elite, and their desire for radical change stemmed from practical experience and insights. They were better acquainted than most of their peers, for example, with Western military technology and its dangerous implications for a backward Japan. Commodore Matthew Perry's "black ships" were symbolic of that threat. Ozawa's comparable insight stems from his role as a facilitator in the U.S.-Japan trade talks and the high-stakes discussion about the Persian Gulf War. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Ozawa argues, the danger is again systemic senility: the LDP establishment's inability to see beyond narrow issues tied to particular constituencies, such as protection of rice farmers or careful adherence to the constitution's pacifist Article Nine. Ozawa's influential *Blueprint* is a plea for Japan to wake

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up to the need for a new system of politics and governance, especially better leadership from politicians.

His prescriptions would be familiar to Americans: a healthy, contentious two-party system; single-member voting districts; a decisive, strong prime ministership; greater devolution of power to local government; legislation protecting workers from long hours, as well as sex and age bias; and extensive deregulation. He also argues that Japan should raise its profile in world diplomacy by supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations, even those that require sending combat troops abroad. In sum, he wants to create a Japan that accepts the responsibilities of a great power and invites envy because of its quality of life. His goal, he writes, is for people to think of a "Japanese dream" in the same way people the world over understand the American dream.

Ozawa believes there should be a Japanese dream, just as there is an American dream.

Ozawa's countrymen regard his recommendations with a mixture of approval and apprehension. His book sold a remarkable 700,000 copies, and readers were enthralled with his candor about how politics in Japan actually works. "The government itself is scattered among many institutions and interests," he writes, for example. "No overarching institution exists to coordinate and control the whole. . . . The cabinet meeting—nominally Japan's supreme decision-making body—is an empty institution." Others have made similar observations, but coming from a politician of Ozawa's stature and inside experience, the criticisms suddenly became bedrock, a given reformers could cite without question.

By the same token, Japanese are well aware of Ozawa's checkered past, and they are not convinced that he is committed to delivering on a broader social agenda that includes proposals for a shorter work week. After all, Ozawa is a classic workaholic, a blue-suited politician who does business in the smoke-filled restaurants of posh Nagatacho, far from the public eye. His commitment to social goals does not seem half as convincing as Hosokawa's, if only because the former prime minister has a casual, tennis-playing lifestyle that charmed the country. More credible is Ozawa's determination to sharpen the powers of Japan's leaders and push the country onto the world stage, even as a participant in U.N.-sanctioned military operations. In Japan, those ambitions stir

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mixed emotions. Rather than the respected, self-confident reformers of the Meiji era, the Japanese remember the authoritarian leaders of the 1930s who abused their power and drove the nation to war.

A POLITICAL HOME

OZAWA, CURRENTLY the secretary-general of the opposition New Frontier Party, has almost single-handedly shaped the debate about how Japan should change. He is also a figure beset with contradictions. Ozawa epitomizes what Japan has been—low-profile, cautious, industrious, and opaquely corrupt. He was a classic backroom LDP manipulator, a chief lieutenant to two of the LDP's most corrupt faction bosses, Kakuei Tanaka and Shin Kanemaru. Ozawa served the latter as his foremost dealmaker and personally made and broke a series of LDP prime ministers. In short, Ozawa's transformation into crusader for a more open, "normal" political system strikes many of his countrymen as opportunism or, worse, hypocrisy. Those labels may fit, but Ozawa's close links to the old bankrupt establishment probably do more to qualify than disqualify him as a reformer.

Like a third of the members of the Diet's lower house, Ozawa, 53, is a second-generation legislator. His father, Saeki Ozawa, came to prominence in a remarkable rags-to-politics odyssey after the war. The elder Ozawa started out as the runaway son of a ne'er-do-well farmer, but by the end of his career he was revered in his local district, in rural Iwate prefecture, and had served in several LDP cabinets. He is especially remembered for his spirited battles with Japan's socialists over two issues, the 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the introduction of single-seat electoral districts. The LDP won the first battle, but only last year did the Diet finally change the electoral system, thanks in large part to the efforts of Ozawa's son, Ichiro.

When his father died in 1968, Ozawa was nearly finished with his law studies and wanted to take the bar exam. His father's coterie in Iwate, however, persuaded him to drop his lawyerly ambitions and run in his father's place. Ozawa won the seat in the 1969 general election at the age of 27—at that time the youngest legislator ever elected to the Diet.

LDP politicians need patrons, and Ozawa sought the favor of Kakuei Tanaka, the self-made construction magnate with a junior high school

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education who was rapidly becoming the most powerful man in Japanese politics. Tanaka pioneered what the Japanese call "money politics"—the shakedown of business, especially construction companies, for the yen equivalent of millions of dollars in under-the-table donations. Tanaka's iconoclastic, high-energy leadership attracted Ozawa, who was not impressed by then–Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. In 1992 Ozawa explained to one of his biographers, Kensuke Watanabe, the appeal of Tanaka: "My generation was tired of the long-lasting Sato cabinet. It was probably my father's influence, but I had strong antipathy for politics by bureaucrats. Sato was called the town's accountant, and for better or worse he was a typical postwar politician. He was stable but showed no inclination to reform. Tanaka was cheerful and active, a remarkable contrast with Sato."

Tanaka liked the unassuming, straight-talking young Ozawa, and in later years often said Ozawa was like a son to him. He arranged his protégé's marriage to Kazuko Fukuda, whose family owns Fukuda Gumi, a powerful construction company in Niigata. Such unions were the equivalent of dynasty-building in the Tanaka era: the fusion of construction company money and LDP influence in public works was unbeatable. Such arrangements also foreshadowed the profound corruption that hounds the LDP to this day.

AN UNLOVED POLITICIAN

OZAWA REPRESENTED the core of the LDP power structure, but he is a surprisingly unpopular man, even in political circles. He is frequently accused of lacking *giri* (obligation) and *ninjo* (human feeling), cardinal virtues among the Japanese. In 1985, for example, Ozawa quit Tanaka's faction when it became clear the political boss was doomed after his conviction in a lower court on charges of accepting a 500-million-yen bribe in connection with Japan Airlines' purchase of Lockheed TriStar airliners. His move made sense, but it was not admired. His friends explain that Ozawa is uncommonly rational, ready to act on logic rather than worry about others' feelings. Ozawa's lack of the common touch is partly the result of his privileged political upbringing. Unlike most young LDP politicians, he did not have to learn to glad-hand to win votes and campaign con-

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tributions. Ozawa rarely visits his Iwate constituency; his wife looks after his political interests there.

As a chief lieutenant to LDP Vice President Shin Kanemaru until his downfall, Ozawa earned a reputation for arrogance. He is frequently accused of having a dictatorial personality, which, in translation, means he is impatient, unwilling to wait for a consensus, and dismissive of respect for senior leaders—all jarring qualities in Japan. He was taken to task, for example, for demanding to "interview" his much-senior colleagues, Michio Watanabe, Kiichi Miyazawa, and Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, for the job of prime minister in 1989. They bitterly resented his presumption.

The public is leery of a master of backroom politics who now comes forward as a reformer.

The public has an uncomfortable sense that Ozawa's past behavior has not been squared with justice. His close friend and mentor in the party, Kanemaru, was indicted on tax evasion charges in 1993 in connection with immense contributions from the now-defunct Sagawa Kyubin trucking company. Kanemaru resigned from the Diet and the party and is currently on trial. Witnesses identified Ozawa as a party to talks where the illegal deals were allegedly made, but in Diet testimony Ozawa said that he was too busy bringing drinks and cleaning ashtrays to understand what was going on. Few people in Japan found this believable, although as of this writing Ozawa has not been charged in connection with that scandal or any other.

Most of the daily newspapers, especially the liberal *Asahi Shimbun*, a national daily based in Tokyo, are deeply skeptical of Ozawa for these reasons, and they fear that his calls for strong leadership mask hidden reactionary, nationalistic views. To some extent the papers also mirror the widespread anxiety that talk of strong leadership still elicits in Japan, where some believe that weak, fragmented power is the best guarantee for avoiding the excesses of the 1930s.

Ozawa arouses suspicions because there is an ambiguity about his nationalism. Among his closest friends are politicians who are more or less open apologists for Japan's behavior in World War II. Where the war is concerned, Ozawa is not full of moral anguish, but he sees the need to make amends in a practical light. As he said in an interview

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last year: "From [the rest of Asia's] point of view, Japan invaded them, and it is natural that they should see it that way. Justice is a term that is used when many people see something as being just, even if God does not view it that way. Therefore Japan did not wage a just war."

Thus Ozawa more or less keeps his distance from the apologists among his friends. To an outsider, Ozawa is clearly a statist, perhaps a Bismarckian, a leader who wants to pursue national interests within a stable international order. Ozawa was quite at home with U.S. President George Bush's concept of a "new world order" and would like to see Japan cast off those aspects of Article Nine orthodoxy that inhibit the country's ability to play a greater diplomatic and military role in ensuring global stability.

Nevertheless, the press' unwillingness to accept the new Ozawa at face value has brought out the intolerant side of his hard-edged personality. He has banned reporters who "misreported" what he said and has shown little inclination to win over his antagonists—an unwise stance for a politician trying to demonstrate his commitment to a new, more open brand of politics. To be fair, however, it is important to note that some of the papers are clearly engaged in a highly partisan campaign. In one riposte, Ozawa reminded reporters that in the 1930s their newspapers called anyone who rejected the emperor and military rule a traitor. "Now it is the same," he said. "Anyone whose opinion does not fit within the media's justice framework, including me, they call an authoritarian or a nationalist or a right-winger." Ozawa, ever the realist, knows that it is unlikely he would ever be a very effective prime minister in the face of such suspicion, which is why he continues to stick to his old role as backroom strategist.

DOMESTIC REFORM

By the time of the Kanemaru scandal in 1992, Ozawa was a changed man. He did not turn his back on his politically dubious past, but he was convinced that government as usual under the LDP was no longer good enough for Japan. His epiphany came during the Persian Gulf War. Ozawa, who was the LDP secretary-general at the time, met repeatedly with American officials who stressed that Japan must play an active role in the coalition or face the charge that Japan was taking

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a "free ride" while the United States paid with the lives of its soldiers. Ozawa was eager to comply, but even his proposals for a modest on-the-ground contribution died in the party and the Diet. Regardless of other national interests, very few legislators in any party were prepared to risk public wrath by putting Japanese troops in harm's way or challenging the prevailing interpretation of Article Nine.

Subsequently, Ozawa fought to organize an immense financial contribution of nearly $13 billion for the war effort. To win its passage, Ozawa made a deal with Komeito, the Buddhist Clean Government Party, to back its candidate against a five-term LDP incumbent in the 1991 Tokyo gubernatorial election. The Ozawa-Komeito candidate lost, which led Ozawa to resign his party post, but the appropriation passed. Two months later Ozawa suffered a serious heart attack.

Ozawa would like to see Japan play a larger role on the international stage.

For Ozawa, the Persian Gulf War revealed that Japan in the 1990s was fundamentally incapable of acting in its national interest. Narrow-minded politicians had put the vital U.S.-Japan relationship at risk over the Gulf War, and Ozawa was determined to avoid a repetition of the crisis. Ozawa's concern with foreign affairs deepened, and in 1991 he created a semi-secret association of bureaucrats and academics calling itself the 21st Century Study Group to discuss the issues confronting Japan. Their papers were the foundation for *Blueprint*.

The Gulf War also convinced Ozawa that Japan must reform its political scene to encourage decisive leadership, especially in foreign affairs. The dominance of the LDP and the feckless opposition of the Social Democrats had corrupted serious politics, turning it into a game of vote-buying and influence-peddling. "Under the postwar political system, real, forthright debates between political parties and politicians do not take place," he said in 1993. "Everyone is comfortable with a system in which you don't engage in serious debate, you don't take responsibility for anything, and you can be rather vague on most matters. That is the system we have to tear down. The time allowed to Japan is now running short."

Like many other LDP members, Ozawa believes that the electoral system was a key part of the problem. Multimember districts for par-

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liamentary elections made it easy for socialists to win a large share of the Diet seats, which meant that the wide spectrum of conservatives had to band together to stay in power. In the 1950s Ozawa's father and others in the LDP tried to change the system to single-member districts, which would have pushed the socialists to the margins and allowed the LDP to split into two parties. The two conservative camps, so they hoped, would have alternated power and joined hands in key areas, such as amending offensive aspects of the U.S.-imposed constitution. But the socialists successfully resisted the effort. The result, throughout the Cold War, was LDP dominance and a limp, unconstructive socialist opposition that, as Ozawa delights in pointing out, has long been more or less in the pocket of the LDP.

Ozawa may be out in the cold, but his foreign policy views are still helping to shape Japan.

The multimember districts also tend to encourage corruption. Candidates can win a seat by patronizing a small segment of the voters in the district—an interest group such as construction workers, rice farmers, or unionists—so long as that segment can deliver about 15 percent of the vote. The single-member district makes winning through patronage more difficult, and in theory should force the candidate to speak out clearly on national issues. In recent years the return to single-member districts has been sold to the public largely as an anticorruption measure, but in the eyes of Ozawa and others it is more important as a means to push the socialists out of politics and establish a healthy bipolar conservative competition.

In June 1993 Prime Minister Miyazawa, like his predecessor Kaifu, could not obtain sufficient party support to put through the single-member districts legislation. Many LDP members silently opposed the bill because it threatened their own seats. Ozawa and his allies saw an opportunity. They wanted to be on the right side of the corruption issue, and they were embattled within the party, where the breakup of the Kanemaru-Takeshita faction had left Ozawa with a rump group. In a momentous decision, Ozawa and his followers joined the no-confidence vote against Miyazawa, brought down the government, and left the party.

The bill, in a watered-down version that provides for a mix of seats filled through direct election in single-member districts and ones filled

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through proportional representation, was finally pushed through the Diet by Hosokawa and Ozawa in 1994, and it will provide the basis for the next national elections for the lower house. These could come as early as this year, but until then it is impossible to say what effect the new system will have. The country's economic retreat is likely to do more to trim corruption than the new districts. Whether a more coherent government emerges depends on many variables, primarily the ability of a single party to post a clear-cut win.

If Ozawa and his New Frontier Party win, Japan will probably see change first where change encounters the least domestic opposition—defense and foreign policy, say. The slowest pace will be in areas like economic and government deregulation and administrative reform, where Ozawa, if he is true to his goals in *Blueprint*, will have to cross swords with his many friends in the bureaucracy and other interest groups. The reformist's only allies may be trade friction and the steadily sinking economy, which will force the tempo.

A FOREIGN POLICY THAT STANDS UP

OZAWA MAY be out in the cold and Japan in disarray, but his views on foreign policy continue to propel small but steady changes in security and foreign policy. The disintegration of the Social Democrats, the keepers of Article Nine orthodoxy, has eased the way for some commonsense adjustments. The Diet late last year approved legislation to permit the use of military planes to rescue Japanese nationals in crisis situations abroad, for example; earlier this was considered impossible because of leftist opposition. After 12 years of negotiations, Japan and the United States are close to working out an agreement on military acquisitions and cross-servicing, similar to those of NATO allies, that has eluded Japan until now, again because of the left. Deployment of the Japan's self-defense forces on non-combat U.N. missions is now routine, exciting little public interest, whereas the 1993 deployment of Japanese troops to Cambodia on a U.N. mission rocked the Miyazawa government.

The Kobe quake spurred better crisis planning in Tokyo and helped rehabilitate the military as a respectable part of society. Most Japanese applauded the work of army chemical warfare experts in

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cleaning up the subways in the capital after the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack in March. There were no protests when the experts took part in police raids on the cult's installations. A few years ago, their presence alongside the police would have been unthinkable.

In the absence of leftist opposition, it is also likely that Japan's Self-Defense Agency will be able to pursue two other high-priority projects, both of which will further the independence of Japanese defenses. One is a proposed theater missile defense system, a multibillion-dollar effort in collaboration with the United States, designed to give Japan a measure of protection against missile attack. The other is a quantum improvement in Japan's defense intelligence capabilities, which are currently highly dependent on the United States. Japanese defense experts are increasingly uneasy about their reliance on the United States when it comes to critical subjects like assessing the potential North Korean nuclear threat. They fear that the Clinton administration's generous settlement with North Korea over the development and use of nuclear fuel was more a product of Clinton's domestic political weakness than a hardheaded analysis of Japanese and Korean interests. One key ambition of Japanese defense planners is a spy satellite, which would help Tokyo draw its own conclusions about regional threats.

This trend in defense and foreign affairs will lead Tokyo to a more articulate, assertive, and independent stance. Ozawa foreshadowed the change during the mini-crisis last year over North Korea. Mindful of the Persian Gulf fiasco, the Hata government took politically difficult steps to ensure it could back at least some tough measures against North Korea, such as cutting off the flow of money to North Korea from Chosen Soren, a wealthy North Korean support group in Japan. Ozawa was determined that Japan do its part.

On the other hand, after the mission of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter put Pyongyang and Washington on track for a settlement, Ozawa was openly critical of the promise to provide 500,000 tons of heavy oil and two light-water nuclear reactors in exchange for Pyongyang's capping of its potentially threatening nuclear development program. The deal left many issues open to question. "As long as nuclear inspections are unsettled," he said on a television program, "we should not provide financial cooperation." Ozawa was in opposition when he made the remark; he might have

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felt differently had he been in power. But there is no doubt that he would insist on being a full partner, and an outspoken one, in dealings with the United States.

Ozawa, or at least the sensibility he represents, underlies the future of U.S.-Japan relations, and his view of the United States is different from that of the older generation in the LDP. Postwar LDP leaders lived with a contradiction: they were ready to blindly take Washington's lead on most foreign policy matters, but they were also deeply committed to Japan's drive for economic primacy. When the two came into conflict, especially over trade, the LDP leadership practiced a kind of yes-and-no diplomacy that repeatedly poisoned the relationship with the United States.

The sensibility that Ozawa represents underlies the future of U.S.-Japan relations.

Ozawa, who places immense importance on continued close security links with the United States and believes trade friction endangers the alliance, sees no reason to draw out talks and turn them into a hostile dispute, especially when American negotiators have a point. For someone with Ozawa's firsthand understanding of politics, it is easy to see the reality—usually some complex set of special interest group relations—behind the stonewalling by Japanese trade negotiators. Ozawa has been an invaluable friend to American trade negotiators since 1988, when he settled the talks aimed at opening up Japanese public construction work to American businesses. Even last year, he was the catalyst for the breakthrough in cellular phone talks that helped Motorola's business in Japan take off and dramatically reduced prices. On recent automobile talks, Ozawa would not have engaged in the damaging grandstanding of Ryutaro Hashimoto, the MITI minister and LDP prime ministerial hopeful; instead, he would have striven quietly to conclude a deal with the United States while avoiding guarantees of a market share to U.S. automakers in Japan.

At the same time, Ozawa is sure to be an outspoken, even critical ally of the United States, not an unquestioning follower of U.S. initiatives, as the old LDP leadership was. Ozawa firmly believes that the alliance is the key to Japan's continued acceptance in the rest of Asia, and more recently he has stressed that Japan needs the United States to counterbalance an increasingly chauvinistic and menacing China.

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In that sense, Ozawa stands opposed to the "Asia first" arguments that have taken root in some conservative circles, egged on notably by former LDP legislator Shintaro Ishihara. Ozawa's Japan would lobby Washington to play a strong role in Asian security while keeping a more constructive, critical distance than in the past. All the while, Japan will move toward a more independent security footing to hedge against Washington's possible disengagement in the future.

The brake on Ozawa's drive to make Japan a normal country in foreign and defense policy will come from the dovish side of the LDP. Leaders like Yohei Kono, president of the LDP, will accept practical changes but draw the line at reinterpretation of the constitution, increases in defense spending, or commitment of self-defense forces to U.N. combat operations. Such views reflect popular opinion, which is deeply conservative when it comes to departing from Japan's head-in-the-sand postwar ethos.

Mindful of those limits, Ozawa has been careful to stress that Japan should commit its troops only under U.N. auspices (although he accepts the possibility of Japanese troops seeing military action), and he remains wary of amending the constitution. He argues, however, that a clause could be added to Article Nine stating that Japan's forces may participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. On Japanese membership in the U.N. Security Council, Ozawa adopts a mischievous position; he likes to say Japan is not yet ready to assume such a responsibility, a roundabout way of making the point that Japan's leadership is not mature enough to handle the hard decisions demanded of Security Council members.

Ozawa's vision for a more active Japanese foreign policy suffers from being boxed in by the U.N. framework; the U.N.'s record after the Cold War is a disappointment. Yet at the moment, the United Nations is the only vessel in which Ozawa can place his vision for Japan's broader security. In *Blueprint for a New Japan*, Ozawa argues that his country, as a trading nation, should follow the example of Venice in its days as a city-state, when it aggressively defended its vast trading empire, not the example of ancient Carthage, which foundered. Japan is beginning to face the implications of such a view, but it is far from ready to accept the leadership of Ichiro Ozawa.

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Ecological Roulette: Damming the Yangtze

Audrey R. Topping

THE RISKS OF THE THREE GORGES DAM

IF ALL goes according to plan, the People's Republic of China by the year 2009 will have completed the biggest, most expensive, and perhaps most hazardous hydroelectric dam ever attempted. The megadam is under construction near the center of China on a fabled stretch of the Yangtze River. Along a mountainous section of the river valley that sharply narrows in three places to form immense, steep-walled canyons—the Xiling, Wu, and Qutang Gorges—the dam will create what the Chinese refer to as a "lake within the gorges." The government claims the Three Gorges Dam will increase the supply of affordable electricity throughout the Yangtze Valley, control floods, boost the growing economy, reduce air pollution, and lessen the impact China's energy production has on the earth's ozone layer.

Although the project had floundered for decades, and final engineering and financing plans were incomplete, last December Premier Li Peng brushed aside international criticism and proclaimed that construction had officially begun on the 1.3-mile-long, 610-foot-high dam. On the surface, the benefits of a megadam to China seem indisputable. But are the benefits worth the costs and risks?

Both the technical and social dimensions of the project are staggering. A reservoir stretching 385 miles up the Yangtze River will be

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created, forcing the resettlement of 1.4 million people and submerging ancient farmland, temples, wildlife habitats, and archaeological treasures dating back 10,000 years. Much of the unique scenic splendor of the Yangtze River, which has been an integral part of Chinese life and mythology, will be lost forever. The environmental effects will be comparable to those of damming the Grand Canyon or diverting Niagara Falls.

The dam has attracted worldwide attention because of the ecological dangers, technical challenges, and human rights issues it poses, and it has raised questions about the rights of other industrialized nations to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. In China the project has sparked a fiery and unprecedented debate over its feasibility. It has also conjured up terrifying memories of disastrous dam breaks from China's past, the worst of them the overnight crumbling of 62 dams in Henan province in 1975. That tragedy was attributed to three once-every-2,000-years typhoons that struck in the same month. In the deluge, the dams—including two of China's largest "iron dams" in the Huaihe River—held against the torrents for only two days. The iron dams had been built in the early 1950s based on Soviet designs, and government officials had proclaimed them indestructible, like the Titanic. When they burst, the "river dragon" escaped with such demonic force that tidal waves wiped out entire towns; an estimated 86,000 to 230,000 people died. Two million more people were trapped for weeks, and some 11 million were stricken by disease and famine in the aftermath.

Surmounting a news blackout by the Chinese government, Human Rights Watch/Asia compiled an account of the disaster from confidential sources in the country. It published a report in February, nearly 20 years after the fact. To this day the catastrophe has not been publicly acknowledged by the Chinese government, nor has it been cited in government hearings on the Three Gorges project.

PROTEST OF THE PEOPLE

WITHIN CHINA, the project has triggered a political backlash. Concern over the dam has reached such heights that many patriotic citizens have been impelled to openly challenge the regime's "mandate of heaven" for the first time since the communists took power in 1949.

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Scientists, writers, scholars, statesmen, flood refugees, and sympathizers have broken their political shackles and risked imprisonment with insistent pleas for caution. Regardless of the project's outcome, their opposition to state policy already stands as an important historical act on the part of a broad cross section of intellectual elites.

In May 1992 police arrested 179 members of the Democratic Youth Party in Kai County and charged them with counterrevolutionary activities aimed at sabotaging the progress of the Three Gorges project. To this day no one knows their whereabouts or legal status; inquiries by journalists and diplomats have gone unanswered. Human Rights Watch/Asia has appealed to foreign governments and businesses contemplating involvement with the dam to assist in discovering the fate of the dissenters.

Dam critics have been jailed and denounced for activities deemed "counterrevolutionary."

Anti-dam lobbyists believe that public access to basic information about the iron dams and debate by hydrologists could have prevented the flood disasters. By calling for an immediate investigation of the Three Gorges construction plans and pushing for more government accountability, they hope to avert the catastrophe that would result if the 36 billion cubic yards of water to be dammed were ever to be released. That flood would be 40 times larger than the one caused by the 1975 collapse of all 62 iron dams combined. Between 270,000 and 400,000 cubic yards of crashing water per second would roar downstream, engulfing dozens of towns, including the populous cities of Shashi, Yichang, Wuhan, and Changsha, and imperiling 10 million Chinese.

Although Premier Li, a former hydroelectric engineer, has admitted that "China does not have the technology to build the 26 sets of 700-megawatt turbines and electrical generators that will be the heart of the dam," many top Chinese scientists have been persecuted for saying much the same thing. Li and the pro-dam faction led by Qian Zhengying, the minister of water resources and electrical power, are denying the public forums in which they can register their disapproval and seem intent on forcing the project through as an icon of superpower status and national prestige. They typify the rigid Mao Zedong mindset that resulted in monumental disasters like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the great floods.

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Qian was serving as minister of water resources and electrical power in 1975 during the iron dams catastrophe. In the 1950s she denounced China's top hydrologist, Chen Xing, and purged him from party ranks for warning about the shoddy construction of the dams and predicting they would bring a "scourge on the people." After the calamity Qian confessed: "I personally must shoulder the principal responsibility." Having relieved the top leadership of responsibility, she was exonerated. Incredibly, at age 70 she remains minister of water resources and leader of the proponents of the Three Gorges project. History seems to be repeating itself.

In 1992 Qian and Li banned the publication of a scholarly book by eight opponents of Three Gorges, all experts on water conservancy science and technology and members of the China People's Political Consultative Conference, the highest government body in China. One of the editors, Tian Fang, like Chen a hydrologist denounced by the government in the 1970s, claims that the government has slandered and reviled him, but he has continued to say there could well be a catastrophe if the Three Gorges project goes forward.

FLOATING ON A RIVER OF MYTHS

WHILE THE controversy has been churning up as much white water as the rapids swirling through the gorges, travel agencies around the world have been exploiting the situation and offering "last chance tours." I had sailed the gorges twice but longed to see the endangered scenery again, so in August 1994 I joined the flock of tourists motivated by the deadline. For me the river holds a sentimental attachment; two generations of my family have lived in China. My missionary grandparents fell in love sailing up the Yangtze in a junk from Shanghai to Wuhan, where they married on Christmas Day, 1891. The next spring they sailed in a houseboat through the gorges of the Yangtze to Chongqing. As a child I was fascinated by sepia photos of my elegant grandmother in her bustle skirt and high-buttoned boots walking with my grandfather in his velvet-collared Prince Albert suit coat and canvas shoes along the banks of the Yangtze. High above on a narrow towpath were dozens of nearly naked laborers in red turbans, straw sandals, and harnesses made of braided bamboo. They strained, often on all

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fours, to pull the houseboat upstream through the foaming waters.

The Yangtze is actually three rivers in one. Tumbling down from its source in the Tibetan glaciers of the Tangula Mountains across the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, it is known as the River to Heaven. From Qinghai it becomes the River of Golden Sands, which flows a thousand miles to Yibin. The last stretch, covering 2,000 miles, is known as the Long River. It cascades through the Three Gorges past Wuhan before spreading its wings through the alluvial plains and winding a path to its mouth in the Shanghai estuary. This 3,960-mile tripartite torrent makes up that mystical force known as the Yangtze, or child of the ocean.

No other river has touched so many lives. More than 380 million people, a third of China's population, live along its banks, where half of China's food is grown. The river has given unequaled adventure to travelers and inspiration to generations of poets and painters. The spectacular gorges with their mysterious rock formations resembling a pantheon of deities and mythical beasts have given rise to folklore and legends passed on by peasants, mandarins, and emperors for millennia. The river embodies the mythic image of Old Cathay—the five-clawed celestial dragon, symbol of the emperors. Lung Wang, the four-clawed dragon king and chief of the water gods, is reputed to reside in a castle under Goose Tail Rock in Wind Box Gorge.



We began our journey by sailing into a navigation lock below the Gezouba Dam. The first attempt at a dam on this site was torn down because of hasty construction by zealous Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. The subsequent dam cost several times the original estimate. Our boat entered the lock, and as it filled, the water hoisted us 70 feet in 20 minutes and released us into the whirling waters of the Three Gorges. The morning mist over the river valley slowly lifted, revealing a landscape of green terraced hills that gave way to the

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precipitous limestone cliffs of Yellow Cat Gorge. Together with Lampshine Gorge, this forms the 16-mile-long Xiling Gorge, which is the one of the "Three Gorges" that will be closest to the megadam on the upstream side. We sailed along, our course winding between small village churches with spires and weathered rock ramparts that culminated in the Pillar of Heaven, a mountain that rises about 2,000 feet above the water level.

The August sun slowly thinned the ground haze to reveal fishermen casting silvery nets from grottoes embellished with weirdly shaped stalactites. On the south bank yawned the black mouth of Dragons Cave, reputed to extend to the center of the earth. Local lore has it that no one who has explored the cave has ever returned, dead or alive. The entrance was festooned with silky maidenhair ferns and feathery bamboo. Above, smooth rock canopies streaked with black, like the palette of some giant calligrapher practicing brush strokes, hung precariously. Streamlets, seemingly from nowhere, tumbled over ledges.

As we traveled upriver, the panorama unrolled like a Chinese scroll. At every turn new summits appeared, some crowned with jagged rocks, some shaped like towering pipe organs, and others like the battlements of medieval castles. A few of the rock fantasies appeared ready to fall in the river, as many have done in the past. The New Dragon Rapids was created in one night in 1896 by a tremendous landslide that narrowed the river from 400 yards to 150 yards, changing a placid current into boiling rapids that over the years have



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devoured thousands of boatmen and travelers before the vicious rock teeth of the rapids were dynamited in the 1950s. Passage through the gorges is not the dangerous voyage it used to be. Devil's Threshold and Coffin Rapids no longer live up to their names, but the old towpaths and shimmering shrines along the riverbank are constant reminders of the way it once was.

Xiling Gorge comprises several inner gorges with names like Shadow Play Gorge and Ox Liver and Horse Lung Gorge, describing the shapes of prominent stalactites at each site. The highest and last inner gorge, Military Manual and Sword Gorge, was named after China's most honored military genius, General Meng Liang, who like most of the heroes of the Yangtze gorges lived during the romantic period of the Three Kingdoms, 221 to 265 A.D. He was also prime minister of Hubei province and was born in Xiangfan, the same city on the banks of the Han River where my father was born and raised. It did not matter that my father was born nearly 1,700 years after Liang's era. During his childhood, Liang was his living hero, and I grew up on tales of this general who won his wars by wit and strategy rather than military might. Liang is said to have written the ultimate book on military strategy, but he feared it would fall into the hands of wicked warlords who might use it to conquer China. So he

Hoover Dam
is 1,244 feet long and 726 feet high. The capacity of its reservoir is 9.6 trillion gallons.

Three Gorges Dam
would be 6,864 feet long and 610 feet high. The capacity of its reservoir would be 10.4 trillion gallons.



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buried it, along with his sword, somewhere in Xiling Gorge.

These relics, never found, are just two among the multitude that thousands of archaeologists hope to save from the Three Gorges megadam. They are racing against time to excavate over 300 square miles of riverbank before Liang's writings and other artifacts from ten centuries of Chinese history—including 200 ancient tombs—are submerged in the reservoir that is now planned. Archaeologists compare the excavations to those carried out in Egypt before the Aswan High Dam was built. Chinese archaeologists argue that the treasures belong not only to China but to the world and that an international effort even larger than the one to preserve the relics along the Nile should be mounted along the Yangtze. Like their Egyptian counterparts, they are appealing to the United Nations and foreign researchers for money and modern equipment. The cost of the necessary excavations in the proposed reservoir area is estimated at $180 million.

A RECKLESS GAMBLE

OPPONENTS OF the megadam fear that vast stretches of the Yangtze River ecosystem will be irreversibly upset. American environmentalists have joined the Chinese opposition, claiming the river blockage will endanger or wipe out the Chinese alligator, the finless porpoise, the white crane, the river dolphin, as well as the Chinese sturgeon, which is unique to the Yangtze. (This giant fish dates back to the age of the dinosaurs and is one of the earth's few living fossils.)

Seismologists studying the project are more worried about its possible effects on people than on animals. They say that the reservoir will be over an active fault line and the weight of the water could trigger an earthquake that could demolish the dam. Also, fluctuating water levels could cause instability on the riverbank, resulting in landslides and tidal waves. The New China News Agency warned last year that extended rains or a jarring earthquake in the region would likely cause the Huangla Stone, one face of an enormous (141 million cubic feet) cliff 40 miles upstream from the dam, to fall, "triggering waves as high as 250 feet to surge along the river." Advocates of the megadam project claim, as they did with the iron dams, that it is designed to withstand any seismic shock and that most of the Yangtze shoreline is solid rock.

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Hydrologists are concerned about the high degree of sedimentation in the Yangtze. I once scooped up a glass of river water and three minutes later an inch of reddish silt had settled on the bottom. Critics believe the dam will cause the river sediment, which is now suspended in the water and largely carried downstream, to pile up around the planned port installation at the end of the reservoir, clogging effluent pipes and causing dangerous sewage backups and floods upstream in Chongqing, a city of 15 million. Downstream, the concerns are about not getting enough silt. Considering that the city of Shanghai and the Yangtze estuary rest entirely on beds of river silt, the concern of residents there is understandable. Dam proponents maintain that downstream areas will not be starved of silt if appropriate reservoir management techniques are used. Such techniques, however, have yet to be developed.

INCALCULABLE HUMAN COSTS

THE CHINESE government has estimated that the Three Gorges reservoir waters will engulf 13 cities; hundreds of villages, districts, and townships; 955 business enterprises and factory towns; and 115,000 acres of the richest land along the river basin. The resettlement of some 50,000 residents is already in motion and a full-scale evacuation is due to begin this year. The government has pledged to spend $4.8 billion on resettlement and earmarked $3.2 million for compensation to the 1.4 million refugees who will be wrenched from the land of their ancestors and relocated in unfamiliar and inhospitable areas.

Government officials are preparing for the serious social unrest that will likely ensue. According to a report on security problems prepared by officials of the Wanxian Prefectural Public Security Department and published recently by Human Rights Watch/Asia, the relocation plan is "spawning outrage towards the government, resulting in resistance to resettlement and interference with the construction of the Three Gorges Project."[1] The report states that "the area where the Wanxian inhabitants are to be moved is already one

[1] "The Three Gorges Dam in China: Forced Resettlement, Suppression of Dissent, and Labor Rights Concerns," New York: Human Rights Watch/Asia, February 1995.

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of many people and little land. The standard of living is backward, and fights are constant over water, trees, and patches of farmland."

Crime has risen because of the huge influx of workers and tourists near the dam site. "Mafia-type gangs will become an evil force," the report says, and "gold-panning fever [greed for illegal profits] directly entices some state officials to engage in criminal activities such as corruption, bribe-taking, embezzlement, speculation, and fraud. This will hinder the process of construction and relocation."

The report cites active opposition to other resettlements that resulted in demonstrations, looting, assaults, and kidnapping and warns: "Considering the difficulties caused by these small-scale resettlements that have involved only a few hundred people, imagine the magnitude of the problem that will come from attempting to relocate 1.4 million people." The report's recommendations include the establishment of a unified public security organization in the gorge area, a major increase in the police force and its equipment, and more support for the local security units from the Central Committee in Beijing.

Between Witches Gorge and Wind Box we sailed through Kai County, where the picturesque orchards on the river banks dripped with ripe mandarin oranges and emerald rice paddies stretched over the foothills. Kai, in the Wanxian district of Sichuan, is the largest and richest county destined to disappear in the deluge. The welfare of thousands of relatively wealthy farmers and their families will have to be sacrificed for the dam, and Chinese security officials are not surprised that the farmers are resisting.

We docked in Wanxian, a centuries-old city with a population of more than 300,000 that has been condemned under the dam plans. Ironically, Wanxian is famous for its propitious location, which provides favorable *feng shui*—spiritual alignment within the landscape—to protect its people from evil and attract benign influences. Apparently it will not be able to protect them from modern technology. The Three Gorges reservoir will submerge half the city, the surrounding farms, and the famous mulberry plantations that feed China's silkworms. We visited a vast silk-spinning factory that will be relocated to Yuanyang, one of the new townships in the mountains established for refugees of the dam project. The Wanxian farmers told us they are demanding over $12 million in compensation for the loss of their mul-

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berry trees alone, but the corruption of the local officials in charge of dispensing the money means they have little chance of receiving it.

We docked at the town of Shibaozhai, noted for its bountiful terraced rice paddies and Precious Stone Castle, a 12-story pagoda erected on Jade Mountain almost 2,000 years ago. The pagoda towers 300 feet above the town, which will be submerged beneath the reservoir, but the temple will survive, just above the water line. The town's 3,000 residents, however, will have to leave their ancient temple and resettle in mountainous areas where they face local hostility, infertile land, and a lower standard of living. Other towns confront similar fates. The residents of nearby Shuidong, for example, who have an annual per capita income of $192, are being relocated to the mountain village of Huangling, where the average income is only $65. The merchants in doomed Shibaozhai are making the most of the tourists while they last. For ten yuan, two bearers will carry visitors in a sedan chair up to the well-stocked gift shops at the foot of the temple.

The government dreads the backlash from the forced resettlement of 1.4 million people.

FIGHTING AND LOSING

FOREIGN CRITICS also point to the violations of the human rights of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers involved in the Three Gorges project. According to Human Rights Watch/Asia, these laborers face discrimination from local government authorities and inhabitants. Long before the official start of the project, 20,000 workers were building watertight enclosures for work on the dam foundations, constructing roads, and moving some 19.7 million cubic yards of earth and stone. Sailing past Sandouping near the new dam site, we saw that the village there had already been evacuated and wiped off the south bank to make room for construction. Thousands of workers were swarming like ants over the scorched terra cotta banks laying power lines to Zhongbao, an island in the river that was chosen as the central staging area of the project because its core, like the riverbed where the immense dam wall will be built, is solid granite.

Human Rights Watch/Asia reports that Sichuan and Hubei, the

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two provinces most affected by the project, have large numbers of political and religious prisoners in the penal labor camps of China's *laogai* system. It also charges that China's suppression of free labor practices and incarceration of political prisoners in forced labor camps is a result of the government's plan for construction of the Three Gorges Dam.

Critics in China's scientific, engineering, and environmental communities who have attempted to raise technical questions about the project have been accused of counterrevolutionary intent and disloyalty, which in communist China are cardinal sins. Opponents have been persecuted since 1956. Li Rui, Mao's personal secretary and a vice minister of water resources, was the first to be purged during the Great Leap Forward. Since then, two generations of scientists and writers have been denounced, publicly humiliated, and imprisoned for their criticism. In 1989 an investigative journalist, Dai Qing, published a collection of articles by several scholars against the dam. After the Tiananmen debacle her book, *Yangtze! Yangtze!*, was officially banned and 30,000 copies were destroyed. The authors were accused of advocating bourgeois liberalization and providing "opinions for chaos and riots." Dai was imprisoned for ten months. The eminent scientist Qian Jiaju, who openly criticized the project, was forced into exile.

The controversy over the dam, which began out of genuine concern over the environmental dangers and future economic health of China, has degenerated into a bare-knuckle political fight. Opponents charge that they have been prevented from expressing their opinions at meetings of the Leading Group for the Assessment of the Three Gorges Project, the main government body planning the project. They have accused pro-dam Communist Party officials of employing unscientific methods and indulging in impossible plans in their quest to build what would be by many measures the biggest dam in the world to stand as a symbol of the regime's power and bring it everlasting glory.

In an interview with Dai, Huan Shunxing, a member of the National People's Congress, expressed his frustration over an instance of censorship at a meeting of the party in 1992: "I raised my hand requesting to speak but was ignored by the chairman. I stood up anyway and at this point I heard a journalist from Taiwan shout: 'No sound! No sound!' Later I learned the entire sound system in the

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meeting hall had been shut down, with the exception of the chairman's microphone. How dare the NPC cut off the power to prevent delegates from exercising their right?"

Although opposition has been severely hampered, it has not been stilled. In April 1992, when Premier Li presented the official resolution on the construction of the Three Gorges Project to the seventh National People's Congress for approval, he received an unprecedented response. The resolution passed, but instead of the usual unanimous approval from the compliant quasi parliament, almost a third of the NPC delegates opposed the resolution or abstained from voting. Notably, most of the opposition came from insiders and specialists at the government's own Water Resource and Electric Power Research Institute.

RELUCTANT FINANCIERS

ESTIMATES OF of the project's cost range between $17.3 billion and $30 billion. To help defray this, the government has been seeking $8 billion in foreign investment. The World Bank, after overseeing a four-year, $8.7 million feasibility study conducted by the Canadian International Development Agency, refused to help with funding. Merrill Lynch and other potential investors have also withdrawn because of the financial and political risks, as well as questions of human rights violations.

Responding to political and business pressures, several foreign governments have vacillated. The Bush administration expressed support for the project, and the Department of the Interior agreed to provide technical assistance. In 1992 the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation signed an agreement with the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources to provide technical consulting services for the Three Gorges project. Seven environmental groups in the United States threatened to sue the bureau on grounds that the dam violated the Endangered Species Act. The bureau terminated the agreement, a bureau spokesperson explaining: "It is now generally known that large-scale water retention dam projects are not environmentally or economically feasible. We wouldn't support such a project in the United States now, so it would be incongruous for us to support a project like this in another country." The Clinton administration is reviewing the issue.

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

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

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

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In 1988 the Canadian government agreed to help fund the project and recommended that it be "carried out at an early date." In Amsterdam the International Water Tribunal ruled against the China-Canada agreement, stating that "due to expediency, the very high ecological and socioeconomic risks of the megadam have not been adequately assessed by the defendant's feasibility studies." The tribunal strongly advised that the project be halted until the populations at risk can exercise their "rights to information and consultation" and "the right to effectively participate in processes affecting their habitats and livelihoods." In April 1992 the Canadian government announced that the Canadian International Development Agency could no longer use government funds for the megadam. However, after the 1994 general election, as part of a broad policy of developing economic ties with China, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien reversed course and announced his support of the project. Three engineering companies established Team Canada to "develop and execute engineering project management . . . in the rapidly growing Chinese power market." Premier Michael Harcourt of British Columbia, who took part in the original Canadian feasibility study, forbade involvement with the megadam for all government agencies in British Columbia.

SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL

THE DAM'S advocates argue that China's fast-growing economy and population have a right to improved prosperity. Today there is a severe energy shortage; about 180 million Chinese have no electricity. In the region to be served by the Three Gorges project, the energy available per person is roughly one percent of per capita energy consumption in the United States. The argument that reportedly persuaded Deng Xiaoping to endorse the project is that the dam reservoir would raise the water level some 500 feet, improving river navigation and enabling 10,000-ton ships to sail up the gorges to Chongqing (vessels are currently limited to 1,500 tons). The Yangtze carries 78 percent of the country's riverborne freight, but present navigational conditions cannot meet the development needs of the economy. The dam would increase capacity for shipping fivefold and decrease shipping costs by about 35 percent. The project would also generate ten percent of the

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electrical capacity China will need, estimated at 18,200 megawatts, or the equivalent of ten nuclear plants, according to proponents.

Opponents do not deny that China needs more power and better flood control, but are leery about putting all their eggs in one basket. Instead of building a single dam of unprecedented size, they recommend building smaller power plants along sparsely populated tributaries throughout the river system, such as the Dadu, Jinsha, and Wujian Rivers, and in the upper reaches of the Yangtze above Chongqing. The mainstream areas of the Yangtze would be the last developed. Opponents maintain that medium-sized projects could yield the same amount of electricity and flood control at lower cost. Such a plan would avert the need for massive population relocation and eliminate the risk of a giant flood. Dams in these areas were already in the planning stages, but progress stalled as the money went to finance the megadam. Critics also claim that increased sedimentation and the need to substantially lower the reservoir water level in summer for flood control would interfere with navigation. They point out that 10,000-ton ships, the size of oceangoing vessels, could not clear the bridges in Nanjing and Wuhan; mammoth locks exceeding all present international standards would have to be constructed.

After being bandied about for decades, the Three Gorges project now resembles an avalanche gaining speed. Sun Yat-sen proposed such a dam in 1919, when nations were still blind to the consequences of environmental changes. Mao resurrected the project, and it is now being championed by Li, who despite his access to the negative engineering and environmental reports is plunging ahead, without regard for human consequences. Human Rights Watch/Asia warned that without public scrutiny "the dam will simply stand, like the Great Wall, as the ultimate symbol of power and authority of a repressive state."

The Great Wall was built by slave labor, including Confucian scholars who objected to the emperor's burning of Chinese classics. Thousands perished. Their bones were crushed and used for mortar, earning the wall the grim sobriquet, "the longest cemetery in the world." Unlike the Three Gorges megadam, however, the Great Wall cannot break and cause further catastrophe.

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Reviews

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What comes after Deng?

How will China be governed? The best answer is "very differently."

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Review Essay

After Deng the Deluge

China's Next Leap Forward

Arthur Waldron

Governing China: From Revolution through Reform. BY KENNETH LIEBERTHAL. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995, 498 pp. $30.00.

The world is relearning a basic lesson about China: how it fits into international society depends on its internal politics. The ease of relations with China from 1976 to 1989 reflected the end of the Cultural Revolution and a great reduction in domestic repression; problems thereafter grew from the regime crisis following the Tiananmen massacre. As for the rise in tensions today, many of the factors prompting it—China's military modernization and expansion in the South China Sea, for example—clearly have something to do with looming political contention in Beijing after the death of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.

What does the future hold? Kenneth Lieberthal ventures an answer toward the end of *Governing China.* The book is an encyclopedic survey of what political science has learned about the People's Republic of China—about the careers of its leaders, its structures of authority, its policy and power struggles—and in both its impressive scope and judicious flavor recalls *How the Soviet Union Is Governed,* Jerry F. Hough's revision of Merle Fainsod's classic, *How Russia Is Ruled.* So it is perhaps worth recalling Hough's prognosis for the U.S.S.R., eminently reasonable in 1979: "Any future evolution is highly likely to retain the framework of the present system in one sense or another."

Lieberthal, similarly, prophesies change for China, but most likely gradual change within existing structures. He expects the state to "employ a range of

ARTHUR WALDRON teaches strategy at the Naval War College and East Asian studies at Brown University, and is an Associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University. His most recent book is *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-25* (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

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strategies to fend off challenges from a developing society" and use the security apparatus to crush any unrest. The Communist Party may abandon socialism for nationalism, but it will continue in its preeminent role. The many internal pressures—economic, demographic, and political—whose buildup Lieberthal chronicles will likely be accommodated as the system evolves in directions that can already be discerned. "While uncertainties abound," Lieberthal writes, "it appears that on balance China in the late 1990s will grow more open, decentralized, corrupt, regionally and socially diverse, militarily powerful, and socially tempestuous."

This prognosis may well be correct, and it is certainly favored by many in government and foreign policy circles. But at root it is a linear projection, and these have an intuitive psychological appeal independent of their cogency. It is difficult enough to predict rain when contemplating a clear sky, let alone imagine a day when the red flag will come down in the People's Republic. Yet the Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time on December 25, 1991. Precisely because such spectacular shifts have taken place in a dozen countries—and almost took place in China in 1989—it makes sense at least to consider another future for China, one involving change more radical, less orderly, and far more discontinuous than Lieberthal foresees.

This alternative assessment says, in effect, let us for once try to recognize the preconditions for major historical change when they arise, and understand that they have inescapable consequences. Evidence for this approach abounds in *Governing China,* chapter after chapter of which presents in statistical detail the dramatic economic and social changes Deng Xiaoping's reform policies have wrought. For 20 years China has been growing economically about as fast as any country ever has. Huge cities have sprouted where a decade ago were only rice paddies. Tens of millions of peasants have left the countryside and moved to cities in search of work. Millions more Chinese have acquired modern education and knowledge of the world, so that thought and culture are changing as well. Communism, the ideological cement of the People's Republic, has been discredited.

Two centuries ago analogous developments in Europe set in train a process of change, conflict, and political reconstruction whose repercussions the world still feels. The consequences of Europe's military, industrial, and demographic revolutions have been thoroughly documented. The rise of cities, the spread of literacy and new ideas, and the development of a bourgeoisie were all changes the old order proved incapable of accommodating. Europe's new economy and new society demanded new state structures—with constitutions, legal systems, and citizen participation—and Europe got them, but only at the cost of much turmoil.

This pattern has been repeated wherever and whenever the same fundamental forces have been unleashed. Is it likely that China will be the great historical exception—that in 20 years it will be a vibrant economic giant, full of educated, mobile, and increasingly affluent people who nevertheless tolerate rule by a self-perpetuating politburo and its co-opted friends in society?

If the answer is no, then instead of wondering about succession, as so many

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pundits do, one should acknowledge that China today faces something far more complex and significant: regime transition. As this is being written, an intense battle is under way in Beijing over which party leaders will seize Deng's mantle. It is a riveting spectacle, but this particular fight will not decide China's future. When the dust settles, the important question will not be who but what. What sort of regime is China heading toward? And what will the consequences be for the world?

SEVERAL ROADS DIVERGE

If this reasoning is correct, the assumptions about China that Lieberthal articulates and governments around the globe share are at best valid only for the short term and are likely to mislead if pushed further. China future will be very different from China past and even present, and particularly from the China whose workings are most familiar and which Lieberthal describes exhaustively: the People's Republic. Substantial—and not evolutionary or gradual—changes are not only possible but likely. These will influence China's relations with the rest of the world far more than any initiatives or agreements decided on today. The present is transitional, and the United States should start positioning itself now for change (and perhaps influencing it).

The twentieth century provides a sense of the wide range of alternatives. One set of possibilities for China may broadly be termed constitutional. In its last years the Qing Dynasty was becoming a constitutional monarchy with a parliament and cabinet. The Republic of China that followed was authoritarian but also saw a remarkable series of parliamentary and constitutional initiatives. Eleven constitutions or draft constitutions were proposed or adopted between 1911 and 1949. The current democratic government in Taiwan operates under the all-Chinese constitution of 1946, with amendments. Difficult as it has been to implement, the idea of constitutionalism continues to have legitimacy in Chinese minds, so that even the People's Republic has felt the need for a basic document, successively adopting five constitutions, the most recent in 1982.

At present, of course, the constitution is a sham. A small group of powerful men, as Lieberthal explains in his illuminating chapters on "inside" and "outside" views of government, handles the real business of ruling China. But Zhou Enlai 20 years ago drew up plans for some reconstitutionalization of rule after Mao's long extralegal reign (though Zhou died before Mao, so they came to nothing). Similar calls come today from the National People's Congress, China's quasi parliament, as Deng's long and equally extralegal rule draws to a close. In fact, generational change may force the government to pay more attention to the rules it has set for itself. With the last of the Long March elders departing from the scene, the strongman solution becomes impractical because no one fully qualifies for the role.

This is not to say that no one will try to become strongman—which brings up a second set of possibilities for the decades ahead. Chinese history this century reveals a pattern of attempts to recentralize authority in the vast and diverse land. Such was the fundamental policy of Yuan Shikai, the first post-dynastic military dictator, who seized power from parliament and ruled from

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1912 to 1916, as well as of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party. After 1949 the People's Republic could proudly claim to have achieved this goal. Until the late 1970s the center, or *zhongyang*, counted for nearly everything (though Lieberthal's discussion shows that the reverse is true almost everywhere in China now). Someone in the center in the years to come could decide that enough is enough, the fractious country must be pulled back together, by force if necessary.

But as Hu Shih, perhaps twentieth-century China's greatest scholar, argued in an important essay, it is precisely when such attempts are made that China's unity has been most imperiled. China is a great civilization, and the most enduring of human historical units. But its inherent unity depends on a good deal of flexibility and local autonomy; apply too much centralizing pressure and the strain will cause China to begin to split. Thus in the 1920s more than a decade of regionally based warlordism and warfare followed Yuan's centralized rule.

Lieberthal mentions the precedent but does not make clear the logic driving it: a once-coherent ruling elite proves unable to reconstitute itself under a new leader after the strongman's death, and its members begin quarreling among themselves, first employing political and parliamentary maneuvers but then cautiously reaching for military means as a way to decision. Nor does he note that this is almost identical to the intraparty politics of the People's Republic as his book describes it—the same personal disagreements, the same attempts to resolve them through alliances and bureaucratic intrigue, and the ultimate appeal to force, most recently in the capital bodyguard division's extralegal ousting of Mao's widow and other followers in October 1976. The key difference is that in the People's Republic such intraparty disputes have never led to full-blown civil conflict—though the Cultural Revolution came close, and 1976 could have been more violent had military dispositions been different.

KEEPING THE LID ON

Lieberthal has considerable confidence in the ruling elite's ability to prevent its bitter rivalries from escalating into country-wide conflict. But in the administration of China, disagreements are ubiquitous within the center, between the center and the increasingly wealthy regions, within regions and units, and between rulers and the ruled. Any of these could supply the spark. Suppose, a few years down the line, an increasingly assertive National People's Congress passes laws that conflict with regulations promulgated by the party administration, or the governor of a wealthy southern province refuses to leave his post when Beijing tells him to. Each side might use its connections in the security apparatus and the military and among the regional authorities to get its way. Resolution might come, but it might not. Unanticipated escalation could even lead to civil war.

No less a figure than Deng Xiaoping prophesied, when Mao asked him in 1973 about the future, that "warlords would emerge and the whole country would sink into chaos"—an answer Mao evidently considered realistic. Strong legitimate political institutions are the best bulwark against such chaos, but Deng when he became ruler did nothing to create such structures.

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Instead he seems to have believed, against all historical precedent, that economic development plus repression, as at Tiananmen, could work.

Mention of Tiananmen brings up another set of possibilities, involving mass discontent pitting society against regime, as opposed to discord among the elite. It is true that many in China believe, with some reason, that the young leaders and students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 misjudged their actions and helped bring about an unnecessary disaster. But that does not mean they endorse the government crackdown; feeling is on the side of liberalization. The memory of the nationwide democracy demonstrations is alive, and the grievances that prompted them are still raw. The gap between state and society has only widened since 1989. The people have grown wealthier, better informed, and more self-sufficient while the government has grown weaker and increasingly reactive.

China in the years ahead will almost certainly see major strikes or mass protests. Noting that the government has been steadily strengthening its internal security forces since 1989, Lieberthal believes any such protests will probably "quickly die down, quelled by the state's repressive regime." But this assumes that the military and the police remain loyal. In fact, the military was deeply divided by the Tiananmen massacre, and individual officers and men often feel as tied to society as to the state. Called on to save an unpopular government in another Tiananmen, the People's Liberation Army is likely to split, or to join the people in getting rid of the politicians who gave the order.

THE BITTER ROOT

Should any of these eventualities come to pass, the challenges to policy for the United States and other countries will be very different from those to which observers have become accustomed. Hitherto the question has been how to deal with a China that speaks more or less with one voice. The United States has not been asked to support one Chinese leader against another (although reluctance to commit to a transitional President Jiang Zemin is part of the reason he has not been invited to visit Washington). It has not had to take a position on China's political form (although American sympathies during the democracy movement were clear, and would appear again under similar circumstances). Nor has it had to deal with prolonged unrest or civil conflict in China.

The root problem in all these scenarios is the antidemocratic character of the Chinese government and its consequent inability to deal with rapid, large-scale change. This will not be solved by economic growth; in fact, growth will only exacerbate it. Nor can a self-perpetuating leadership, no matter how adept at managing its internal disagreements and co-opting emerging social forces, indefinitely postpone the reckoning the country faces.

Finally, the new stress on an assertive nationalism that Lieberthal correctly identifies in China today will not finesse the problem of how China is governed. The Communist Party increasingly presents itself not as it had from its founding—as an iconoclastic force at war with the past and promoting social revolution—but as the guardian of tradition and vanguard of Chinese national feeling.

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Lieberthal explains this remarkable shift as a response to economic development; since prosperity alone cannot guarantee stability, the country "will need something more as a cohesive force, and most likely China's leaders will turn to some form of nationalism to meet this need."

But the stress on nationalism is at least as much an attempt to head off demands for popular participation, and the government has intensified its efforts in this quarter since crushing the democracy movement in 1989. Today the initiative, formalized as the Campaign for Patriotic Education, cannot be missed. It gives people restoration of the Great Wall, rituals honoring Confucius, new patriotic schoolbooks, and renewed emphasis on the evils of imperialism, particularly in connection with the return of Hong Kong.

Though the Chinese undoubtedly love their country, this does not translate smoothly into love of government, as rulers this century have discovered. Passionate national feeling begets criticism as often as loyalty, and the current leadership summons up the spirits of nationalism at its own risk. And no amount of solemn flag-raising ceremonies and patriotic education in the schools can obscure the need for genuine institutional change.

If such change is resisted, the increasingly tense situation inside China will probably be reflected in more turbulent foreign relations, as indeed is already happening. Should autocracy entrench itself in China for another decade or two, neighboring states, many of which are democratic, will find that they have less in common with China. Investment flows will shift. Arms races will begin (in fact, some have already begun).

On the other hand, it is possible that China will experience liberalization and progress, however chaotic, toward constitutional rule and legality. Most of the potential foreign policy problems that have been mentioned here are connected with domestic repression: the hard line abroad corresponds to the hard line domestically. But a Chinese government that had been elected would know itself to be legitimate and likely possess the confidence and flexibility necessary to resolve such issues and others, even the Taiwan and Tibet questions.

Lieberthal's book does not claim to be a guide to the future; rather, it is a comprehensive synthesis of Western scholarship on the P.R.C. But as Lieberthal notes, China today is an amalgam of aspects of Chinese tradition, Stalinism, and the East Asian economic model as found in places like Taiwan and Singapore. This amalgam, created by revolution, is being tested by the forces unleashed by reform. The result is a China that resembles less and less the People's Republic that it has been since 1949.

China, after all, is not the regime created by Mao and partly dismantled by Deng. It is a civilization, even a world. Like certain other great civilizations—Italy, France, and Russia come to mind—it has had great difficulty finding its political form, and the matter is open even today. How China is governed is an important topic. Even more important, however, is how it will be governed, and to this the best answer is, probably very differently.

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Review Essay

The Apparatchik's Lament

Dobrynin's Stab-in-the-Back Theory

Steven Merritt Miner

In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents. BY ANATOLY DOBRYNIN. New York: Times Books, 1995, 688 pp. $30.00.

A reader of Anatoly Dobrynin's important memoir is likely to be struck by a sense of having seen all this somewhere before. Colored throughout by nostalgia for a great but vanished empire, it is written in a conversational now-this-can-be-revealed tone, containing large dollops of court gossip, intrigue, and wistfulness about the author's loss of high position. It suggests that things could have turned out much better had it not been for incompetence and even betrayal in high places. Then it dawns on you. Although Dobrynin, a long-time diplomat and ambassador, was a loyal servant of the communist regime throughout his career, his book reads for all the world as though it were written by a tsarist functionary in the wake of the 1917 revolutionary cataclysm.

As with many memoirs in this genre, Dobrynin's is a fascinating read; it will also be an essential source for historians trying to come to terms with the late Soviet period. Ultimately, however, Dobrynin gives little insight into fundamental questions. He certainly provides useful new information about such things as Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty negotiations and the fate of détente. But relying solely on his account would leave one wondering why the formidable Soviet empire, whose power and status until recently seemed to be a permanent fixture of the international scene, proved so brittle and crumbled so suddenly and completely. Like his tsarist predecessors, Dobrynin is at a loss to explain how everything he thought permanent could prove to be so ephemeral.

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A MISTRUST OF CONVICTION

Dobrynin was an outstanding product of the second generation of Soviet diplomats, as was his longtime boss, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. The first generation had been composed of old revolutionaries, cosmopolitans whose experience of the world predated the Soviet period. They were a linguistically talented, heterogeneous lot whose broad knowledge of the non-Stalinist world, far from making them an asset to the great dictator's diplomacy as one might think, doomed them to the concentration camp or the bullet. They were too independent for Stalin's taste. Dobrynin's class, which stepped into the not-yet-cold shoes of this vanished group, was selected precisely to be a new breed—not self-important experts but obedient executors of a rigidly centralized foreign policy. Caution was, and would remain, the hallmark of this post-purge class. They would serve the system faithfully, simultaneously advancing their careers, but unlike their predecessors they were not true believers. A consistent theme of Dobrynin's account is that, throughout his career, he was most uncomfortable dealing with people, Soviet or foreign, who held strong personal beliefs. They contradicted his survivor's ethic.

Dobrynin was an aircraft engineer in 1944 and was less than delighted when informed he had been selected for the foreign service. Like Gromyko, who was an agronomist and had been drawn into diplomacy six years earlier, Dobrynin had no prior knowledge of foreign affairs or indeed foreign languages. He gives a wry account of his hasty training, which consisted of a combination of rushed language instruction and drilling by a Soviet Miss Manners. He reveals that, obsessive Soviet secrecy being what it was, diplomatic trainees were not cleared to read foreign "bourgeois" newspapers. Instead, he had to polish his English skills with such masters of prose as the communist *Daily Worker*. Apparently the object of the training was to create a class of diplomats who could deliver Moscow's notes competently without the embarrassment of proletarian etiquette.

The bulk of the memoir deals with Dobrynin's long tenure as ambassador to the United States, from 1962 to 1986. His chapters correspond to changes in American presidential administrations and the issues at stake. Here it is interesting to read observations of Washington's leadership by an acute, if hostile, observer. Dobrynin provides pen portraits that teach very little beyond demonstrating that the view from the Soviet embassy concurred with received wisdom. Thus, Robert Kennedy was emotional and difficult; Lyndon Johnson personalized the Vietnam War and became obsessed with it; Henry Kissinger was clever and able but overly fond of diplomatic intrigue; Jimmy Carter was "erratic" and suffered from "emotional instability"; Alexander Haig "was a typical bully." Dobrynin is less certain what to make of Ronald Reagan; he was the sort of conviction politician that made Dobrynin uncomfortable. The president's anticommunism was "not just some political pose," and Dobrynin's ambivalent portrait of Reagan is one of the work's more interesting features.

It is less pleasant to read how during election years presidential candidates and their minions from both parties routinely courted Moscow's favor, often assuring Dobrynin, as Lyndon B. Johnson did in

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1964, that anti-Soviet campaign rhetoric "would in no way signify any change in Johnson's position toward the Soviet Union." Two decades later, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill warned Dobrynin that Ronald Reagan's reelection would be catastrophic: "Reagan will give vent to his primitive instincts . . . probably put us on the verge of a major armed conflict. He is a dangerous man."

SOVIET SENILITY

What makes this memoir valuable is less what it reveals about American diplomacy than the glimpse it provides under the surface of Soviet foreign policy making and government, likely the best source of insight until the Kremlin's archives are fully declassified. Dobrynin's portrait of the Kremlin leadership, though incomplete and self-serving, is nonetheless devastating. He shows how Soviet leaders were insular and chronically unable to coordinate their policies even on major issues such as the interventions in Afghanistan and Africa. Also interesting is the evidence he unwittingly provides that the long tenure of Soviet officeholders such as Gromyko and even Dobrynin himself, far from enabling them to mature and master their tasks, led to sclerotic and decreasingly imaginative policies. Instead of crafting programs for a rapidly changing world, Soviet diplomatic mandarins became complacent and wedded to process; Dobrynin became the consummate insider and dealmaker, more concerned with the latest arms agreement than with the crumbling bases of Soviet power.

Nor did experience protect Soviet leaders from making crass misjudgments. Gromyko, who had been ambassador to the United States, so badly misunderstood the nature of American politics and society that he ordered Dobrynin to offer financial aid to Hubert Humphrey in his 1968 campaign against Richard Nixon, whom Moscow feared as an ardent cold warrior. Dobrynin argued fruitlessly that such an offer, if accepted, would inevitably become public knowledge and would backfire. Fortunately for both the U.S.S.R. and the Democratic Party, Humphrey declined the offer.

Dobrynin with President Truman



. . . and President Kennedy

ALL PHOTOS: UPI/BETTMANN

Leonid I. Brezhnev himself supplies the best argument against lengthy political tenure. Dobrynin reinforces the accounts of other Soviet functionaries, such as Georgi Arbatov, who have outlined the effects of the general secretary's creeping senility during his final years. Dobrynin

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claims that during his Vienna summit with Carter, Brezhnev had to read entirely from a prepared text; even his answers to questions were scripted. His translators "were armed with several versions of his possible reply [to Carter's questions] and helped him pick the right one at the moment it was needed." Clearly, imaginative statesmanship was unthinkable under such circumstances, making suspect Dobrynin's argument that American diplomacy could have achieved more during the twilight of the détente era.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Soviet leaders were unable to understand the American Constitution. Watergate puzzled them, as did the incessant wrangling between Congress and the president over foreign policy. The concept of a chief executive who was not master of his own house mystified men reared under Stalin. Their confusion was compounded by the amazingly constricted flow of information, even at the highest ranks. According to Dobrynin, during the Brezhnev years most Politburo members relied on the state-run newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* for news of the outside world; in discussions of diplomacy they routinely deferred to the advice of a few figures, notably Gromyko and Yuri V. Andropov, the KGB chief, who had read the relevant cables.

Peace seems to have been kept among Soviet hierarchs via self-denial, whereby Politburo members did not interfere in their colleagues' fiefdoms. Gromyko, for instance, ran relations with the United States with a minimum of interference, whereas he ordered his staff not to inform him of such "absurd" domestic matters as the actions of dissidents. The Foreign Ministry had no idea of the size of the Soviet armed services because the Defense Ministry reported exclusively to Brezhnev; in arms control and force reduction talks with the United States, Dobrynin claims, the Soviets relied on Western figures.

Although this compartmentalization preserved oligarchic amity, the policy cost was enormous. If Dobrynin is to be believed, the lack of coordination between branches of the Soviet apparat makes Washington's perpetual policy wrangles look like a model of deliberation. The KGB and the Communist Party's International Department, under Boris Ponomarev, engineered Soviet intervention in Angola and later Ethiopia without consulting the Foreign Ministry. They were motivated by "a simple but primitive idea of international solidarity which meant doing our duty in the

. . . and President Nixon

. . . and President Reagan.

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anti-imperialist struggle." Soviet leaders were blithely unconcerned about the international ramifications of their actions. "I happened to be present at several meetings of the Politburo dealing with Angola, Somalia, and Ethiopia," Dobrynin writes, "and I can report that American complaints were not even seriously considered."

The decision to invade Afghanistan was made almost lightheartedly by only a few key members of the Politburo. They believed that the operation would prove as simple as the Czech invasion in 1968. Interestingly, Dobrynin suggests that Johnson's failure to react more forcefully encouraged Moscow to believe that Washington would do nothing to help the Afghans. "The plan was opposed by our general staff and by military officers who knew Afghanistan firsthand," Dobrynin writes, but when these officers presented their concerns to Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, he curtly told them to "stop reasoning." They were simply to enact their political masters' will.

Dobrynin ridicules Western leaders for worrying that the Afghan invasion might be part of some Soviet master plan to interdict Persian Gulf oil routes, but his assurances ring hollow for at least two reasons. First, if there were such plans, Dobrynin, even as a member of the Central Committee, may not have known of them. After all, he disclaims any prior knowledge of such crucial events as Nikita Khrushchev's placement of missiles in Cuba, the Czech invasion of 1968, and the Soviet interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, and even Afghanistan. Furthermore, by his own admission he lacked direct information from the Defense Ministry. Second, Dobrynin admits that the U.S.S.R. suffered from "imperial overextension," which drew Moscow into quarrels it had not foreseen. It is not hard to imagine how, once ensconced in Afghanistan, the Kremlin could have discovered vital new security interests one step further to the south.

DELUSIONS OF LEGITIMACY

Dobrynin often tries to have things both ways. In his telling, he opposed all the proper things: the stationing of missiles in Cuba, the inhumane treatment of dissidents and Jewish would-be émigrés, and the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The shooting down of Korean Air Lines flight 007 was "a gross blunder," the installation of new Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe another "gross miscalculation." One wonders how vigorously he argued these points while prospering in his career. Nonetheless, he faults Western leaders for overreacting to these very same Soviet actions. This will no doubt strike some readers as admirable evenhandedness. In fact it suggests a remarkable failure to understand the broader context of foreign relations.

For Dobrynin, the chief object of diplomacy is to make deals between states. His ideal, so far as one can divine from this book, would have been the perpetual continuance of détente, with the U.S.S.R. recognized as a legitimate great power on equal terms with the United States and with a long series of cautiously crafted arms control agreements slowly ratcheting down the Cold War. He has a Kennanesque suspicion of and even distaste for untidy popular movements and passions that get in the way of diplomats'

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serious work. Soviet dissidents and their Western defenders get short shrift, as do Soviet Jews whose "persistent and outspoken desire" to leave the U.S.S.R. "made things even worse." Amazingly, he scarcely mentions Eastern Europe or Poland, though he admits that during the Johnson years Moscow was unwilling to make serious force reductions because "it was not sure it could maintain stability in Eastern Europe with far fewer troops."

The problem with this worldview is that, at least since the rise of democracies, diplomacy does not exist in a vacuum. Popular movements are part of the international landscape whether diplomats like it or not. Dobrynin has an apparatchik's view of the world, a world controlled by sober masters. This becomes most evident in his remarkable treatment of the Gorbachev years.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. was, in his view, a grave tragedy. It was also unnecessary, the product of "our incompetent but highly ambitious leaders." Gorbachev, assisted by his "evil mastermind," Aleksandr Yakovlev, engaged in hastily planned reforms "without seriously contemplating the consequences." Vain, flattered by the Western media, economically incompetent, acting like "a virtual monarch," the Gorbachev that emerges from Dobrynin's account is very different from the man still widely admired in the West. His headlong rush to gain American cooperation led to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and "the Soviet Army, still seen as the victors of World War II, [being] rushed home as if it had simply been thrown out. This is an inglorious heritage of the Gorbachev era." "Few Russians are prepared to forgive him" for failing to play "his best card" by demanding more in exchange for German reunification.

Without Gorbachev's bungling, "all positive achievements" could have been preserved "and major shortcomings and mistakes of the past eliminated in a carefully planned and evolutionary way." "The Soviet Union . . . would have ranked high among the democratic countries of the world." Instead, Gorbachev lacked a "coherent, balanced, and firm foreign policy to end [the Cold War] on the basis of equality." "This equality," Dobrynin believes, "was real."

Here is the core of Dobrynin's problem. He does not understand why, for all its military might, the U.S.S.R. was not and could not be an equal partner of the democratic West. Perhaps he is right that the U.S.S.R. need not have collapsed when and as it did, but he is surely wrong in believing that it could have somehow magically resolved its myriad deadly illnesses and still remained the military power it once was. Dobrynin had been abroad too long and become too isolated from the reality of life in Eastern Europe and his own homeland. Like a tsarist servitor, he cannot understand why all those people in the empire rejected the rule of their betters.

One puts down this hefty book with a nagging worry. Dobrynin has advanced a stab-in-the-back theory explaining Soviet collapse. How widespread this view is among the Russian elite remains to be seen. But carrying as it does a sense of betrayal, xenophobia, and imperial longing, it is a dangerous sentiment. One hopes it never becomes the reigning ideology.

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Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

Media and Revolution: Comparative Perspectives. EDITED BY JEREMY D. POPKIN. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995, 246 pp. $29.95.

The essays in this book wrestle with the role of the media in promoting revolution, from the seventeenth-century Puritan revolution in England through the American, French, and Bolshevik revolutions and the anticommunist upheavals in China and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In recent years scholars have moved from seeing revolutions as products of class struggle, in which discourse and communications were deemed epiphenomenal to broad social changes, to McLuhanesque interpretations in which changes in communications media bring about social revolution. Like many collections of conference papers, the essays here are suitably eclectic; fortunately, most avoid extremes of either economic or technological determinism. Some authors, like the editor, emphasize the importance of changes in technology, while others, including those writing on Czechoslovakia and China in the past decade, surprisingly tend to downplay technology's importance. The media at issue here are almost entirely print. Perhaps reflecting the fact that most of its contributors are historians, this otherwise thoughtful collection lacks any analysis of how emerging communications technologies may shape social interactions in the future.

Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention. EDITED BY GENE M. LYONS AND MICHAEL MASTANDUNO. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 324 pp. $48.50 (paper, $16.95).

The latest of a long series of recent books on the obsolescence of the nation-state, this conference volume considers whether

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anything like an international community, capable of intervention against states violating common international norms, has emerged. The diverse chapters straddle the two poles represented by James Rosenau and Stephen Krasner. The former argues that technological and economic changes have undermined the effectiveness of nation-states, to the benefit of both supranational and subnational actors that have become powers in their own right. Krasner, by contrast, argues that the recent upsurge in interventions is nothing new—great powers have always acted in concert and taken an interest in the internal affairs of weaker states, as much as this contradicts their emphasis on sovereignty. The editors cautiously conclude that while there is an increased willingness to intervene in other states' internal affairs, the international community lacks the resources for doing so effectively. Looking back on the shameful hypocrisy and weakness of the international community in Bosnia, Somalia, and other trouble spots, there is some reason to be nostalgic about old-fashioned unilateralism by the great powers.

Decline of the Nation-State. BY GURUTZ JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1994, 230 pp. $32.95.

Written in 1986 by a Spanish academic before the explosion of new nationalisms in the former communist world, this book argues that nationalist movements in Europe are profoundly retrograde because they have been associated historically with a strong, centralizing, and homogenizing state. While the rise of strong nation-states was understandable given the requirements of economic integration and war, they have today become obstacles to a healthy civil society. The book suffers from a poor translation and badly needs updating. What is interesting about many of the new nationalist movements of the 1990s is that, unlike those earlier this century, they are decidedly anti-statist and therefore more compatible with the kind of social outcome the author favors.

Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader. EDITED BY JOEL H. ROSENTHAL. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1995, 303 pp. $18.95 (paper).

This reader contains selected essays from the journal *Ethics and International Affairs,* which for the last eight years has published some of the best writing on moral questions in global politics. Beginning with Robert Myers on Hans Morganthau's legacy, one is reminded of how much the ethical landscape has changed in the short time since the journal's founding. While the Cold War was still on, the East-West power struggle made realism a sensible framework for American foreign policy, and moral debates inevitably returned to the question of nuclear weapons. Given the way the conflict ended, no one on the left can any longer claim moral equivalence between East and West. But the right as well has had to question the imperatives of realism now that there are none of the overarching power-political imperatives that simplified earlier moral choices. The book's second and third parts deal with the newly changed agenda: culture and its implications for nationalism and human rights, democracy, and new possibilities for collective security and the defense of human rights.

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Edmund Burke and International Relations. BY JENNIFER M. WELSH. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 247 pp. $59.95.
This is a thoughtful and illuminating analysis of the eighteenth century's foremost conservative thinker on international politics. Burke held a complex (some would argue contradictory) view of how the international system ought to work: on the one hand, he prized order, stability, and moderation in interstate relations, as reflected in his opposition to the British government's attempts to crush the American revolution, while on the other, he showed a crusader's zeal in urging the use of force against the French Revolution. While critical of Burke in many respects, the author sees a larger consistency in his thought that is relevant to contemporary foreign affairs. Never simply a realist, Burke believed there was a moral and cultural underpinning to the European state system, and that concepts like legitimacy and sovereignty had to have a substantive as well as a procedural meaning.

The United Nations and Civil Wars. EDITED BY THOMAS G. WEISS. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, 233 pp. $42.00.
International Organizations and Civil Wars. BY HILAIRE MCCOUBREY AND NIGEL D. WHITE. Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995, 294 pp. $63.95.
These two books analyze U.N. interventions in civil wars of member states, spurred by recent crises in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and elsewhere. The volume edited by Weiss focuses on the multifunctional character of recent peacekeeping operations—that is, U.N. involvement in civilian administration rather than just security operations—which it argues is too often overlooked. The McCoubrey-White volume expatiates at great length on the international legal justifications for the expansion of U.N. involvement from external to internal conflicts. Of the two books, the former is more useful; rather than dwelling on the legalisms of intervention, it provides helpful analyses of actual U.N. operations. Both books chronicle the United Nations' weaknesses and failures; neither squarely confronts whether there is a fundamental flaw in the entire concept of U.N. peace enforcement, or whether the organization has become a dodge for nation-states seeking to evade international obligations.

The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. EDITED BY BRUNO SIMMA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1,258 pp. $220.00.
This formidable tome is a detailed, article-by-article commentary on the U.N. Charter by a group of German, Austrian, and Swiss legal experts. It provides extensive background on the legislative history, interpretation, and application of the document. While of use to specialists in international law, this volume's appeal to the general reader is likely to be limited.

An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics. BY DONALD W. SHRIVER, JR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 284 pp. $27.50.
This book, by a professor of Christian ethics, starts from the unexceptional premise that the world would be a better place if nations and other political actors would practice greater forgiveness toward enemies, in light of the way that memories of wrongs committed long ago tend to

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drive atrocities. The problem is that the author takes the ethical question out of a political context. He is therefore prone to seeing moral equivalence in America's dealings with its various enemies, and he fails to confront adequately how democracies are to live with hostile states that are neither forgiving nor repentant. His extended treatment of America's postwar relations with Germany and Japan is much less perceptive than, for example, Ian Buruma's *Wages of Guilt;* while aware that the Japanese have not come to terms with their past as the Germans have, Shriver plays this down by saying that Americans have not done so either. His moral premise quickly leads to mushy recommendations for greater mutual understanding and some highly questionable recommendations for dealing with race problems in the United States.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy since 1776. BY ALFRED E. ECKES, JR. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995, 382 pp. $34.95.

The author, a historian who served on the International Trade Commission (ITC) during the 1980s, is well placed to write a history of American trade policy, and this book contains much interesting, even fascinating, material. It usefully corrects some popular impressions on a number of points, such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 as a cause of the Great Depression, and Alexander Hamilton's protectionist leanings—he supported America's first import tariff (averaging nine percent) mainly for revenue.

Unfortunately, the author falsely depicts the evolution of U.S. trade policy over the years as a struggle between the interests of domestic policy and the interests of foreign and defense policy, with the former generally dominating the century before 1934 and the latter dominating since 1934 (with some useful correction during his term at the ITC during the 1980s). Nowhere does Eckes discuss the real struggle over trade policy as viewed by economists for two centuries and by U.S. presidents since Herbert Hoover: between the here-and-now interests of particular economic sectors or firms and the general interests of Americans as consumers.

The book contains extensive references to archival material; but the author's use of it, and of other quoted material, is both selective and tendentious. Presidents since 1934 generally saw trade liberalization as good domestic as well as foreign policy, even when the domestic politics of liberalization were sometimes uncomfortable.

After the Gold Rush: The Trouble with Affluence: 'Consumer Capitalism' and the Way Forward. BY STEWART LANSLEY. London: Century, 1994, 269 pp. $20.00.

Why is so much malaise associated with such general affluence? That is the topic of Lansley's book, written in Britain and drawing largely on British and European experience. The book's thesis is that

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while rapidly moving international events have gradually destroyed post-1945 verities, most of the malaise results from domestic rather than international influences, in particular from growing affluence itself as people have gradually lost their sense of community and moved toward competitive individualism and governments' ability to manage domestic economies and societies has eroded. The usual culprits—growing unemployment, increased job insecurity, widening distribution of income—are mentioned, but the key factor is that aspirations and expectations outran performance. Amid countless (usually misleading) reports of declining real wages, for instance, real consumption by the average American grew 51 percent between 1970 and 1993, only 4 percentage points of which can be a decline in savings. Consumption grew even more rapidly in Western Europe. Unfortunately the book offers no systematic explanation for why aspirations rose even more rapidly.

International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence. EDITED BY WERNER SENGENBERGER AND DUNCAN CAMPBELL. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1994, 394 pp. $36.00 (paper).

The U.N.-affiliated International Labour Organization celebrated its 75th anniversary last year. This celebratory symposium offers a useful introduction to a wide range of views and perspectives on international labor standards. These standards played a significant role in the American debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement, were raised unsuccessfully by the United States and France at the concluding session of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, and are on the future agenda of the new World Trade Organization.

The ILO has a long history of promoting international labor standards by simple majority vote of its tripartite council, although ratification by governments has been far less common. Here 29 authors from 17 countries, drawn from labor, business, academe, and international organizations, reveal a wide disparity of views, from those who believe standards should be universal (but with recognition that the content should vary from country to country according to level of development, for example on child labor or minimum wages) to those who believe the idea of labor standards has been made obsolete by rapid technological change and vigorous international competition, requiring great flexibility by business firms.

The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy. EDITED BY SANFORD M. JACOBY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 231 pp. $39.95.

Modes of labor organization, the practices of collective bargaining, and legislation regarding the workplace and fringe benefits vary substantially across the rich industrialized democracies. Yet all are increasingly subject to the influences of globalization: competition from other countries in product and capital markets and even through labor migration. These pressures are especially acute within the European Union, where legal barriers to migration among member nations have consciously been eliminated. This volume results from a conference at UCLA on the influence of the changing international environment on organized labor. Its nine

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

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

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

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chapters are illustrative rather than comprehensive, although the editor provides an excellent introductory overview.

The volume finds that labor is less mobile in European countries than the United States even though fringe benefits such as pensions and health care are more portable in Europe, due largely to national systems. Declining labor power has reduced strike activity in some countries but increased it in others. Introduction of Japanese production teams and other cooperative management techniques have not been widespread in Japanese-owned firms in California; the much-publicized automobile firms turn out to be the exception, not the rule. South Korean growth occurred despite substantial industrial policies in the 1970s rather than because of them; favored industries showed lower productivity increases (despite greater investment) than non-favored ones, a contrast that was even greater in Mexico, where productivity in non-favored industries grew much more rapidly.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

The Oxford Companion to World War II. EDITED BY I. C. B. DEAR AND M. R. D. FOOT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1,343 pp. $49.95.

Why another hefty one-volume compendium on World War II? This massive tome has some of the usual justifications, including an exceptionally distinguished list of contributors, among them British scholars Norman Davies, John Gooch, and Richard Overy as well as German, Japanese, American, and Canadian experts. The editors have drawn, directly and indirectly, on the latest scholarship, although they might have done more to point readers to further works. This book stands out for a string of very fine thematic articles, which the editors have stressed at the expense of capsule campaign narratives. The result is a series of general essays (for example, the discussion of Italy by two eminent Italian historians) that are long enough to do justice to their subjects. The contributors try, where possible, to be cross-national: the essay on radar in the war, for example, is particularly useful in showing how the combatants differed in their use of this new tool of warfare. One of the most appealing features of this work is its superb graphics, including not only maps but also excellent and creative time lines, tables, and diagrams. In sum, an invaluable aid to the serious student of World War II.

Defense Conversion. BY JACQUES S. GANSLER. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, 260 pp. $25.00.

This is a rather broader book than its title implies. Gansler, an experienced and well-regarded student of the defense industrial base, argues that civil-military integration—relying on a single industrial base—requires substantial changes in how the Pentagon does business, including a dismantling of much of the military's depot system of maintenance and upgrades. In making this case the

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author is illuminating on a number of matters, including legislative impediments to sound acquisition practices and trends in civilian technology, which he believes should help undermine the military specifications that have long made defense technology outrageously expensive. An important book, which deserves attention not only in the Pentagon but, more important, on Capitol Hill.

Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. BY ROBERT JAMES MADDOX. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995, 200 pp. $19.95 (paper).

The author, a historian at Pennsylvania State University, enters the debate about the decision to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A vigorous defender of the traditional interpretation, namely, that the use of the bomb was inevitable in view of the war up to that point and necessary in view of Japanese internal politics, Maddox brings to bear considerable scholarly research. He is particularly scathing in documenting the errors of revisionists in handling historical evidence. A concise and convincing study.

Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander. BY KHALED BIN SULTAN. New York: HarperCollins, 1995, 492 pp. $35.00.

This memoir, ghostwritten in part by a journalist with experience in the region, is a useful contribution to the literature on the Gulf War. Khaled, eldest son of the Saudi defense minister, at age 42 was promoted from his position as commander of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces to serve as Joint Forces Commander—in effect, the senior Arab military officer in the coalition against Saddam. Like any memoirist, he at times inflates his role and tribulations during the war, and like many of his American colleagues he disregards much of the postwar analysis of the fighting. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of interesting material in the book's first half on Khaled's education and activities before the war, including negotiating with the Chinese for long-range missiles. Moreover, his discussion of the intricacies of coalition politics is extremely (if perhaps unintentionally) illuminating. At the end of one shouting match General Norman Schwarzkopf, the American commander, asked his Saudi counterpart, "Should I treat you as a general or as a prince?" Khaled recalls that he replied, "Both!" a reply that almost makes one feel sorry for Schwarzkopf.

Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s. BY DANIEL BOLGER. Novato: Presidio Press, 1995, 368 pp. $24.95.

Lieutenant Colonel Bolger, a rising Army officer with a practiced pen (he has written three books, including one piece of fiction), has produced a popular survey of America's small wars in the 1990s. The book begins with a sniper ruminating on a 168-grain bullet exiting a skull in a spray of bone chips, blood, and tissue, and it contains many a reference to bloodied eye sockets and dismemberments—prose that becomes gruesomely cloying. There is also, unfortunately, an undercurrent of bluster about "armchair strategists" and "U.N. attorneys" and assertions like "war power is America's iron hand." Nonetheless, Bolger does a creditable job of describing American military efforts in Somalia, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia. He is particularly adept at explaining such

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arcana as the rules of engagement and makes the occasional shrewd observation about why operations succeed or fail. Like many military officers these days, he feels free to make broad political judgments. The book would have been considerably better had the scholar (he has a Ph.D. in history) gotten the upper hand over the novelist.

Betrayal: The Story of Aldrich Ames, an American Spy. BY TIM WEINER, DAVID JOHNSTON, AND NEIL A. LEWIS. New York: Random House, 1995, 308 pp. $25.00.

Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Counterintelligence and Covert Action. BY ROY GODSON. McLean: Brassey's, 1995, 342 pp. $24.95.

Having a "CI," or counterintelligence, mentality was for quite some time in the intelligence community regarded as a professional and indeed personal defect. As the Aldrich Ames case tragically revealed, however, that was an error of monumental proportions. Tim Weiner and his coauthors, *New York Times* correspondents all, have written an excellent journalistic account of the Ames saga, relying on the public record and interviews. There is an instructive, dismal chronicling of how the directorate of operations at the CIA protected a mediocrity, allowing him to become a devastatingly destructive traitor. Also instructive is the account of the CIA's unwillingness to come to grips with the implications of this case, including what it says about the folly of relying on lie detectors to plumb human nature.

Roy Godson's more scholarly and theoretical book provides a useful complement. Covert action has as bad a name as counterintelligence once did, and the author attempts to rehabilitate it. Much of the effort here is taxonomic—describing principles of both covert action and counterintelligence—and necessarily general, albeit well illustrated with historical examples. Both books are noteworthy contributions in a world in which spies play a significant and perhaps growing role.

The U.N. Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for On-Site Verification. BY KATHLEEN C. BAILEY. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, 151 pp. $49.95.

The author, a former government official and senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, lays out clearly the lessons of the Iraq inspection effort. She covers a wide range of problems, from the mundane (the physical burdens of suiting up to visit contaminated sites) to the intangible (the psychology of self-censorship). The gist of the argument is simple: inspection is a much more difficult business than one would think, even when the subject is nominally cooperative. It is a great pity that the publishers have put such an absurd price on this book, because it deserves a wider distribution than libraries.

U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: An Agenda for Reform. BY ERNEST MAY, ROY GODSON, AND GARY SCHMITT. McLean: Brassey's, 1995, 325 pp. $29.95.

This volume, edited by three veteran intelligence scholars, is considerably better than the run-of-the-mill collection of articles. It reflects the labors of the Working Group on Intelligence Reform, a

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floating seminar run by the three editors that drew on the efforts of practitioners who can write reflectively and academics who have a feel for policy problems. Individual contributions stand out, among them David Kay's superb description of Iraq's success at hiding its nuclear program from U.S. intelligence. The predominant tone here is, broadly speaking, traditional. That is, the authors believe in the efficacy of deception, the imperative of counterintelligence, and the definition of intelligence as the ferreting out of secrets rather than the creation of a super-social science. In the wake of the covert Iraqi nuclear program, the Ames debacle, and the dismaying record of CIA estimates of the Soviet economy in the 1980s, they appear to have a good case. The authors do not march in lockstep, however, and represent a variety of political views, including those of the current administration. Those interested in provocative but informed discussion of where American intelligence stands at the end of the Cold War, and where it should go, should start with this book.

China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century. BY KENNETH W. ALLEN, GLENN KRUMEL, AND JONATHAN D. POLLACK. Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, 249 pp. $15.00 (paper).

One in a series of RAND monographs on air power around the world, this dense but informative volume sheds light not only on the People's Liberation Army Air Force, but also on the Chinese military more broadly. The authors describe an air force that is, despite recent acquisitions of advanced technology, woefully obsolete, deficient in fundamental maintenance and logistical infrastructure, and either extremely secretive about, or simply lacking in, air power doctrine. They point to changes as well, including selective acquisition of high-end Western and Russian technology, the incorporation of advanced designs (including, reportedly, some from the abortive Israeli Lavi project) in the forthcoming F-10 fighter, and Chinese awareness of the gap between themselves and their neighbors, let alone the United States. If this sober account is to be believed, the Chinese are a long way from acquiring air power commensurate with their great power aspirations and self-image. On the other hand, the critical question is the speed with which China is moving in this area of its development, as in others. The answers there are of necessity murkier.

The United States

DAVID C. HENDRICKSON

After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age. BY JONATHAN CLARKE AND JAMES CLAD. New York: Madison Books, 1995, 228 pp. $24.95.

The declared enemy of these two former diplomats from Britain (Clarke) and New Zealand (Clad) is a U.S. foreign policy elite with an interventionist agenda worlds apart from a more skeptical public; their aspiration is "to empower our readers in a modest way to come to *their* own conclusions about foreign policy in accordance with *their* priorities rather than as *imposed* by an establishment that has got out of the habit of *listening.*" Thus empowered, one wishes to observe that the "foreign policy elite" is not quite the

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uniform collection of rabid interventionists here portrayed; most of the authors' arguments, ironically, would fit rather snugly in the vital center of elite opinion (if such a vital center could still be said to exist). Clarke and Clad place great value on working with established allies, want to preserve the global trading system and to build a North American community, and do not foreclose military intervention when necessary to preserve access to oil or prevent other forms of "strategic denial." They have, it is true, some unconventional ideas about regional organizations, looking upon the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and a similar grouping they propose for Northeast Asia as "primary care networks" that can get along fine without adult supervision from the United States. But they worry, as elite and public do alike, over the "gap between resources and aspirations and the disconnectedness between rhetoric and reality." Though their warnings of the hazards of global crusading are persuasive, the style (featuring "wily old birds" like Clausewitz) is relentlessly jazzy—rather like an aging dowager who thinks she must don miniskirts to keep up the flagging interest of her inattentive hosts. This detracts from the otherwise considerable appeal of the book.

Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles. BY IRWIN F. GELLMAN. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 499 pp. $29.95.

This work probes the relationship among three men who played the principal role in American foreign policy before and during the Second World War. Its centerpiece is the feud that developed between Welles, "the most important undersecretary of state in the twentieth century," and Hull, who came increasingly to resent Welles' importance. The liaisons with black male train porters that Welles wished to consummate, when drunk, and the incapacity produced by Hull's tuberculosis are the two closely guarded secrets Gellman explores. Hull emerges in a thoroughly unflattering light, a handsome gramophone endlessly playing the same old song ("free trade equals international peace") but good for not much else. When he did succeed in forcing Welles' resignation in 1943, it opened up a void in the State Department that Hull was incapable of filling. Though there is much original material on internecine State Department struggles, Gellman's treatment of Roosevelt's diplomacy is perfunctory and unenlightening. Despite all the biographical detail, moreover, the characters remain wooden, their psychological portraits too often drawn by a compilation of the nasty comments of their enemies, and obscured by the author's censorious tone.

Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World Order. BY GRAHAM WHITE AND JOHN MAZE. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995, 353 pp. $34.95.

This careful scholarly biography gives a convincing psychological profile of a highly controversial figure—one whom contemporaries often regarded as inexplicable. Wallace, whose vision of "One World" he believed was Franklin Roosevelt's own, was dumped from F.D.R.'s ticket in 1944 and broke bitterly with

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Truman over containment in 1946. In so doing, Wallace set out a critique of American policy whose main lines would later be revived by revisionists but at the time met with calumnious rejection by Truman and ultimately the American people. The authors think badly overdone the charge of mysticism that continued to dog Wallace, though they acknowledge the authenticity of the "Guru letters" he wrote in the 1930s (merrily brought to light by columnist Westbrook Pegler during Wallace's humiliating 1948 run at the presidency). Though mildly reproving of his naïveté toward Stalin's Russia, they insist that "Wallace's pacifism was far from 'woolly idealism'" and think his vision of material abundance in a world at peace had many sensible and courageous aspects. That his vision made sense in 1948, however, they do not exactly show. Wallace himself recanted in 1950 and reverted to a "conservative, patriotic orthodoxy"—demonstrating anew his proclivity to see the world in black and white.

Joe Alsop's Cold War: A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue. BY EDWIN M. YODER, JR. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995, 220 pp. $24.95.

An affectionate and amusing biography, largely focused on the 1950s, of one of the premier columnists of his day. A militant cold warrior perennially sounding the tocsin against the worldwide Kremlin conspiracy, Alsop—along with his younger brother and collaborator, Stewart—also saw early the poison of McCarthyism and fought bravely against the various idiocies then perpetrated in the name of loyalty and 100-percent Americanism. The interplay between their fierce anticommunism abroad and their insistence on civility at home is the large theme of the book. Yoder advances the obvious paradox—that the Alsops were "fighting a fire that they themselves had helped to set"—but in the end clears them of that charge. Less plausible is his claim that the Alsops' dire forecasts of tumbling dominoes and missile gaps "turned out to be not so much incorrect as inconsequential." "Inconsequential" is an epitaph that Alsop would doubtless have loathed, and rightly so: his alarums did have consequences, Vietnam among them, and it is odd that Yoder would so casually exorcise that particular ghost. But the author's stumble here is uncharacteristic; he is normally sure-footed and indeed graceful in evoking the controversies of the 1950s and uncovering the complicated role that Alsop—an inveterate intriguer and fearsome iconoclast—managed to play in nearly all of them.

The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy. BY DAVID MAYERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 335 pp. $35.00.

The author, a professor at Boston University, assesses the outlook and effectiveness of U.S. diplomats in Russia, from the beginnings of relations in the late eighteenth century to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mayers considers the envoys up until World War I, with a few exceptions, to have been mediocre—"strangers in a strange land" sent for reasons other than their expertise, which was normally minimal. He views the Moscow embassy much more favorably from the opening of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1933. The sympathetic treatment of Averell Harriman's ambassadorship in the mid-1940s is emblematic

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of the qualities Mayers prizes. Harriman moved from warning against Roosevelt's inflated expectations of Soviet cooperation to cautioning against hyperbolic conceptions of the Soviet threat, all the while retaining his usefulness and tact in dealing with Stalin. Mayers' skill in evoking the travails of the Moscow station and in assessing the advice and impact of U.S. ambassadors, together with his keen sense of the functions of diplomacy, makes for enthralling reading. This is scholarly history at its best: sharp in its judgments but at the same time scrupulously fair and exhaustive.

For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. BY CHRISTOPHER ANDREW. New York: HarperCollins, 1995, 600 pp. $30.00.

A prolific British historian (the joint author of a well-regarded history of the KGB) provides a richly detailed account of the uses to which American presidents have put U.S. intelligence agencies. Most of the work deals with the Cold War period (although George Washington emerges as a minor hero for his adept use of spies in the Revolutionary War). Andrew tends to be harder on Cold War presidents than he is on the intelligence community; although the latter had its share of failures, presidents tended to deprecate its product because of exaggerated expectations, simultaneously underestimating the value of intelligence (for instance, in stabilizing the Cold War competition in armaments) while overestimating "the secret power that covert action put at their command." The brisk narration, unfortunately, is seldom leavened by much analysis, lending to the work a certain sprawling character and creating a (symbolically interesting) gap between the immensity of the data presented and what it all means.

After more than three decades of splendid reviews, Fritz Stern has stepped down from the Western Europe section. We will miss his intelligent advice and finely tuned prose. His successor, Stanley Hoffmann, Founding Chair of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, will write his first batch of reviews for the November/December issue.

Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. BY MARIA JOSÉ MOYANO. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, 226 pp. $25.00.

Moyano, an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, has produced an outstanding diagnosis of actions and psychology in the violent and bloody guerrilla struggle in 1970s Argentina, arguably the central element in understanding Argentinean politics over the past 20 years. She seeks to answer why "the Argentine guerrillas became the lost patrol," developing after 1973 a blind adherence to military as opposed to political strategies, rejecting compromise, and increasingly isolating

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themselves from the political and social context. The history of Argentina's dirty war is a many-sided story, and Moyano provides an important contribution to its ongoing and painful revelation. Guerrilla tactics, she argues "not only provoked extreme extralegal action; they also helped to legitimize it." Her quest for answers involves a fascinating journey into the guerrilla movement based on extensive confidential interviews with former guerrillas as well as military figures. Elegantly written, sensitive to Argentine history and guerrilla movements elsewhere in the world.

With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest. BY WARREN DEAN. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995, 482 pp. $38.00.

The late Warren Dean, who was professor of Brazilian history at New York University, has left his many admirers a formidable posthumous testimony to his skills and passionate concern for Brazilians and their environment. A pioneer in environmental history with several major books to his credit, Dean has written a magnificent and disturbing account of the destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic forests, which once covered a million square kilometers and have been reduced over several centuries to small patches scarred by logging, pollution, and scavenging. *With Broadax and Firebrand* is the story of the long history of devastation and recent desperate battles for conservation. The Atlantic forest has always been Brazil's most populous and developed, and this book is much more a history of Brazil informed by environmental concerns than a history of the environment. "Avarice," he writes, "is so pallid a word to describe this expropriation, and avarice itself is only a minor character flaw compared to ignorance, indifference, and alienation that accompanied it." Finely written, profoundly thoughtful, never sentimental, and exhaustively documented, the book concludes with a sense of alarm and foreboding: "The last service that the Atlantic forest might serve, tragically and forlornly, is to demonstrate all the terrible consequences of destroying its immense western neighbor."

Our Guerrillas, Our Sidewalks: A Journey into the Violence of Colombia. BY HERBERT BRAUN. Niwot: University of Colorado Press, 1995, 239 pp. $17.00 (paper).

A grim and compelling account of the 1988 kidnapping of Texas-born oilman and longtime Colombia resident Jake Gambini by Marxist guerrillas, written by Herbert "Tico" Braun, Gambini's Colombian brother-in-law and a history professor at the University of Virginia. The fast-paced narrative, which has the makings of a movie script worthy of Alfred Hitchcock, is constructed around a series of narratives and diaries from the individuals involved, reconstructing their thoughts and actions during the complex negotiations that eventually led to Gambini's release and return to the United States. This memorable book takes the reader inside the Colombian revolutionary movements and politics, examines the psychology of conflict resolution, and shines with human perseverance and courage in the face of despair and adversity. Braun provides an intimate examination of a phenomenon rarely captured in print, often covered

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up by the victims and their families, but which remains very much part of the Latin American landscape.

Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. BY YOUSSEF COHEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 186 pp. $14.95 (paper).

While written with an academic audience in mind, this book is an important addition to the debate over the causes of democratic collapse in Latin America. Cohen, a professor of political science at New York University, rejects the deterministic explanations of the past two decades, which relegated human agency to the sidelines and gave a central place to economic, political, and social imperatives. The most common explanation held that democratic systems and the demands of reform in the 1960s and 1970s became incompatible with the requirements of capitalist development. To preserve growth, reform and democracy had to be suppressed. Examining Brazil and Chile, Cohen argues that structures certainly set constraints but always left alternatives. Thus, the key becomes explaining choice. Thwarted democratic reform, he says, was a clear case of the prisoner's dilemma: moderates knew the benefits of mutual agreement but could not trust each other, so they splintered, joining instead in extreme solutions. All this may seem highly esoteric, even obvious, but in the clientelistic realm of Latin American political science, such arguments come close to parricide and lead Cohen to take on most of the discipline's major figures. He hopes his book will help restore confidence in democracy since "implementing reforms within a democratic context may be a difficult balancing act, but it is possible." One former central participant in the intellectual tradition he takes to task will now surely agree with him—Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union. BY ALEKSANDR G. SAVELYEV AND NIKOLAY N. DETINOV. Westport: Praeger, 1995, 204 pp. $52.95.

From 1969 to 1991, if U.S. policymakers could have been flies on the wall, nowhere would they rather have been than the rooms in which their Soviet adversaries were deciding their next steps in strategic arms negotiations. General Detinov, a representative of the defense industrial sector in the party apparat, was at the center of these deliberations, first as a key player in the critical five-agency group staffing the ultimate decision-makers during the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, and eventually as the number-two man in the Soviet delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces talks.

In the forward, Paul Nitze describes Detinov as a negotiator of integrity who cared about the truth and avoided games-

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manship, a characterization the text echoes. Detinov and his collaborator, an academic specialist on strategic nuclear arms, not only outline the politics and players—and how these changed over time—but they provide considerable insight into the reasons the Soviets did what they did.

While they are frank in admitting the twisted logic in some of the demands and, at times, even prevarication of their side, in the end they do not lend much support to those who viewed the Soviet stake in strategic arms control as a cynical subterfuge to secure unilateral advantage at every turn. The truth seems to have been the opposite. Yes, Soviet leaders sought the best deal they could get and resisted yielding any of their military advantages, but, when their demands looked like an attempt to disadvantage the United States seriously, they were usually reacting to their own black, worst-case assumptions about U.S. programs and intentions. If the authors were not so candid about the Soviet position, this tale might be dismissed as the rationalizations of a participant seeking to put the best face on an enterprise in which he participated.

Zhirinovsky: An Insider's Account of Yeltsin's Chief Rival and "Bespredel"—the New Russian Roulette.
BY VLADIMIR KARTSEV. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 198 pp. $24.95.

Before becoming the director of publications at the United Nations, Kartsev was from 1982 to 1989 the head of Mir, the largest Soviet foreign-language publishing company dealing in scientific and technical literature. A year into his tenure, he hired Zhirinovsky as the company's second lawyer, and, as he tells it, for the next six years suffered, defended, fought, and heard out this man, hence his claim to understand the odd and, for many outside observers, frightening figure in Russian politics.

The fellow he knew then and still thinks he knows, while a little daft, maddeningly opinionated, and a rabble-rouser, was more a sensationalist than a political extremist. Already his tumultuous inferiority-superiority complex was evident and so, too, his antagonism to the system and bulldog determination to inflict small defeats on the authorities whenever he could. Kartsev does not believe Zhirinovsky is genuinely antisemitic, fascist, or that his Russian nationalism seeks forcibly to recreate the Russia of 1900, although he willingly plays the antisemitic card, and his often outrageous comments would fool most.

The author sees Zhirinovsky as a danger, but not because of where he means to lead Russia; rather because of where he is capable of being carried by the Russian people as they give vent to their anger and frustration.

The distinction between a vessel and a prod, however, may not be helpful if Zhirinovsky turns out to be not one or the other but both. Also, Kartsev is an angry man. The state into which Russian society has descended he lays at the doorstep of the reformers. *Bespredel,* the Russian word for "anything goes," he says, is what this all is, and then turns the second half of his book into a fuming disquisition on the subject. *Bespredel* is what will transform Zhirinovsky the man, relatively innocuous in his basic excesses, into Zhirinovsky the phenomenon, an altogether more dangerous matter. A reader worries, however, that Kartsev's fury may be determining rather than informing his biography,

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coloring rather than being colored by the interesting detail he assembles from his earlier association with Zhirinovsky.

Stalin's Letters to Molotov. EDITED BY LARS T. LIH, OLEG V. NAUMOV, AND OLEG V. KHLEVNIUK. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, 276 pp. $25.00.

Slowly and much less completely than Russia's new leaders promised, the Russian archives are revealing their Soviet secrets. This is the second in a planned series of 18 volumes to be published by Yale University Press bringing key documents to an English-reading audience. It consists of a passel of private letters primarily from 1925 through 1930 that Stalin wrote to Vyacheslav Molotov, his confidant and ally, which Molotov turned over to the archives in 1969. These personal and confidential letters refine the image of Stalin's leadership skills, coarseness, and brutality and shed light on key events such as the inner party struggles and Soviet actions during the Kuomintang's bloody ascent in China.

Most of the 79 letters Molotov presented to the Central Party Archive, out of what was evidently a much larger collection, are published here. Molotov, however, remained an admirer and supporter of Stalin for the remainder of his life, and the bulk of the letters from 1931 to 1936 and those missing entirely from 1928 doubtless represent, as the Russian experts who edited the letters for this volume surmise, Molotov's attempt to cleanse the record of his master's most degraded thoughts and acts.

In this case Molotov is the censor, but the letters refer to a number of key foreign policy decisions, the documents for which were placed in the so-called Special File and recently transferred to the Soviet, now Russian, Presidential Archive. Contemporary Russian leaders have been in no hurry to release these invaluable historical items, and what they have released has principally served their own political and foreign policy agendas. Because their reluctance seems to be deepening, the Yale series is likely to suffer from important gaps that go beyond those created by documents long ago destroyed.

Still, in this volume the publisher has done very well by the documents at hand. They are skillfully introduced by Lih, a U.S. specialist on this period, and accompanied by extremely helpful and often elaborate annotations provided by the two Russian collaborators and their colleagues.

A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. BY STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 350 pp. $49.95.

Kirschbaum traces the history of the Slovak people back to the sixth century and of their land to ancient times, bringing to bear a great deal of work done by Slovak historians, most of it until now unavailable in English. It is fitting, moreover, that a newly independent Slovakia have its story told in full, from the ninth-century Great Moravia Empire through the thousand years of Magyar domination, the nationalist struggles of the nineteenth century, to the first Czechoslovak Republic and the postwar communist regime. Perhaps inevitably this history has come with a Slovak nationalist slant.

Kirschbaum marvels at the capacity of the Slovak people to maintain their iden-

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tity, language, and culture over more than a millennium without a state of their own. The first Slovak state emerged in 1939, as part of Europe's march toward tragedy. For Kirschbaum, "Czechoslovakism" as an ideology belongs in the same nefarious category as Magyarization in the nineteenth century and communism in the twentieth. Trouble is that when the first Slovak state appeared, it was in the service of Hitler's Germany, which Kirschbaum also chalks up to the struggle for survival.

Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution. BY M. STEVEN FISH. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 300 pp. $39.50.

Misleadingly subtitled, this book is only fleetingly about organized political opposition in post-independence Russia. Fish focuses instead on the varied and motley groupings that emerged under Gorbachev and sought to undo the existing system, most of them in the name of democracy, hence the revolutionary label. Parties are supposed to be able to compel those in power to pay attention to particular interests in society. The Soviet parties in the Russian Republic did this feebly or not at all.

The author contests those who think a real civil society began to develop in the Soviet Union's last days. Nor is it any mystery to him that civil society remains weak in Boris Yeltsin's Russia because the curse of the past remains, derived from a ramified Soviet state that, even as it ceased to be more than a shadow of its former self, was still sufficiently strong and recalcitrant to incapacitate the new parties.

All this comes with his own taxonomy of theory allowing the author to distinguish himself from others—traces of the dissertation the book originally was. Not only because the taxonomy mixes theory, some of it classic, with mere concepts, and the concepts are of greater use to him than the theory, but also because his argument is fairly straightforward and not particularly theoretical, the larger scaffolding is more interesting than functional. The book's payoff, while more modest, is considerable: at its heart the reader will find an intelligent, subtle, first-hand account of the years after Gorbachev opened the door with perestroika.

Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Battling for Peace: A Memoir. BY SHIMON PERES. New York: Random House, 1995, 350 pp. $25.00.

Memoirs by politicians, especially those still in office, are bound to be self-serving. But Israel's foreign minister has done more here than settle old scores and enhance his reputation. In dealing with his early career, Peres describes his role in developing Israel's links to France and its nuclear technology. He paints an admiring portrait of David Ben-Gurion and brings to life the mood in Israel in the mid-1950s, when the existence of the Jewish state could still not be taken for granted. Later he discusses the early period of the peace negotiations with Egypt, his rivalry with Yitzhak Rabin, his views on the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, his service as prime minister from 1984 to 1986, and, as his crowning achievement, the talks with the PLO that led to the Oslo Accord in September 1993. He makes a strong case that the

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secret agreement he negotiated with King Hussein of Jordan in 1987 might have been a breakthrough if it had been better handled by American diplomats and not sabotaged by his own prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir. Others involved in that affair, including George Shultz, give a very different version of events. Therein lies one of the problems with this type of self-serving contemporary history. Which version is closer to the truth?

At times Peres seems to pull his punches unnecessarily. In discussing the Lavon incident of the mid-1950s—concerning responsibility for an undercover operation in Egypt that involved setting off bombs at American and British installations in order to damage Abdel Nasser's relations with the West—he provides a great deal of firsthand information but stops short of pointing a finger at the person responsible. When he mentions Israeli settlements in the West Bank, he seems to recognize that they are obstacles to peace, but he nonetheless condones them. He has a few heroes—Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan—and many adversaries, most notably Israeli hard-liner Ariel Sharon. Throughout, the author remains somewhat elusive—this is not an autobiography that reveals much that was previously unknown. It is a memoir, but not a solid history. One senses that Peres is trying hard to say to his critics that he is a decent man who has served his country and the cause of peace well.

Bitter Harvest: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World. BY PAUL SALEM. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, 302 pp. $39.95 (paper, $17.95).

At a time when Islamic movements seem to set the tone for much of the political discourse in the Arab world, it is worth being reminded that many other ideologies have competed with political Islam in recent years. This finely crafted work is more than a history of ideas. The author centers the study of ideology in a sociopolitical context, arguing that ideology develops as the result of rapid social change that causes stress as new groups seek political power. He traces the class and generation bases for different phases of ideological development in the modern Arab world and highlights the evolution from the predominance of liberalism in the interwar period, to Arab nationalism after World War II, to the present assertiveness of Islamism. Each phase has lasted about a generation, and he sees a possibility that the age of ideology in the Arab world may be approaching its end. In seeking to explain the content of ideological movements, he examines the role of social class, minorities, youth, and severe crises that affect whole populations. He spends more time on Marxism than seems warranted by its relatively limited success in the Arab world and neglects the regional variants of nationalism that emerged in Algeria and among the Palestinians. But on the whole this is an impressive survey of a complex topic and deserves to be widely read.

The Mystery of Arafat. BY DANNY RUBINSTEIN. South Royalton: Steerforth Press, 1995, 132 pp. $18.00.

If you have spent long hours wondering why Yasir Arafat always seems to have a three-day growth of beard, why he never

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wears a tie, why he married so late in life, why he used to spend most of his time on airplanes, or where he was born, this book will enlighten you. It will not be as satisfying when it comes to what makes the PLO chairman behave as he does; nor does it fully account for his remarkable relationship with the Palestinian people.

Rubinstein's is the most recent in a series of books that has tried to unravel the enigma of Yasir Arafat, and his readable account avoids the extremes of vilification or adoration. His basic theme is that Arafat has succeeded to date because he has reflected the distress and needs of the Palestinians after their traumatic defeat and exile in 1948. In a general sense, Rubinstein is probably correct, but he does not provide much in the way of new information to substantiate his opinion. His is the first book, however, to chart the transition of Arafat from leader of a war of liberation to politician trying to pay the bills. True, Arafat's image is not what it used to be. Balancing the budget in bankrupt Gaza would be tough on anyone's charisma, and Arafat looks more and more like a ward boss and less like the leader of a revolution. Still, he is more popular than any other Palestinian leader, according to recent public opinion polls, and he may have a few more moves to make in the uneven game of negotiations he has been carrying on, in one way or another, with his Israeli adversary-neighbor-partner. But the myth of Arafat is clearly fading, and Rubinstein shows many of the reasons.

Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance. BY SIMONA SHARONI. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995, 199 pp. $29.95 (paper, $14.95).

In increasing numbers, feminists are turning their attention to the Middle East. New interpretations of history are available, the consequences of political and economic developments for women are highlighted, and the voices of women from the Middle East are being heard. In this book, the author focuses on the role of Israeli Jewish women and Palestinian women, especially since the intifada. This is an important and overlooked angle, and Sharoni is right to underscore the part played by women on both sides in furthering the peace process. At times, however, she seems so determined to make gender the issue around which all else revolves that she essentializes the concept, as if all men and all women will adopt political views congruent with this one dimension of their identities. If traditional writers have tended to ignore the part played by gender in politics, others risk exaggerating it, as this study does.

The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud. BY SAID K. ABURISH. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 326 pp. $24.95.

There is a cottage industry forming to predict the impending fall of the House of Saud. Some of the newsletters that take this line are bought off by the Saudi regime after a few issues. Others are more reputable, calling attention to real problems in a country that largely avoids careful scrutiny by scholars and the media. There is a chance, of course, that someday the Saudi regime will be swept away, but no one can know when or how. This book takes the harsh view that the Saudi experiment was bankrupt from the outset. Even King Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, usually held up as a model of a strong and shrewd tra-

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ditional leader, is dismissed as ignorant and cruel. The corrupting effect of money after the oil boom of the 1970s is underscored in what is probably the most convincing part of the book. The author's key analytical point is that the regime is running out of money to buy the loyalty, or at least acquiescence, of its rapidly growing population. Unless oil prices go back up or the regime curbs its spending habits, that may well be true. What is less certain is that the next step will be a radical Islamic revolution as in Iran, accompanied by further oil price hikes and even the possibility of a full-scale war. Of course, this all makes for much more dramatic reading than would a version that says the regime faces financial problems, as well as uncertainties stemming from succession, and that fairly substantial political changes will no doubt be needed in the coming decade to cope with the politicized new middle class, including Islamist opposition voices. The latter scenario, however, seems more plausible than the predictions contained in a book that is long on speculation, filled with intriguing vignettes, and totally devoid of footnotes that might help document the alleged facts.

Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon: The Troubled Years, 1982-1988. BY ELIE A. SALEM. New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995, 296 pp. $35.00.

Lebanon's former foreign minister (1982-84) and adviser to its president (1984-88) has written a straightforward, revealing memoir of this troubled period in Lebanon's recent history. He resists the temptation to blame all of Lebanon's ills on others, but his fair-minded tone also makes it hard for the reader to understand the depths of the passions that rent the fabric of Lebanon's politics during that time. There are many anecdotes, documents, and new pieces of information. As the author takes leave at the end of the failed presidency of Amin Gemayel, it is still not quite clear why Lebanon suffered so much, or why the author remains hopeful that the country is on the mend. Still, the book is valuable for its insights into Lebanon's recent political history.

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. BY BARNETT R. RUBIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, 378 pp. $35.00.

With the end of the Cold War, interest in the heroic freedom fighters of Afghanistan has been replaced by either indifference or caricatures of fanatical Afghans turning their lust for violence against one another. Rubin has written a superb book that places Afghanistan in the context of state formation and the effects of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry that added to Afghanistan's misery after 1978. He rejects the notion that present-day tribalism is some atavistic artifact of an earlier period. Instead, he shows, it is very much the product of Afghanistan's forced integration into the modern state system. This study is theoretically informed, empirically grounded, and gracefully written. Anyone who wants to understand Afghanistan's troubled history and the reasons for its present distress should read this book.

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Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran. BY JOHN CALABRESE. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 221 pp. $45.00.

At a time when Americans are being told that Iran is an outlaw state, it is worth noting the conclusions of a careful study of recent Iranian foreign policy. This book certainly does not try to whitewash Iran's image. But the author does argue that Iran's revolutionary message has been tempered in recent years by an acute awareness of the economic weakness of the state and the dangers of the surrounding regional environment. As a result, Iran has usually put state interests ahead of revolutionary goals. The exceptions are noted and ascribed to incomplete control by the regime over foreign policy or to divisions within the elite. Missing from the book is the wider setting of Iran's relations with Russia, China, India, Japan, and Europe. In addition, the author used almost exclusively English-language sources. Still, this is a solid contribution to understanding Iran's regional policies.

A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West. BY GRAHAM E. FULLER AND IAN O. LESSER. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, 193 pp. $49.95 (paper, $15.95).

The clash of civilizations thesis is tackled head-on in this book and found wanting. Or is it? The authors begin with a sensible criticism of those who overgeneralize by speaking of "Islam" and "the West," as if these categories were especially helpful. But almost despite themselves, they fall back on these same abstractions as they analyze the issues that divide the two regions. Still, the main theme in this wide-ranging essay is that most conflict in the lands of Islam is among Muslims, that the West does not face an unmanageable threat, and that both sides in this age-old rivalry need to make some efforts to avoid a new Cold War between the West and Islam. On balance, this is a non-alarmist account of political Islam, arguing for inclusion of Islamic activists as a way of ensuring evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. The authors expect that somewhere in the Arab world, most likely in Algeria, another Islamic republic will be formed, but this prospect does not particularly alarm them.

Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 1. EDITED BY AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON. New York: E. J. Brill, 1995, 328 pp. $87.25 (paper, $30.00).

What is it about the Middle East that makes political systems there resistant to democratization? By now, a vast literature on this topic has developed, much of it emphasizing the role of Islam as an impediment to political liberalization. Norton, the editor of this volume and the director of a multiyear project on civil society in the Middle East, rejects the culturalist explanation for the scarcity of democracy and concentrates instead on the weakness of civil society where authoritarian regimes have taken root. Until political groupings that transcend family, tribe, or clan are allowed to develop, pluralistic politics of the sort that supports democracy cannot thrive. Whether one accepts this argument in full or not, this volume of excellent essays—some previously published—is well worth reading. In addition to several general essays, country studies on Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Egypt, and the Palestinians will be found. A second volume will soon be published.

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U.S. Policy on Palestine: From Wilson to Clinton. EDITED BY MICHAEL W. SULEIMAN. Normal: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995, 263 pp. $15.95 (paper).

Palestinians and their supporters in the United States have long lamented the pro-Israel tilt in American foreign policy. In this volume, analysts look at the reasons for American hostility to the concept of Palestinian self-determination. Each presidency is examined in essays of uneven quality. Still, not much has been written on this topic, and the best of these studies merit attention.

Asia and the Pacific

DONALD ZAGORIA

China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy. BY MICHAEL D. SWAINE. Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, 144 pp. $15.00 (paper).

This RAND report is the most detailed and sophisticated analysis yet of the complex internal factors influencing Chinese foreign policy and the differing foreign policy views of the Chinese elite. The author sees three different tendencies in security policy. The first is a mainstream, balance-of-power, realpolitik approach that combines suspicion of the United States with awareness of the need for continued cooperation with the West and the maintenance of a placid regional environment. Second is a more conservative variant of the mainstream that stresses Western hostility toward China. Finally, there is the non-mainstream view of a small minority that recognizes the growing importance of global interdependence and the consequent imperative to qualify or reject the realpolitik approach for a more cooperative stance toward the West.

The author warns that "strong, public U.S. pressures on China in a variety of areas (including the Taiwan issue) could greatly increase the likelihood of strongly anti-Western conservative nationalists gaining control of the Chinese political system." To minimize the chances of the most adverse outcomes, he urges the United States to strengthen and expand both official and unofficial contacts with Chinese civilian and, especially, military leaders; to avoid vaguely defined or broadly punitive economic or diplomatic actions against China; and to encourage more extensive and durable economic links that promote moderate Chinese growth. At a time when America's China policy seems to be in disarray, with Congress and the administration veering in different directions, this report should be widely read. It is a reminder of the potentially huge costs the United States will pay if it begins to treat China as an enemy.

China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry. BY RICHARD MADSEN. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 262 pp. $27.50.

Unlike most books by American China specialists about the People's Republic of China, this one focuses not on history, politics, or economics but on the intriguing conflict between Chinese and American dreams—the cultural myths that shape the perceptions of the people of both nations. The American dream, says

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the author, is about individualistic independence in a land of opportunity. It is conveyed through stories about pilgrims, pioneers, and declarers of independence. These stories contrast sharply with those the Chinese tell about themselves.

The author illustrates his central thesis with a revealing anecdote. After a sumptuous dinner in the private dining room of a Chinese general, the general tries to convince the author of the validity of the P.R.C.'s claims to Taiwan by invoking a narrative of the unbreakable historical ties between them. "The people in Taiwan speak Chinese, their culture is Chinese, their ancestors came from mainland China." The author replied that "there may be good geopolitical reasons for considering Taiwan part of the P.R.C.," but "if our founding fathers truly agreed with such an argument, we would still be part of England." By analyzing the U.S.-China confrontation in these terms, Madsen provides an indispensable tool for understanding why it is so difficult for the two nations to reach a modus vivendi. The U.S.-China relationship is not just about trade, Taiwan, and human rights; it is also about very diverse cultural traditions. There is a chapter on how the Tiananmen massacres shattered the "liberal" U.S. myths about China, and there is a compelling final chapter appealing for a deeper East-West dialogue.

Korea Approaches Reunification. BY NICHOLAS EBERSTADT. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1995, 180 pp. $55.00 (paper, $21.95).

Carefully assembling a variety of economic and demographic data, this volume contrasts South and North Korean economic and social development and advances several hypotheses about the size of North Korea's military forces and other aspects of North Korea's veiled society. In a concluding chapter, the author argues that the paramount need is to prevent war on the peninsula, and he strongly supports the deterrence policy, including U.S.-Republic of Korea security ties. But Eberstadt also calls attention to several problems in the security arrangement. First, South Korea should fully share its intelligence about North Korea with the United States rather than continuing its selective policy. Second, South Korea needs to provide for more of its own protection. And finally, Seoul should stop blaming the United States for policies it favors privately but is unwilling to embrace officially, which fans anti-Americanism in the South. The author also argues that South Korea should do much more to establish a genuine rule of law, including provisions to protect Western business. He cites several recent studies concluding that, despite legal reforms in recent years, foreign corporations in Korea are subject to government-enforced restrictions, sanctions, and punishments with no basis in written statute.

Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region. EDITED BY ANDREW MACK AND JOHN RAVENHILL. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, 298 pp. $58.00.

This is a collection of essays by prominent specialists about the prospects for regional economic and security cooperation in the Pacific. The conclusions vary, but two of the liveliest essays are pessimistic. The British scholar Barry

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Buzan argues that the defining feature of the region's international relations is a "remarkable degree of political fragmentation and hostility." He also says that there is little that binds Asia's states and societies together and much that divides them. He is particularly concerned about the potential revival of two historical patterns of conflict suppressed by the Cold War: Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian rivalry. Buzan says that his pessimistic assessment does not mean that large-scale conflict or war is inevitable or even probable. But the escalation of military spending and arms rivalry is a real possibility and could occur in the context of regional hostility virtually unmediated by cooperative traditions and institutions. An Australian scholar, Joseph Camilleri, is pessimistic for different reasons, among them the growing economic tensions between the United States and Japan. David Rapkin, an American academic, focuses on the need for leadership in regional cooperation and finds that the United States has "failed to produce a coherent, let alone comprehensive, vision."

North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation.
BY MICHAEL J. MAZARR.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 290 pp. $35.00.

North Korea's nuclear ambitions have posed one of the most acute and complex foreign policy dilemmas for the Clinton administration and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. They are also an issue on which extreme differences remain. The author has produced a very informative and well-documented account of how the United States and North Korea have arrived at their current positions, and he has drawn some conclusions about the more general problem of nuclear proliferation. Mazarr makes clear that the Clinton administration, for all its inconsistency and occasional ineptness, deserves more credit than it has been given for avoiding a military confrontation. Although there are many critics of the nuclear freeze agreement, the author decides that if the deal is implemented, it will represent as near to a complete resolution of the nuclear issue as could realistically be imagined. He argues further that the United States and South Korea should not stall on their planned economic and political engagement of North Korea because locking Pyongyang in a bold embrace, while an imperfect approach, still offers a far better chance than isolation.

Based on numerous interviews with U.S. and South Korean government officials, the book sheds much light on the bureaucratic infighting in Washington and reaches some surprising conclusions. The Department of Defense was the most consistent dove because its highest priority was to avoid a war in Korea. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on the other hand, took the hawkish side because of its concern for the integrity of the Nonproliferation Treaty. There are also intriguing insights into the role of the media, Congress, and foreign policy analysts outside the government.

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Africa

GAIL GERHART

The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? EDITED BY AHMED I. SAMATAR. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, 297 pp. $40.00.

The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. BY JAMA MOHAMED GHALIB. New York: Lilian Barber Press, 1995, 267 pp. $29.50 (paper, $14.95).

When Somali dictator Siad Barre was driven from power by armed rebels in January 1991, he left behind a state and society in anarchic collapse. With urban areas of the country's north already despoiled by civil war, the southern centers fell prey to gunslinging factions fighting for turf and booty as starvation wracked the hapless civilian population. If ways out of Somalia's continuing catastrophe are even to be discussed, correct explanations for what happened in 1991 must first be found. These two works attest that this is no easy task, even for expert Somali analysts.

The first, a penetrating look at Barre's rule by a former high-ranking member of his regime, attributes Somalia's descent into bankruptcy and chaos almost entirely to Barre's cunning but inept and immoral leadership. The author poses no theories about Somali culture or history but paints an illuminating picture of regional, clan, and class conflicts during the post-independence years. The second work, a collection of nine essays (five by Somalis) on Somalia's economy, society, politics, and foreign relations, presents a less coherent analysis but contains much useful data and commentary. A provocative contribution by David Rawson, an American diplomat who served in Mogadishu in the late 1980s, faults the U.S. government and the World Bank for their assistance policies in the Barre era, which in the end did little to develop Somalia and much to fuel the corruption, inflation, and militarization that brought the country to ruin.

The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. BY CRAWFORD YOUNG. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, 356 pp. $40.00.

The assertion that Africa's authoritarian leaders learned their politics at the feet of their former colonial rulers is not new. But this erudite study by a senior American Africanist probes the colonial state in new depth to decipher the particular logic and processes that eventually gave birth to independent African governments. Drawing on contemporary theory about the state and civil society, and surveying the contrasting nature of colonial rule in a wide array of non-African countries and regions, he argues that in several respects colonialism in Africa bequeathed a distinctively destructive legacy to its successor regimes. Readers may be discouraged by the stark solution the author proposes: that Africans must invent a new kind of state that "sheds the debilitating traditions of the past." As an authoritative synthesis on the rise and fall of colonialism in Africa, however, this book should be warmly welcomed.

Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana. BY PAULINE E. PETERS. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994, 302 pp. $49.50 (paper, $18.95).

Botswana stands out among African countries for its stable democracy and

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steady economic growth based on sound management of mineral resources. The majority of its people, however, derive their livelihoods not from mining but from livestock, the management of which is the focus of this study by a Harvard anthropologist. Tracing policies and practices of communal grazing from the introduction of borehole used in the 1930s through the generally unsuccessful Tribal Grazing Land Policy introduced in 1975, the author rigorously critiques the conventional wisdom—shared by wealthy Botswana ranchers, the World Bank, and others—that fencing and private tenure necessarily result in superior range management. With evidence from her fieldwork in Kgatleng district, she shows that strong traditions of local-level democracy have acted as a restraint on the adoption of tenure policies that accelerate the growth of social inequalities. Not a book for beginners, this is a clearly presented but complex examination of the historical interrelationships between culture, public policy, and economic development.

The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya. BY ANGELIQUE HAUGERUD. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 266 pp. $59.95.

This book is an exciting attempt to bring methods and concepts from contemporary anthropology to bear on African politics. Discarding the simplistic images of Kenya as an African success story that became a disaster under the autocratic leadership of Daniel arap Moi, the author analyzes continuity and change in Kenyan political culture as expressed in both public and private discourse and behavior. She explores ways in which the realities of power and tradition are shaped and challenged by the use of rhetoric in various media, including popular songs, plays, and especially the *baraza* (public meeting). At the microeconomic level, she downplays the assumptions of both development specialists, who attribute peasant prosperity where it exists to the adoption of progressive innovations, and class theorists, who see the structural features of an economy as the main determinant of who becomes rich or poor. Instead, from her extensive study of peasant producers in Embu, a central area of Kenya, she explains individual household fortunes by taking into account the subtle micropolitics of local relationships between patrons and clients.

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Letters to the Editor

J. Brian Atwood; Gerald Segal; Stephen John Stedman
Joshua Muravchik; Max Jakobson; and others

BAD TRANSITIONS

To the Editor:

As Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue, transition from autocratic to democratic government raises the likelihood of conflict with another state in the short run ("Democratization and War," May/June 1995). But the authors neglect the flip side: transition from democracy back to autocracy is equally dangerous. The problem is not democratization but change in unstable regimes. Moreover, a transition to democracy carries special dangers when the international system is composed almost entirely of autocracies, as it was until recently.

Our analysis—using methodology similar to Mansfield and Snyder's—shows clearly that transition in general is the culprit. States changing from autocracy to democracy did show an increased frequency of conflict several years later, but so equally did states changing from democracy to autocracy. (We cannot yet measure whether a state that has experienced great political change is therefore more aggressive or whether conflict arises because it is perceived as an easy victim for an aggressive neighbor.)

Since major political change raises the chance of a state's involvement in international violence, national and international policies should try to shorten the period of political consolidation and mitigate sources of conflict until the state is stable. Once a state becomes a stable democracy, its chance of engaging in violence with another stable democracy is vastly reduced.

JOHN ONEAL AND BRUCE RUSSETT
Political Science Departments, University of Alabama and Yale University

THE CONSCIENCE OF A NEOCON

To the Editor:

In his polemical review essay, John B. Judis, Washington correspondent for the "independent socialist" magazine *In These Times,* argues that the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev wanted to call off the Cold War in the early 1970s but was blocked from doing so by the doleful influence of American neoconservatives ("Trotskyism to Anachronism," July/August 1995). As a result, the Cold War was prolonged for 15 years until Ronald Reagan grasped the long-proffered Soviet olive branch, which somehow Jimmy Carter had missed.

Judis engages in the kind of smear that is called McCarthyism when it issues from the right. Judis claims that neoconservatism grew from two roots. One was Paul Nitze's alleged militarism, the other Trotskyism. He labels neoconservatives "heirs" of Trotsky and cites my advocacy

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of exporting democracy as a kind of inverted Trotskyism.

As proof of his hypothesis, he labels seven neoconservatives current or former Trotsykists: Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, Albert Wohlstetter, Penn Kemble, Carl Gershman, and me. This is sheer invention. Six never were. The seventh, Irving Kristol, was for a few months as a youngster.

As a final proof, Judis reveals that Eugene Rostow "was named after socialist Eugene Debs." This stuff belongs only in *In These Times*, where standards of discourse are different, where "Trotskyist" is a familiar epithet, and where the notion that Soviet peace efforts were thwarted by Trotskyist wreckers raises no eyebrows. What is it doing on your pages, where many readers will find the terms perplexing—not least those to whom they are applied?

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
Washington, D.C.

WHAT ABOUT CHINA?

To the Editor:

In their swingeing attack on the newly articulated American defense policy for the Asia-Pacific region, Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn score some clever points about the confused and confusing nature of U.S. policy toward Japan ("The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," July/August 1995).

The Pentagon's new strategy toward East Asia does suggest that Japan is unlikely to need or want a debate about its own foreign policy. But in their obsession with Japan, Johnson and Keehn miss a new aspect of American strategy that deserves applause: it can hardly be considered ossified (presumably from the Cold War) when it doesn't mention the former Soviet Union as a threat. But the strategy is still platitudinous and mealy-mouthed on the pivotal issue of the challenges to American interests. This is reinforced by the article by Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in the same issue ("The Case for Deep Engagement"). The easy task is to articulate American interests in an open, pluralist, and market-oriented East Asia. The much more difficult task is to identify who threatens those interests. China (and to a much lesser extent, North Korea) is the only non–status quo power in the region.

The epitome of mealy-mouthed strategy is the notion of "engagement." Nye's list of ways to engage China includes only a range of contacts similar to those America had with the former Soviet Union. Notably missing is a sense of how the United States should regard a less-cooperative China—one that seizes territory from ASEAN states (as in the Spratly Islands in January 1995), threatens Taiwan with force, breaks conventional arms agreements, blocks attempts to reach further agreement on nuclear arms control, and alone among the world's countries still targets the United States with nuclear weapons.

If the United States is going to continue to use the term engagement, then that word needs to be forcefully defined as tying China into the international system. China will have to be deterred, constrained, and even compelled not to do simply whatever it sees fit. Only the United States with its closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region can do it. Johnson, Keehn, and even Nye may be surprised when Japan has its foreign policy debate and decides it wants more help, not less, from the United States in dealing with China.

GERALD SEGAL
Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

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HEADHUNTING AT THE U.N.

To the Editor:

Brian Urquhart accuses Kurt Waldheim and me of "setting a disastrous precedent" by campaigning publicly for U.N. secretary-general in 1971 ("Selecting the World's CEO," May/June 1995). He believes that "individual campaigning should be barred." He also suggests that Waldheim's war record escaped notice because candidates were not properly vetted.

This is nonsense. All candidates—there were more than two—had publicly declared, so we were exposed to intense scrutiny by the officials of major nations. The Soviets knew everything about Waldheim. That is why they preferred him.

It is not possible to depoliticize the selection process. Well before the end of 1996, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali is due to retire, several candidates will enter the field. Nothing can stop them from campaigning openly or discreetly. The five permanent Security Council members will reach agreement by a process of elimination: each will veto the candidates their government, for whatever reason, considers objectionable.

By this route, the permanent members are likely to sink to the lowest common denominator. Fortunately, the secretary-general is not really "the world's CEO." The United Nations is only one of many international organizations that governments use to manage their relations.

In coming years the most important task of the secretary-general will be to persuade the United States to reengage in the United Nations. Without active American interest, the decline of the United Nations is bound to continue. The next secretary-general should be able to influence American opinion and convince Congress that serious U.N. reform is in the offing. This is not a job for a neutral diplomat. Only an experienced and strong-willed politician could succeed.

MAX JAKOBSON
Helsinki, Finland

To the Editor:

My three years as under secretary-general for political affairs at the United Nations (1989-1992) convinced me that the reforms Brian Urquhart advocated for selecting the secretary-general are right on target.

Beyond Urquhart's proposals, however, the single most important reform measure that could be taken by the secretariat is the creation of a deputy secretary-general. The list of demands on the secretary-general cited by Urquhart dramatizes the need for an across-the-board deputy, preferably one nominated by the secretary-general and approved by the General Assembly. The deputy secretary-general's time would be devoted to management and coordination with the specialized agencies, functions that unfortunately are overlooked by an overburdened secretary-general. At the same time the number of under secretaries could be reduced and their functions consolidated.

RONALD I. SPIERS
Former Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of State

NATIONAL SOCIALISM, SERB STYLE

To the Editor:

Warren Zimmermann's views on the breakup of the former Yugoslavia stem from his utterly negative attitude toward separatist nationalism ("The Last Ambassador," March/April 1995). The catastrophe's causes do not lie, as

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Zimmermann believes, in nationalism but in the national socialism and totalitarianism expressed by racist and militarist Serbs and in their "ethnic cleansing."

The region's recent conflicts are over the political and constitutional principles on which the post-communist Yugoslavia was to be based. Slovenia and Croatia sought federalism, human rights, multiple parties, and market economies. Simultaneously, however, Serbia and the leadership of the Yugoslav army (JNA) sought to negate these principles.

Contrary to Zimmermann's analysis, the nationalist and secessionist movements in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia were not the cause but the inevitable consequence of pan-Serbian national socialism. That movement threatened to undermine federal and democratic institutions, prevent multiparty elections, block private ownership, and oppress all non-Serbs.

The causes and motives of these wars are to be found in Serbia, the Serbs, and the JNA. Slobodan Milošević's national socialist movement, which came to power in 1986, wanted neither federalism nor democracy for Yugoslavia. Its goal was total Serbian domination. For the JNA, Croatian and Slovenian demands for democracy, a market economy, and federalism were the immediate reason for war or a coup. When the new political parties came to power in Slovenia and Croatia, Milošević and his national socialist movement were already prepared for their wars of aggression. As Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulić put it, "The war is not difficult to understand at all. There existed a Serbian political elite determined to start a war; it controlled the army; it controlled the media; and it had four years of systematic nationalist propaganda behind it. This is all it takes to start a war."

Given the implacably aggressive attitude of the "Greater Serbia" imperialists, the Croatian government tried to prevent aggression first by reducing the potential for ethnic conflict and then by proposing a confederation designed to transform the former Yugoslavia into a commonwealth of sovereign Slavic states. For various reasons, this proposal did not obtain the support of the former Yugoslav republics. The commonwealth proposal was also submitted to representatives of the Bush administration in September 1991, which instead favored unity for communist Yugoslavia, then led by the reformist government of Prime Minister Ante Marković. Unfortunately Marković was, like Zimmermann, less a tragic hero than a loser. As Yugoslavia crumbled, Marković sat quietly on in Belgrade until the last moment, when nobody even noticed his protest resignation.

SLAVEN LETICA
Former Principal Adviser to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman

A THOUSAND RWANDAS

To the Editor:

Stephen John Stedman rightly points out that there are no easy solutions to prevent or stop the internal and regional conflicts that have broken out since the end of the Cold War, and that the resources available for foreign aid and conflict prevention are declining ("Alchemy for a New World Order," May/June 1995). But despite the lack of simple solutions and scarcity of resources, something can be done. The human and financial costs of man-made disasters are neither acceptable nor inevitable.

Most of the conflicts besetting countries today are internal, but they both

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affect and are affected by conditions in neighboring countries. As a result of recent conflicts, 3.2 million refugees have fled Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia. An additional 4 million people are displaced within these countries. During 1994 and the first half of 1995, the United States spent more than $500 million on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

The relief costs of man-made emergencies now vastly outstrip those of natural disasters. But unlike natural disasters, conflicts seldom occur without warning. Economic and social conditions—widespread, deep, and inequitable poverty, rapid population growth, limited resources, growing numbers of youth with inadequate economic prospects, and environmental destruction—render countries vulnerable to breakdown and violence. In addition, arms left over from the Cold War make conflict more likely. In such societies a major shock can provoke an outburst of violence or be used as an excuse for premeditated conflict.

Building economically strong and equitable societies in which all citizens have a stake provides an important hedge against societal breakdown. Among the ingredients for stability are a balance between population growth and resources, healthy and educated citizens, economic opportunity, and resilient and responsive political systems. These are the fundamental elements of the sustainable development program of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Prevention works. Local conflict resolution in South Africa helped avert widespread violence during its transition to a fully democratic government last year. Collective action by nations in the Sahel since the late 1970s prevented recurring droughts from becoming famines. When the worst drought in 100 years struck southern Africa in 1991 and 1992, preemptive action and regional cooperation averted widespread death by starvation.

Stedman is correct that the declining resources available for foreign assistance—which now amount to less than one percent of the U.S. federal budget—cannot fix the problems of the world. However, development assistance addresses many of the key factors underlying potential conflict. USAID has reduced the number of objectives in its programs and now focuses on five mutually reinforcing strategic areas of development: population, health and nutrition; democracy and governance; economic growth; the environment; and humanitarian assistance. We have also reduced the number of countries that receive foreign assistance.

With the end of the Cold War, we are no longer compelled to prop up corrupt governments for strategic reasons. Hand in hand with efforts to foster sustainable development, we must condemn the abuse of human rights and the self-serving activities of authoritarian leaders or those who incite ethnic hatred.

In the transition phase following conflict, countries may begin to recover or descend into crisis again. That we have seen war and genocide in only a small number of nations in the post–Cold War era is not cause for complacency. One of the problems with preventive diplomacy is that one does not hear or see the results of those efforts as easily as one does the chaos so dramatically portrayed in the media. Nor have the true costs of conflict been analyzed until recently. To turn away

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from efforts to prevent future conflict in the world because our resources are limited, because the root causes of conflict are deep, or because the results of prevention do not make headlines is to abdicate U.S. leadership and risk international disorder.

J. BRIAN ATWOOD
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

WEIRD SCIENCE

To the Editor:

In his vituperative defense of preventive diplomacy, Michael S. Lund argues that social science is "pinning down the probable precipitants" of "ethnic warfare, genocide, and the breakdown of states" ("Underrating 'Preventive Diplomacy,'" July/August 1995). Lund suggests the following indicators: demonstrations, repressive measures, hate rhetoric, arms buildups, and separatist communities forming parallel institutions. He accuses me of "knee-jerk negativism" in my critical appraisal of preventive diplomacy ("Alchemy for a New World Order," May/June 1995).

His argument is wobbly. First, while the outcomes of ethnic warfare and state collapse may often have these precipitants, it is crucial to know how likely the precipitants are to trigger the outcomes. Since many countries score high without experiencing ethnic warfare or state collapse, social science is unfortunately a poor forecaster. Statistical indicators for violence are no substitute for human judgment. Social science will not provide clear prescriptions for policymakers during crises.

Second, assuming Lund's overall point is correct (that intervention is more effective at early stages when "disputes tend to be simple and singular rather than complex and multiple" and "disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized"), he still needs better indicators. The ones he cites are evidence of full-blown complex disputes and rigidly polarized and politically mobilized groups. According to Lund's own logic, these indicators do not provide warning early enough for preventive intervention to succeed.

My negativism about this new intellectual fad, hardly knee-jerk, is grounded in realism, which throughout the twentieth century has debunked utopians who ignore the importance of power, offer simplistic prescriptions, endorse social engineering, and privilege themselves from scrutiny by invoking morality and science.

STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN
Associate Professor of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

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

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

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

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
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

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

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